'Separating equilibrium' presentation slideshows

QR 38 Signaling I, 4/17/07 I. Signaling and screening II. Pooling and separating equilibria

575 views • 36 slides

Hidden Overconfidence and Advantageous Selection

Hidden Overconfidence and Advantageous Selection. Rachel J. Huang Assistant Professor, Finance Department Ming Chuan University, Taipei, Taiwan Yu-Jane Liu Professor, Department of Finance National Cheng Chi University, Taipei, Taiwan Larry Y. Tzeng Professor, Department of Finance

426 views • 28 slides

342 views • 20 slides

QR 38 Signaling II (Applications), 4/19/07 I. The logic of alliances and other commitments

QR 38 Signaling II (Applications), 4/19/07 I. The logic of alliances and other commitments II. Modeling alliances. Logic of signaling important in modern study of international relations. Illustrate by considering a specific application, to the study of military alliances.

267 views • 19 slides

Introduction to signaling

Introduction to signaling. 1 Principal With SI: Both types got their U With AS: B got his U G got more than U Agents are better with AS than with SI They do not have incentives to disclosure any information. Many Ps competing for A Type B gets the same utility with SI than with AS

173 views • 9 slides