Chapter 6: Interpreting the criminal environment

1. Chapter 6: Interpreting the criminal environment

2. Target selection �I�ve been set a performance management plan. It is updated yearly.� (intelligence manager) �I make my own decisions. I target the worst offenders.� (analyst) Two New Zealand intelligence professionals, quoted from Ratcliffe, J.H. (2005) 'The effectiveness of police intelligence management: A New Zealand case study', Police Practice and Research, 6:5, pp. 435-451.

3. Cope�s seven key variables Nature of offence (the legal category of the crime) Location (space and place of crime) Time of offence Method of offence (modus operandi) Target details Victim characteristics Physical and social circumstances of the offence

4. ViCAP Violent Criminal Apprehension Program After ten years, it was found that less than 10 per cent of homicides were reported to ViCAP Original form had 189 questions

5. Threat assessments National agencies such as SOCA, CISC and Europol use unclassified annual threat assessments to raise public awareness Law-enforcement-sensitive versions used to inform law enforcement priorities and other relevant initiatives (legislation, regulation or policy)

6. Harm as a component of threat assessments Harm � the adverse consequences of criminal activity Metropolitan Police have four types: Social Negative physical, psychological or emotional consequences that cannot readily be expressed in cash terms (as in homicide and assault) Economic Negative effects on an individual, community, business, institution, government or country (in as theft, counterfeiting and fraud) Political Negative effects on the political stability of a community or institution (such as in corruption, loss of confidence in government or law enforcement) Indirect Secondary adverse consequences of criminal activities (such as environmental damage from clandestine drug labs)

7. Offender self-selection Offender self-selection may be a more ethical approach to offender targeting Existing criminal triggers are used to identify more serious offenders Offenders bring police attention on themselves

8. Self-selection example Traffic wardens in Huddersfield, Yorkshire compared cars illegally parked in disabled bays with nearby legally parked cars. Illegal cars were: nearly 10 times more likely to be of immediate police interest at least 10 times more likely to be owned by someone with a criminal record, and more likely to be driven by someone with a history of traffic violations See Chenery et al. 1999

9. Playing well with others Problems: Information sharing is a US priority after 9/11 but the organization of police departments militates against it Small agencies rarely have the resources to address wider concerns Memorandums of understanding are often convoluted and take time to organize and approve

10. Playing well with others Potential solutions: Informal networks spring up to work around bureaucratic hurdles Joint task forces allow access to data from various agencies Wide dissemination of products that are not case-sensitive can improve information sharing Liaison officers can overcome some problems

11. Intelligence requirements Structured mechanisms that can aid information collation, especially when analysts collaborate Strategic Intelligence Requirements Tactical Intelligence Requirements

12. Sheptycki�s organizational pathologies Digital divide - caused by incompatible information systems between agencies Linkage blindness - where crime series cross agency boundaries Noise - low-quality information volume exacerbated by increased sharing Intelligence overload - lack of analytical capacity in the crime intelligence system Intelligence gaps - caused by criminals operating in the spaces between police agencies either hierarchically or geographically Duplication - caused by separate agencies keeping the same information on isolated systems Institutional friction - between agencies with different missions, structures and methodologies Intelligence hoarding and information silos - caused by retention of information until it is most beneficial to the information-holder Defensive data concentration - concentration of resources in one area to address a short-term problem creates other organizational pathologies Occupational subcultures - both intra-agency as well as interagency

13. Sharing information � 2005 forum ideas Become intelligence-led Police chiefs should work closely with analysts Co-locate analysis and intelligence functions close to decision-makers Articulate the analytical vision within the police department Make the case for integrated analysis Create integrated reporting mechanisms Develop informal information exchange mechanisms Consciously collect feedback and respond to criticisms Create an analysis users group Get over the whole security issue Develop technology solutions but do not fixate on them Be realistic about what can be achieved in your department

14. Nine analytical techniques in the NIM Crime pattern analysis Network analysis Market profiles Demographic/social trend analysis Criminal business profiles Target profile analysis Operational intelligence assessment Risk analysis Results analysis

15. Strategic thinking Aims for a more �holistic� view of the criminal environment Uses techniques rarely taught in analysis classes Futures wheels Competing hypothesis Force-field analysis Morphological analysis Ishikawa diagrams PESTEL(O) SWOT analysis Delphi analysis Scenario generation (for descriptions and examples of these techniques, see Heldon 2004 and Quarmby 2004)

16. Futures work in crime analysis For future work within a strategic intelligence environment to succeed, there must be: An identifiable decision-making system to support; A will to think ahead in both the intelligence system and the decision system to be supported; A will to apply the results in both the intelligence system and the decision system to be supported Neil Quarmby (2004: 128-129)