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Catherine H. Gebotys 1 , Robert J. Gebotys 2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,

Secure Elliptic Curve Implementations : An Analysis of Resistance to Power-Attacks in a DSP Processor. Catherine H. Gebotys 1 , Robert J. Gebotys 2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo 1 , Wilfrid Laurier University 2 , Waterloo, Ontario Canada

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Catherine H. Gebotys 1 , Robert J. Gebotys 2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,

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  1. Secure Elliptic Curve Implementations : An Analysis of Resistance to Power-Attacks in a DSP Processor Catherine H. Gebotys1, Robert J. Gebotys2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo1, Wilfrid Laurier University2, Waterloo, Ontario Canada cgebotys@optimal.vlsi.uwaterloo.ca

  2. Outline • Motivation • Previous Research • Methodology and ISI index • Experimental Results • Conclusions

  3. Motivation • Wireless Communications • Highly Cost Sensitive • Low Energy Dissipation • High Security (data, audio, video) • Secure against Power-Attacks • Security At all layers

  4. Previous Research • Power / EM / Timing Attacks • SPA, DPA, [Kocher 96,99] • SW-DPA [Clavier& 00], IPA [Fahn& 99], nthDPA [Messerges 00],… • DPA extension for ECC [Coron 99] • DSP processors [Dusse 90][Itoh 99]

  5. Problem Definition • Methodology for Design of Secure Embedded Processors • Secure against power-attacks • Energy efficient • Throughput constraints

  6. Methodology • Point Doubling, Adding • Timing and Power Traces identical through adding redundant operations • Point Multiplication • Timing and Power Traces identical through looping and switching

  7. Experimental Results • Elliptic Curve Cryptography • Weierstrass (projective coordinates) • Jacobi form of curve • 192-bit prime fields • DSP processor core at 100MHz

  8. Research Setup

  9. Star*core Architecture HIGHBW POWERFUL

  10. Cycle Counts

  11. SUM 2hs = h ^2 om = j ^2al = th * hs __th=y2<<3la = h * hsth = la * ix3 = om - al___be=al + omz3 = ga * h___al=hs<<1___be=z3<<1___om=be+z3___ga=hs<<2la = hs * g___al=la<<1___be=om*omom = la –x3___ga=om-alal = om * jy3 = al - th DOUBLE b1 = y ^2 e1 = z ^2b2 = b1 * b1 b = b2<<3__z2=y2 * x2z31 = y * ze2 = x - e1e3 = x + e1e = e2 * e3z12 = z31<<1c1 = e<<1c = c1 + ef1 = b1<<2a = f1 * xf3 = a<<1d1 = c * cx12 = d1 - f3y31 = a - x3y32 = y31 * cy12 = y32 - b SUM 1z2s = z2 ^2 z1s = z1 ^2z2c = z2s * z2 __al=y2<<3f = z1s * x2g = z2s * x1___th=x1-z1s ___ga=x1+z1sz1c  =  z1s * z1___om=g<<1___ga=z1c<<1th = f + g___al=z2s<<2ga = z1 * z2___la=ga<<1i = y1 * z2c___al=i-lah = f - gom = y2 * z1cj = om - i

  12. Power Traces PA-resistant ECC Code Original ECC Code

  13. Power Traces – timing shifts

  14. (1) Implementation Security Index Incorporates Variance into Difference of Means

  15. ISIS,D(t)-1 vs DPA

  16. Sum–Double Power Traces

  17. ISIDS,SD(t)-1 vs DPA

  18. Memory Stalls : Power

  19. Comparison to SW-DPA

  20. Jacobi Form of Curve

  21. ISIS,D(t)-1 : Jacobi Curve

  22. Energy – Performance Comparison

  23. Conclusions • Security against Power-Attack • ISI Metric for software development • ISI : Variances plus Difference of Means • Timing Shifts , Parallelism • Complex Processor Cores

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