1 / 30

Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994

Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. PH201 Spring 2011 Paul Bacon. Republic of Rwanda Historical, Political and Ethnic Background. Era of Belgium's colonial rule after WWI.

scalhoun
Download Presentation

Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 PH201 Spring 2011 Paul Bacon

  2. Republic of RwandaHistorical, Political and Ethnic Background

  3. Era of Belgium's colonial rule after WWI • The Tutsi minority formed the traditional political and economic elite. • Despite the power difference, Hutu and Tutsi intermarried and coexisted peacefully. • Belgium's colonial administration designated Tutsis as 'civilized' and privileged them as the ruling group, while Hutus were labeled as an inferior race.

  4. Independence and the rise of the Hutus • 1959: Hutus rebel against Tutsis →violent conflicts. • 1961: Belgian forces withdraw, resulting in the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy. • 1962: Rwanda becomes independent after being under UN trusteeship. • Ruled by the Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation Parhehuith, led by Grégoire Kayibanda

  5. Habyarimana and the rule of the MNRD • 1973: Major General Juvenal • Habyarimana came to power in a coup. • Habyarimana's party, Mouvement  • National pour la Révolution et le • Développement (MNRD), • had a doctrine of Hutu superiority. • However: • In 1990, the RPF, a group of exiled Tutsis supported by Uganda, invaded Rwanda and a civil war began. • International pressure to democratize on the Rwandan Government. In 1991, a new multi-party constitution came into force. 

  6. The Arusha Peace Agreement • 1992: Habyarimana entered into negotiations with the RPF • 1993: Habyarimana signed a peace agreement in Arusha,Tanzania. Pressure from France, Belgium, USA, African • states, OAU and UN.  The MNRD extremists' response: • Coalition pour la Défense de la Republique (CDR) • creates organizational machinery of genocide  • Radio Television Libre Mille Collines (RTLM)  • broadcasts incitements to kill Tutsi. • The power-sharing agreement with the RPF provided equal representation between new Tutsi-friendly parties and the former ruling party.

  7. What did the UN do?

  8. Actions taken by the UN October 5, 1993 • Resolution 872 - UNAMIR • Phase 1: • “To monitor the implementation • of the ceasefire and the • movement to a transitional • Government”. 1458 troops. • Phase 2: “To oversee the • process of demobilization and • the creation of a new integrated • Army”. 2548 troops.

  9. Actions taken by the UN DPKO insists that Dallaire should only act when permitted by Rwandan government. Resolution 909 - Withdrawal of UNAMIR    Under strong US pressure. To be withdrawn     in 6 weeks. Dallaire ordered to prepare for withdrawal Jan 11, 1994 April 5, 1994 April 10, 1994 •   Meanwhile:     • April 6: Habyarimana's plane •      is shot down, the identities of • those responsible remains unknown. • April 7: Government soldiers  •      murder Hutu Prime Minister, Ms •      Uwilingiyimana and the 10 Belgium peacekeepers •      protecting her - Belgians withdraw.

  10. April 20, 1994 “Special Report of the Secretary General on UNAMIR” 3 Options:   A massive deployment of troops and a change of mandate Scale down UNAMIR to a force size of around 270, mandate to negotiate with the parties and assist with humanitarian relief efforts Complete withdrawal of UNAMIR Actions taken by the UN • Meanwhile: • Dallaire continues cabling to warn about killings with an ‘ethnic motivation’ and noting that UNAMIR camps had become safe havens.

  11. Night of April 20 SG's military adviser Baril's briefing to non-P members on the ‘terrible conditions under which the peacekeepers were operating’. Actions taken by the UN April 21, 1994 Resolution 912 - UNAMIR reduction to 270Result: Many civilians under their protection were immediately killed.

  12. 28/29 April 1994 Czech Ambassador Kovanda and Council President Keating appeal to the SC to use the term ‘genocide’ - but this request is rejected. Actions taken by the UN

  13. May 13, 1994 “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation of Rwanda”  Recommended increase of troops to 5,500 and the creation of safe havens. Actions taken by the UN May 17, 1994 Resolution 918 - Increase numbers to 5,500, UNAMIR II     Mandate to provide humanitarian assistance

  14. June 8, 1994 Resolution 925 - Deployment of 5,500 troops Actions taken by the UN June 21, 1994 Resolution 929 - Opération Turquoise • July 1994: • The RPF captures Kigali. The Hutu government flees to Zaire (now DRC), followed by a tide of refugees. • The French end their mission and are replaced by Ethiopian U.N. troops. • The RPF declares a ceasefire and •       sets up an interim government of •       national unity in Kigali.

  15. What should the UN have done? 

  16. The UN should have... • Given a mandate to protect human rights,  • Sent more troops and resources,  • Explicitly used the term ‘genocide’ • Referred to the 1948 Genocide Convention and drafted a resolution upon it,  • Considered genocide as a threat to international peace and security of Article 39 and triggered a Chapter VII mandate.

  17. Role of other key international actors

  18. The US and Clinton Administration • The Somalia incident turned US against support of UN operations.  • The US insisted on the Arusha Agreement and kept costs low, when military equipment was needed.  • Mobilized against naming Rwanda a genocide. • May 1994: Agreement on Presidential • Decision Directive (PDD25), putting • strict limits to US participation in future • UN PKOs. As a permanent member of UNSC, US hindered UN from intervening effectively in Rwanda.

  19. France • Very close political and economiclinks with the Habyarimana government. • Military support, training the Presidential Guard and militias • Therefore, a realistic candidate for leading an intervention • Also capability of rapid reaction force in the region - could have quickly supported UNAMIR. Their long awaited intervention, Opération Turquoise, was too late and militarily inefficient to be justified as an carried out solely to save human lives.

  20. Others.. • African States • In the absence of Western intervention, the only alternative was African states.  • Troops offered to UNAMIRII, but dependent on UN and the West for financing military equipment.  • Belgium • With their departure after the killing of the Prime Minister and their soldiers, UNAMIR’s strength was significantly depleted.  • UK • Strongly opposed a UN intervention and usage of the term ‘genocide’.  • Human Rights groups and NGOs • Reported and verified the genocidal nature of the killings through communications with the UNSC or briefing UN individuals. 

  21. The Media • The killings began to attract serious media coverage • Journalists covering the historic election in South Africa visited Rwanda on the way home • New York Times did invoke the language of ‘genocide’, but  strongly opposed US intervention • Claimed there were no clear political and military objectives. • In the end, media coverage finally galvanized the UN into action.

  22. [UNAMIR I & II] How were humanitarian justifications for non-action explicitly expressed?[Opération Turquoise]How were humanitarian justifications for actionexplicitly expressed?

  23. [UNAMIR I & II] Justifications for non-action • [USA in SC informal consultations] Congress • would not pay for any new operations and • that the UN was in danger of becoming overcommitted.  • [DPKO] “Not Somalia again…” The organization would suffer a possible fatal blow to its credibility. • No legal precedent to use Chapter VII Article 39 to argue that the risk of genocide constituted a threat to international peace and security. • [Secretariat] Naming the violence as a civil war and not a genocide legitimated their inaction • [4/20 Hannay in SC informal consultations] “Think back to Somalia and think about what you would ask these troops to do”.

  24. [UNAMIR I & II]Justifications for non-action • [Michael Barnett] Any more peacekeeping fatalities .. would undoubtedly mean more criticism and fewer resources for the UN • [Clinton Administration] Haunted by Somalia and the 18 lost soldiers • [Hannay] “were the Council to use the word ‘genocide’, it would become a laughing stock. Having failed to find any troops for intervention, the SC would lack all credibility if it was then to name Rwanda a genocide”. • [US Ambassador Albright in the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee] ‘folly’ for the USA to venture too quickly into this African maelstrom. Essential for the UN to not overreach in Rwanda and jeopardize its future credibility.

  25. [Opération Turquoise]Justifications for action • [French Ministers] “To save lives” • [French Foreign Minister Alain JUPPE wrote in Liberation 6/16] “France had a real duty to intervene in Rwanda .. to put an end to the massacres and protect the populations threatened with extermination”.

  26. [Opération Turquoise] Justifications for action • The real purpose of France’s ‘humanitarian’ mission was to save its client government that was losing the war with RPF. • To 'prop up‘ a failing French ally. • French policy makers were determined to stop the triumph of the 'Anglophones' in what they viewed as their part of Africa. • The mission was to maintain what was left of French influence. • France was no paper tiger and it could project power rapidly on the continent.

  27. Responsibility to Protect • Remember that the responsibility to protect is further divided into three: • The responsibility to prevent. • The responsibility to react. • The responsibility to rebuild. • People often, understandably, think of Rwanda as a case of a failure to react. This is true. • However, less obviously, Rwanda is also an example of the failure of the responsibility to prevent.

  28. Key decision points • The Arusha Accords, and the design of the deal(failure of prevention). • The initial size of the peacekeeping force (failure of prevention). • The failure to heed Dallaire’s warning, based on credible intelligence, that the Hutu were planning a genocide (failure of reaction). • The failure to respond with a significant increase in troop numbers two weeks into the genocide, when several hundred thousand lives could still have been saved (failure of reaction). • The decision to allow the French to secure a cordon through which the Hutu genocidaires could escape to the DRC.

  29. - Between April and June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of 100 days. "The whole world failed Rwanda…" Words attributed to UN staff members by Philip Gourevitch- in Annals of Diplomacy: The Genocide Fax, New Yorker, 11 May 1998.

More Related