Missile Defenses for Stability in Europe

1. Missile Defenses for Stability in Europe Baker Spring F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy The Heritage Foundation Vienna, Austria February 19, 2008

2. President Bush�s National Security Strategy � March 2006 �Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage.� Damage Limitation Strategy

3. President Bush�s National Policyon Ballistic Missile DefenseMay 20, 2003 �The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense.� �Building on previous missile defense work, over the past year and a half, the Defense Department has pursued a robust research, development, testing, and evaluation program designed to develop layered defenses capable of intercepting missiles of varying ranges in all phases of flight.� �Because the threats of the 21st Century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against these threats.�

4. Global, Layered Missile Defense System Global Scope Layered Defense Different Missile Ranges Different Basing Modes

5. Global Defenses U.S.-based Defenses for the Protection of U.S. Territory (e.g. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense in Alaska and California Defense of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad (e.g. Patriot PAC-3) Defense of U.S. Allies and Friends (e.g. Aegis-based defenses on ships)

6. Allied Cooperation (Examples) Great Britain (Fylingdales radar) Denmark (Thule radar) Germany (MEADS) Italy (MEADS) NATO (Defenses against shorter-range missiles) Israel (Arrow) Japan (Aegis systems)

7. NATO and Missile DefenseU.S. Department of State Fact SheetApril 16, 2007 �NATO has focused its missile defense development efforts on countering shorter-range threats.� �The United States and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a more a more effective defense for Europe.�

8. Components of the Global Missile Defense System Patriot PAC-3 Standard Missile-3 Standard Missile-2 Block IV Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Defense Support Program Satellites Upgraded Early Warning Radar Sea-Based X-Band Radar Aegis AN/SPY-1 Radar Cobra Dane Japan-based FBX-T Radar Patriot AN/MPQ-65 (PAC-3) Radar Global Command and Control Structure Future systems

9. European Sites Midcourse X-Band Radar in the Czech Republic Transportable Forward-Deployed X-Band Radar in Caspian Basin (For Analytical Purposes) 10 Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptors in Poland Protecting Europe and the U.S. Against Longer-Range Missiles

10. The Damage Limitation Strategy Protection Over Retaliation Reassuring U.S. Allies Reduce to an Absolute Minimum the Likelihood of an Attack on the U.S and Its Friends and Allies with Weapons of Mass Destruction Lessen the Incentives for Other States and Non-State Actors to Acquire Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and the Means to Deliver Them Limit the Impact of Attempted Attacks

11. The Damage Limitation Strategy and Stability:The Link to Missile Defense Target Driven Force Posture Offense-Defense Mix Timely Engagement Adaptive Force

12. Stability and the Nuclear Games Exercises Proliferated Environment (7-Player Game Design) Regional Settings (Global Option) Differing Levels of Vulnerability Diplomatic Options (Formal and Background) Force Posture Options (Offensive and Defensive) Disarmament Option (Not An Arms Control Exercise) Detailed Study on Nuclear Games Exercises is Available at www.heritage.org/upload/NuclearGames.pdf

13. Nuclear Games ExerciseTokyo, JapanAugust 9, 2006 Player Descriptions Are Derived from an AbstractSetting Based on East Asia Player A ~ North Korea Player B ~ South Korea Player C ~ China Player D ~ Japan Player E ~ Taiwan Player F ~ Russia Player G ~ The United States

14. Opening Moves North and South Korea both hedge their bets by shrouding readied weapons. Japan moves to disarm, but only after seeking defenses and protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The U.S., seeking to reassure its friends and protect its own position, readies its offensive force and fields defenses for itself. To realize its nonproliferation goals, the U.S. offers defenses and nuclear guarantees to other players that disarm.

15. North Korea SeeksLarger Power Sponsorship  North Korea proposes an alliance with China and Russia. While North Korea is rebuffed on the alliance offers, its relationship with China remains friendly.

16. Initial Adjustments China and Russia move to ready their offensive weapons. U.S. and Japan enter into an alliance. South Korea lifts its shroud and holsters, as it sees China and North Korea holster and obtains defenses from Player G. North Korea lifts its shroud and holsters on the basis of its confidence in its relationship with China.

17. Divergent Tracks Japan, Russia and the U.S. see North Korea as too unpredictable and move to isolate it by downgrading relations. South Korea and Taiwan, seeing Japan not adversely affected by its decision to disarm, disarm under the U.S. nonproliferation offer, while Taiwan even seeks non-hostile relations with China.

18. Russia Moves Toward the West Russia sees its security enhanced by joining the U.S. in seeking the disarmament of all the lesser powers and joins a great power condominium with the U.S. for that purpose. Simultaneously, Russia moves to improve relations with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

19. China Isolated China offers closer relations to Russia to break the great power condominium, but the effort fails. The U.S. and Russia enter a full-blown alliance and Russia obtains defenses. The U.S. and Russia later move together to threaten China over its refusal to disarm.

20. North Korea Refuses to Disarm; China Looks to Back Down North Korea refuses combined U.S./Russian demands that it disarm and faces an imminent threat of destruction at the hands of both. China moves to holster, but not disarm, and seeks non-hostile relations with Taiwan and improved relations with Japan in an effort to avoid being attacked. A combined U.S./Russian attack remains possible.

21. Lessons Learned The presence of the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains essential to stability (deterring North Korea and China) and a force against proliferation (through reassurance to allies). The ability and the willingness of the U.S. to provide defenses contribute to stability and nonproliferation goals (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan disarm).

22. Lessons Learned-Continued The U.S. finds nuclear-armed allies a risky proposition and will work to seek their disarmament through close security relationships that include nuclear guarantees. Both U.S. and Russia are tempted by a great power condominium to lessen the nuclear risks to themselves from the lesser powers.

23. Lessons Learned-Continued New nuclear powers are likely overestimating the value of nuclear weapons, (made evident by the North Korean equivalent player�s refusal to disarm despite an imminent threat of destruction). New nuclear powers do not have well developed doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons, which may simultaneously carry great risks for miscalculation and conflict and unexpected opportunities for disarmament (inherent volatility).

24. Lessons Learned-Continued It is possible for Japanto forgo nuclear weapons. The Japan equivalent player demonstrated that Japan can maintain its security without nuclear weapons in a proliferated setting (example to others). It required a strong security relationship with the U.S (maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance). It required an effective nuclear deterrent by the U.S. It required defenses.

25. A New Design of the Nuclear Games Exercise European/Middle East Regional Setting (Iran, Israel, Czech Republic, Poland, United Kingdom, United States) Partially Proliferated Environment (Two Players Lack Nuclear Arsenals) Initial Offensive Forces Differ (Nuclear Players) Initial Diplomatic Relations Differ

26. Conclusion Nuclear Games Validates the Damage Limitation Strategy The Need to Protect and Defend Over Retaliation Multilateralizing Mutually Assured Destruction Will Lead to Instability Policymakers Can Use the Nuclear Games Tool to Familiarize Themselves with the Requirements for Stability in a Multi-polar Environment