Effective Cipher Techniques in Computer Security

1. Cipher Techniques Chapter 12 Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

2. Overview • Problems • What can go wrong if you naively use ciphers • Cipher types • Stream or block ciphers? • Networks • Link vs end-to-end use • Examples • Privacy-Enhanced Electronic Mail (PEM) • Secure Socket Layer (SSL) • Security at the Network Layer (IPsec) Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

3. Problems • Using cipher requires knowledge of environment, and threats in the environment, in which cipher will be used • Is the set of possible messages small? • Can an active wiretapper rearrange or change parts of the message? • Do the messages exhibit regularities that remain after encipherment? • Can the components of the message be misinterpreted? Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

4. Attack #1: Precomputation • Set of possible messages M small • Public key cipher f used • Idea: precompute set of possible ciphertexts f(M), build table (m, f(m)) • When ciphertext f(m) appears, use table to find m • Also called forward searches Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

5. Example • Cathy knows Alice will send Bob one of two messages: enciphered BUY, or enciphered SELL • Using public key eBob, Cathy precomputes m1 = { BUY } eBob, m2 = { SELL } eBob • Cathy sees Alice send Bob m2 • Cathy knows Alice sent SELL Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

6. May Not Be Obvious • Digitized sound • Seems like far too many possible plaintexts, aa initial calculations suggest 232 such plaintexts • Analysis of redundancy in human speech reduced this to about 100,000 (≈ 217), small enough for precomputation attacks Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

7. Misordered Blocks • Alice sends Bob message • nBob = 262631, eBob = 45539, dBob = 235457 • Message is TOMNOTANN (191412 131419 001313) • Enciphered message is 193459 029062 081227 • Eve intercepts it, rearranges blocks • Now enciphered message is 081227 029062 193459 • Bob gets enciphered message, deciphers it • He sees ANNNOTTOM, opposite of what Alice sent Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

8. Solution • Digitally signing each block won’t stop this attack • Two approaches: • Cryptographically hash the entire message and sign it • Place sequence numbers in each block of message, so recipient can tell intended order; then sign each block Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

9. Statistical Regularities • If plaintext repeats, ciphertext may too • Example using AES-128: • Input image: • corresponding output image: • Note you can still make out the words • Fix: cascade blocks together (chaining) More details later Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

10. Type Flaw Attacks • Assume components of messages in protocol have particular meaning • Example: Otway-Rees: n || Alice || Bob || { r1 || n || Alice || Bob } kA Bob Alice n || Alice || Bob || { r1 || n || Alice || Bob } kA|| { r2 || n || Alice || Bob } kB Bob Cathy n || { r1 || ks } kA || { r2 || ks } kB Bob Cathy n || { r1 || ks } kA Bob Alice Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

11. The Attack • Ichabod intercepts message from Bob to Cathy in step 2 • Ichabod replays this message, sending it to Bob • Slight modification: he deletes the cleartext names • Bob expectsn || { r1 || ks } kA || { r2 || ks } kB • Bob getsn || { r1 || n || Alice || Bob } kA|| { r2 || n || Alice || Bob } kB • So Bob sees n || Alice || Bob as the session key — and Ichabod knows this • When Alice gets her part, she makes the same assumption • Now Ichabod can read their encrypted traffic Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

12. Solution • Tag components of cryptographic messages with information about what the component is • But the tags themselves may be confused with data … Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

13. What These Mean • Use of strong cryptosystems, well-chosen (or random) keys not enough to be secure • Other factors: • Protocols directing use of cryptosystems • Ancillary information added by protocols • Implementation (not discussed here) • Maintenance and operation (not discussed here) Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

14. Stream, Block Ciphers • E encipherment function • Ek(b) encipherment of message b with key k • In what follows, m = b1b2 …, each bi of fixed length • Block cipher • Ek(m) = Ek(b1)Ek(b2) … • Stream cipher • k = k1k2 … • Ek(m) = Ek1(b1)Ek2(b2) … • If k1k2 … repeats itself, cipher is periodic and the kength of its period is one cycle of k1k2 … Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

15. Example • AES-128 • bi = 128 bits, k = 128 bits • Each bi enciphered separately using k • Block cipher Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

16. Stream Ciphers • Often (try to) implement one-time pad by xor’ing each bit of key with one bit of message • Example: m = 00101 k = 10010 c = 10111 • But how to generate a good key? Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

17. Synchronous Stream Ciphers • n-stage Linear Feedback Shift Register: consists of • n bit register r = r0…rn–1 • n bit tap sequence t = t0…tn–1 • Use: • Use rn–1 as key bit • Compute x = r0t0 … rn–1tn–1 • Shift r one bit to right, dropping rn–1, x becomes r0 Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

18. Operation … … rn–1  mi r0 … riith bit of register tiith bit of tap sequence miith bit of message ciith bit of ciphertext ci … ri´ = ri–1, 0 < i ≤ n rn–1´ r0´ r0t0 + … + rn–1tn–1 Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

19. Example • 4-stage LFSR; t = 1001 rkinew bit computation new r 0010 0 01001001 = 0 0001 0001 1 01000011 = 1 1000 1000 0 11000001 = 1 1100 1100 0 11100001 = 1 1110 1110 0 11101001 = 1 1111 1111 1 11101011 = 0 0111 • 0 0 11101011 = 1 1011 • Key sequence has period of 15 (010001111010110) Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

20. NLFSR • n-stage Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register: consists of • n bit register r = r0…rn–1 • Use rn–1 as key bit • Compute x = f(r0, …, rn–1); f is any function • Shift r one bit to right, dropping rn–1, x becomes r0 Note same operation as LFSR but more general bit replacement function Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

21. Example • 4-stage NLFSR; f(r0, r1, r2, r3) = (r0& r2) | r3 rkinew bit computation new r 1100 0 (1 & 0) | 0 = 0 0110 0110 0 (0 & 1) | 0 = 0 0011 0011 1 (0 & 1) | 1 = 1 1001 1001 1 (1 & 0) | 1 = 1 1100 1100 0 (1 & 0) | 0 = 0 0110 0110 0 (0 & 1) | 0 = 0 0011 0011 1 (0 & 1) | 1 = 1 1001 • Key sequence has period of 4 (0011) Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

22. Eliminating Linearity • NLFSRs not common • No body of theory about how to design them to have long period • Alternate approach: output feedback mode • For E encipherment function, k key, r register: • Compute r= Ek(r); key bit is rightmost bit of r • Set r to r and iterate, repeatedly enciphering register and extracting key bits, until message enciphered • Variant: use a counter that is incremented for each encipherment rather than a register • Take rightmost bit of Ek(i), where i is number of encipherment Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

23. Self-Synchronous Stream Cipher • Take key from message itself (autokey) • Example: Vigenère, key drawn from plaintext • keyXTHEBOYHASTHEBA • plaintextTHEBOYHASTHEBAG • ciphertextQALFPNFHSLALFCT • Problem: • Statistical regularities in plaintext show in key • Once you get any part of the message, you can decipher more Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

24. Another Example • Take key from ciphertext (autokey) • Example: Vigenère, key drawn from ciphertext • keyXQXBCQOVVNGNRTT • plaintextTHEBOYHASTHEBAG • ciphertextQXBCQOVVNGNRTTM • Problem: • Attacker gets key along with ciphertext, so deciphering is trivial Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

25. Variant • Cipher feedback mode: 1 bit of ciphertext fed into n bit register • Self-healing property: if ciphertext bit received incorrectly, it and next n bits decipher incorrectly; but after that, the ciphertext bits decipher correctly • Need to know k, E to decipher ciphertext k Ek(r) mi r … E …  ci Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

26. Block Ciphers • Encipher, decipher multiple bits at once • Each block enciphered independently • Problem: identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks • Plaintext image: • Ciphertext image: Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

27. Solutions • Insert information about block’s position into the plaintext block, then encipher • Cipher block chaining: • Exclusive-or current plaintext block with previous ciphertext block: • c0 = Ek(m0 I) • ci = Ek(mici–1) for i > 0 where I is the initialization vector • Example encipherment of image on previous slide: Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

28. Multiple Encryption • Double encipherment: c = Ek(Ek(m)) • Effective key length is 2n, if k, k are length n • Problem: breaking it requires 2n+1 encryptions, not 22n encryptions • Triple encipherment: • EDE (Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt) mode: c = Ek(Dk(Ek(m)) • Problem: chosen plaintext attack takes O(2n) time using 2n ciphertexts • Triple encryption mode: c =Ek(Ek(Ek(m)) • Best attack (p chosen plaintexts) requires O(2n+1p + 2h+b+1/p) time, O(2n/p) memory Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

29. Authenticated Encryption • Transforms message providing confidentiality, integrity, authentication simultaneously • May be associated data that is not to be encrypted • Called Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) • Two examples: • Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) • Galois Counter Mode (GCM) • message is part to be encrypted; associated data is part not to be encrypted • Both are authenticated and integrity-checked; if omitted, treat as having length 0 Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

30. Counter with CBC-MAC Mode (CCM) • Defined for block ciphers with block size 1287 (like AES) • Parameters: • LA size of authentication field (may be 4,6,8,10,12,14,16 octets) • LM size of message length (may take up between 2 and 8 octets) • nonce of 15 – LM octets • Notation: k key, n nonce, M message, A associated data • Three phases Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

31. CCM Phase 1 • Compute authentication field T • Prepend set of blocks Bi to message; first block B0 has message info: • Octet 0 has flags • Bits 0-2: LM – 1 • Bits 3-5: (LA – 2) / 2 • Bit 6: 1 if there is associated data, 0 otherwise • Bit 7: reserved, set to 0 • Octets 1 . . . 15 – LM: nonce • Octets 16 – LM . . . 15: length of message in octets Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

32. CCM Phase 1 • Next octets contain information about length LA: • 0 < LA < 216 – 28: first 2 octets contain LA • 216 – 28 ≤ LA < 232: first 2 octets 0xff, 0xfe, next 4 octets contain LA • 232 ≤ LA < 264: first 2 octets both 0xff, next 6 octets contain LA • Block B0, these octets prepended to associated data A; split this into 16-octet blocks, with 0 padding if needed • Append message, split into 16-octet blocks, with 0 padding if needed • This gives B0 . . . Bm Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

33. CCM Phase 1 • Compute CBC-MAC of B0 . . . Bm x1 = Ek(B0) xi+1 = Ek(xi ⊕ Bi) for i = 1, . . ., m • Authentication field T is first LA blocks of xm+1 Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

34. CCM Phase 2 • This enciphers the message using counter mode • Ai block with the following: • Octet 0 contains flags • Bits 0-2: contains LM – 1 • Bits 3-7: set to 0 • Octets 1 . . . 15 – LM: contain nonce • Octets 16 – LM . . . 15: contain ith counter’s value • Key blocks Si = Ek(Ai) Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

35. CCM Phases 2 and 3 Phase 2: • Encrypt message with blocks M1 . . . Mz: for i = 1, . . . , z, Ci = Mi ⊕ Si • Let sA be first LA bytes of S0 • Compute authentication value U = T ⊕ sA Phase 3: • Sender constructs C = C1 . . . Cz and sends C || U Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

36. CCM Decryption • Decryption and validation: simply reverse process • Important requirement: if validation fails, recipient must only reveal that computed T is incorrect • Must not reveal the incorrect value, or any part of decrypted message Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

37. Galois Counter Mode (GCM) • Can be implemented efficiently in hardware • If encrypted, authenticated message is changed, new authentication value can be computed with cost proportional to number of changed bits • Allows nonce (initialization vector) of any length • Parameters • nonce IV up to 264 bits; 96 bits recommended for efficiency reasons • message M up to 239 – 28 bits long; ciphertext C same length • associated data A up to 264 bits long Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

38. GCM Notation • Authentication value T is t bits long • M = M0 . . . Mn, each block 128 bits long • Mn may not be complete block; call its length u bits • C = C0 . . . Cn, each block 128 bits long; C is LC bits long • Number of bits in C is the same as number of bits in M • A = A0 . . . Am, each block 128 bits long; A is LA bits long • Am may not be complete block; call its length v bits • 0x, 1y mean x bits of 0 and y bits of 1, respectively Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

39. Multiplication in GF(2128) /* multiply X and Y to produce Z in GF (2128 ) */ functionGFmultiply(X, Y: integer ) begin Z := 0 V := X; fori := 0 to 127 do begin if  Yi  = 1 then Z := Z ⊕ V; V = rightshift(V, 1); if V127 = 1 then V := V ⊕ R; end return Z; end • This is written Z = X ∙ Y • Yi isith leftmost bit of Y, so Y127 is the rightmost bit of Y • rightshift(V, 1) means to shift V right 1 bit, and bring in 0 from the left • R is bits 11100001 followed by 120 0 bits Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

40. GCM Hash Function GHASH(H, A, C) computed as follows: • X0 = 0 • for i = 1, . . ., m–1, Xi = (Xi–1 ⊕ Ai) ∙ H • Xm = (Xm–1 ⊕ Am) ∙ H • Am is right-padded with 0s if not a complete block • for i = m+1, . . ., m+n–1, Xi = (Xi–1 ⊕ Ci) ∙ H • Xm+n = (Xm+n–1 ⊕ Cn) ∙ H • Cn is right-padded with 0s if not a complete block • Xm+n+1 = (Xm+n ⊕ (LA|| LC)) ∙ H • LA, LC left-padded with 0 bits to form 64 bits each Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

41. GCM Authenticated Encryption This computes C and T: • H = Ek(0128) • If IV is 96 bits, Y0 = IV || 0311; otherwise, Y0 = GHASH(H, 𝜈, IV) • 𝜈 empty string • for i = 1, . . . n, Ii = Ii-1 + 1 mod 232; set Yi = Li-1 || Ii • Ii-1 right part of Yi-1; treat it as unsigned 32 bit integer; Li-1 left part of Yi-1 • for i = 1, . . . n–1, Ci = Mi + Ek(Yi) • Cn = Mn + MSBu(Ek(Yn)) • MSBu(X) is u most significant (leftmost) bits of X • T = MSBt(GHASH(H, A, C) + Ek(Y0)) Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

42. GCM Transmission and Decryption • Send C, T • To verify, perform steps 1, 2, 6, 3, 4, 5 • When authentication value is computed, compare to sent value • Note this is done before decrypting the message • If they do not match, return failure and discard messages Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

43. GCM Analysis Strength depends on certain properties • If IV (nonce) reused, part of H can be obtained • If length of authentication value too short, forgeries can occur and from that, H can be determined (enabling undetectable forgeries) • Under study is whether particular values of H make forging messages easier • Restricting length of IV to 96 bits produces a stronger AEAD cipher than when the length is not restricted Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

44. Networks and Cryptography • ISO/OSI model • Conceptually, each host communicates with peer at each layer Application Application Presentation Presentation Session Session Transport Transport Network Network Network Data Link Data Link Data Link Physical Physical Physical Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

45. Link and End-to-End Protocols Link Protocol End-to-End (or E2E) Protocol Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

46. Encryption • Link encryption • Each host enciphers message so host at “next hop” can read it • Message can be read at intermediate hosts • End-to-end encryption • Host enciphers message so host at other end of communication can read it • Message cannot be read at intermediate hosts Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

47. Examples • SSH protocol • Messages between client, server are enciphered, and encipherment, decipherment occur only at these hosts • End-to-end protocol • PPP Encryption Control Protocol • Host gets message, deciphers it • Figures out where to forward it • Enciphers it in appropriate key and forwards it • Link protocol Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

48. Cryptographic Considerations • Link encryption • Each host shares key with neighbor • Can be set on per-host or per-host-pair basis • Windsor, stripe, seaview each have own keys • One key for (windsor, stripe); one for (stripe, seaview); one for (windsor, seaview) • End-to-end • Each host shares key with destination • Can be set on per-host or per-host-pair basis • Message cannot be read at intermediate nodes Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

49. Traffic Analysis • Link encryption • Can protect headers of packets • Possible to hide source and destination • Note: may be able to deduce this from traffic flows • End-to-end encryption • Cannot hide packet headers • Intermediate nodes need to route packet • Attacker can read source, destination Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition

50. Example Protocols • Securing Electronic Mail (OpenPGP, PEM) • Applications layer protocol • Start with PEM as goals, design described in detail; then lool at OpenPGP • Securing Instant Messaging (Signal) • Applications layer protocol • Secure Socket Layer (TLS) • Transport layer protocol • IP Security (IPSec) • Network layer protocol Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd Edition