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A Game Theoretic Study of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Systems

A Game Theoretic Study of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Systems. Chris Y. T. Ma, Nageswara S. V. Rao, David K. Y. Yau. Agenda. Motivation System model Boolean attack and defense System with robustness Conclusion. Motivation. Cyber-physical systems

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A Game Theoretic Study of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Systems

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  1. A Game Theoretic Study of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Systems Chris Y. T. Ma, Nageswara S. V. Rao, David K. Y. Yau

  2. Agenda Motivation System model Boolean attack and defense System with robustness Conclusion

  3. Motivation • Cyber-physical systems • Model a number of engineering infrastructure systems • Physical – hardware components • Cyber – computations, communications • Susceptible to attacks

  4. Motivation • Our objectives • Use of game theoretic formulations to capture the attack and defense of cyber-physical systems • Study the survival of the cyber-physical systems using different utility functions

  5. Motivation • Our observations • Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) may not exist • Cost boundaries (budgets) may determine the NE outcome • The presence of NE does not mean the system survives

  6. System Model

  7. System Model

  8. Boolean Attack and Defense Special case of attacks where the cyber and physical parts can be attacked or defended as whole units Successful attack on either cyber or physical part will disrupt the whole system

  9. Boolean Attack and Defense

  10. Boolean Attack and Defense

  11. System with Robustness General case when resources are not represented as one whole unit Consider different benefit functions

  12. System with Robustness

  13. System with Robustness The players’ best response functions

  14. General Benefit and Cost Functions

  15. General Benefit and Cost FunctionsOne-space cases

  16. General Benefit and Cost FunctionsOne-space cases • Observation • Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is rare, most likely to exist when the attacker has tight budget

  17. General Benefit and Cost FunctionsTwo-space cases

  18. General Benefit and Cost FunctionsTwo-space cases • Observations • Resource allocation is non-trivial even without an attacker, and greedy approach may be sub-optimal, e.g., the S-shaped benefit function • The NE results are sensitive to the parameters of the payoff functions in the two spaces

  19. General Benefit and Cost FunctionsTwo-space cases System A Cyber space: Ba Physical space: Ba NE: X System C Cyber space: Ba Physical space: Bb NE: ? System B Cyber space: Bb Physical space: Bb NE: X Observations

  20. Conclusions Presented a game theoretic formulation of the interplay between a rational attacker and a rational defender in cyber-physical system security Studied the presence (or absence) of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium using different payoff functions

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