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Intrusion Detection System WSN

Intrusion Detection System WSN. Tamer AbuHmed. Topics. IDS Challenges in WSN SPINS : Security Protocol for Sensor Network Efficient anonymity schemes for clustered wireless sensor networks. Placement Problem. Signature Update. IDS Challenges in WSN. Authentication.

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Intrusion Detection System WSN

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  1. Intrusion Detection SystemWSN Tamer AbuHmed Information Security Research Laboratory http://seclab.inha.ac.kr/

  2. Topics • IDS Challenges in WSN • SPINS: Security Protocol for Sensor Network • Efficient anonymity schemes for clustered wireless sensor networks. • Placement Problem. • Signature Update.

  3. IDS Challenges in WSN • Authentication. • Anonymity(prevent compromising). • Node placement. • Signature Update. • SPINS: Security Protocol for Sensor Network • Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, JD,Vector Wen, and Davide Culler • Springer 2002

  4. Introduction • Symmetric techniques • The secret keys are pre-distributed among sensors before their deployment. • Due to the limitation on memory, symmetric key techniques are not able to achieve both a perfect connectivity and a perfect resilience for large-scale sensor networks. • Public key cryptography • eliminate the connectivity and resilience problems. • Common criticism: computational complexity and communication overhead. • ECC signature verification: 1.62s (160-bit Atmega 128)

  5. System Assumptions • Communication Architecture: • The broadcast is the fundamental communication way. • The network topology is tree which the BS is the root. • The sensors cooperate to pass the packets from the leaves to the root. • The communication patterns categorized into : • Node Bs • BS node • Bs All Nodes. • Node  node

  6. They assumed sensors are not trusted. • The nodes in initialization phase trust the BS but not after this phase. • The protocol achieve security requirements like data authentication, data integrity, and data freshness.

  7. Notation

  8. SNEP • The two parties A, B shared XAB and derived the comm. Keys KAB=FX(1), KBA=FX(3), K’AB=FX(2), K’BA=FX(4). • The encrypted data E(D){K,C}, and MAC(K’,C||E) • The complete message from AB is: AB: (D){KAB,C}, MAC(K’AB,C|| (D){KAB,CA})

  9. Counter Exchange Protocol • AB: CA BA: CB , MAC(K’BA,CA||CB) AB: MAC(K’ AB,CA||CB) • How does the synchronization of the counter be? • AB: CA, MAC(K’AB,CA) BA: CB , MAC(K’BA,CA||CB)

  10. µTESLA • Requirements: • The BS and Nodes be loosely synchronized. • Each node know the upper bound of max. sync. error. • Each node loaded with commitment key K0.

  11. µTESLA cont. • The BS compute the MAC (K,P) where K unknown for receiver at sending time. • Ki=F(Ki+1) • K0=F(F(K2)) F F F F F F K2 K0 K3 K1 K4 K5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2

  12. µTESLA detailed description • Sender phase.(keys generation e.g. MD5) • Sending Auth. Packet. • Bootstrapping new receiver.(parameters of sync.) • MS: NM • MS: TS|Ki|Ti|Tint|δ,MAC(KMS,NM| TS|Ki|Ti|Tint|δ) • Auth. received packet.

  13. Node to Node key agreement • If node A(IDS) want to communicate with node B. • They use trusted party BS because the share master secret key with it (XAS,XAB). • AB: NA,A BS: NA,NB ,A,B, MAC(K’BS,NA|NB|A|B) SA: {SKAB}KSA,MAC(K’ SA,NA|B|{SKAB}KSA) SB: {SKAB}KSB,MAC(K’ SB,NA|B|{SKAB}KSB)

  14. IDS Challenges in WSN • Authentication. • Anonymity(prevent compromising). • Node placement. • Signature Update. • “Efficient anonymity schemes for clustered wireless sensor networks” Satyajayant Misra and Guoliang Xue Inderscience,Wireless Network 2006 Arizona State University

  15. Requirements for anonymity in a CWSN • SN can communicate with any other SN in its neighborhood and the BS in an anonymous . • Routing of messages is anonymous • The nodes in a cluster are indistinguishable. • SNs outside the neighborhood of a cluster cannot figure out the CH of the cluster.

  16. Framework for the anonymity schemes • 2k pseudonyms • Continuous chunk of size 2L • The total chunk N2 K bit 2L …. …. N2

  17. Each node produce table and for scheme management. • SN assign chunk for comm. With node v from (N) • In secure way: • UV: chunk • VU:chunk • The sender & receiver IDs became: i + index v i’ + index u Table of node u Sender: index u|| IDvu Receiver: index v ||IDuv

  18. IDS Challenges in WSN • Authentication. • Anonymity(prevent compromising). • Node placement. • Signature Update.

  19. Cluster Construction Grow the cluster iteratively Wait for a random amount of time Timeout and elect itself as a clusterhead Legitimate Cluster Valid cluster Network partition constructed R mR R mR mR R R mR LOCI: Local Clustering Service for Large Scale Wireless Sensor Networks (Springer 06, Vineet Mittal)

  20. Placement Problem R Tree Based A Tree Based

  21. IDS Challenges in WSN • Authentication. • Anonymity(prevent compromising). • Node placement. • Signature Update.

  22. Signature Update • The problem of multi pattern matching technique is preprocessing phase. • We have two choices(rebuild in node, send to preprocessed signature ) √ • Send new signature from BS • Less comm. Overhead • Processing overhead • Send whole table to IDS node • Intensive comm. Overhead • Less node processing overhead

  23. Thank You Any Question ?

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