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The Political Economy of Protection 317L8

The Political Economy of Protection 317L8. The study of political forces that influence trade policies. Why protection?. Generally economists think that free trade is best. Static and dynamic arguments.

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The Political Economy of Protection 317L8

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  1. The Political Economy of Protection 317L8 The study of political forces that influence trade policies

  2. Why protection? • Generally economists think that free trade is best. Static and dynamic arguments. • But, as we saw last week they have provided several arguments for protection in certain circumstances • E.g Terms of Trade and Strategic

  3. The general case for government intervention • Market failure • T.oT • Existence of Monopoly or Oligopoly • Internal and external economies of scale

  4. Economists remain sceptical • The assumptions are extreme • Risks of retaliation • International treaty obligations

  5. Despite these factors governments still grant protection. Why? • Public choice theory(Mancur Olsen, 1965) • Demands for protection • Labour,skilled,unskilled(but also consumers and users) • Capital • Land and owners of natural resources (e.g.oil) • Workers and owners in industries under threat Operate through: • Organised pressure groups, Media etc.

  6. Mixed motives • Consumers are also often producers,or their partners are • As consumers they want low prices and therefore cheap imports • But if their income comes from an industry under threat they are likely to lobby for protection.

  7. Trading partners • Trading partners would be expected to strongly oppose protection (But see Bangladesh and ending of MFA) • Case of VERs in earlier years.

  8. Governments • They too are subject to pressures from different directions. • Promote income and growth long term objective • Be a good member of WTO etc. • But domestic pressures

  9. Supply of Protection Policy makers want to satisfy interest groups, get financial support and get elected, but, social welfare (conflict) • How they act is conditioned by the electoral system, national finance, and international treaty obligations • Whether protection is granted depends on all these factors.

  10. Conditions favouring protection • Rising unemployment or trade deficits e.g US-Japan, or US-China. • Proximity of elections • Against: • Constraints: Domestic user industries, domestic exporters WTO or Trade Treaty Rules (Getting round the rules)

  11. Rent seeking and DUP • Rent seeking: attempts to gain tariff or quota protection to increase profits. Involves lobbying, currying favours or bribery • Directly Unproductive Activities: the above plus other means such as cheating customs and smuggling. • All of the above divert resources from production and cost cutting.(Eg. 7% of GDP for India, 15% for Turkey) (Maybe exaggerated?)

  12. Remedies • Assuming economists want to promote economic welfare what should they recommend in the context of political biases in favour of protection? • Strengthen rules of WTO • Insist on consumer representation on all bodies dealing with trade policy • Transparency and objectivity.

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