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SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s. R. Hooper Monterey, June 2012. IRAQ. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR. Iraq was an original signatory of the NPT (July 1968) and became a party prior to NPT entry-into-force
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SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s R. Hooper Monterey, June 2012
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR • Iraq was an original signatory of the NPT (July 1968) and became a party prior to NPT entry-into-force • Their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered-into-force February 1972 • Israeli 1981 destruction of the 40 MW Tamuz I research reactor being constructed by the French at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center • Iraqi response – the Tuwaitha “berm” and other measures against low altitude attacks
HISTORY CONTINUED • In the years prior to the Gulf War, safeguards were implemented in four installations designated to be facilities at Tuwaitha • IRT 5000 research reactor • 0 power Tamus II research reactor • an away from reactor fresh fuel store • a pilot fuel fabrication facility inspector access was limited to “strategic points” at each of those four locations as specified in facility attachments
THE GULF WAR AND THE UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS • The Gulf War ended in March 1991 with Iraqi acceptance of UNSCR 687 – cease fire and disarmament of Iraq • UNSCR called for the “destruction, removal and rendering harmless” of Iraqi WMD and associated infrastructure • IAEA was given a qualified mandate re nuclear disarmament. The remainder – missiles, chemical and biological – was the responsibility of the newly created UNSCOM
UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS CONTINUED • First IAEA UNSCR 687 on-site inspection occurred mid-May 1991 • Mapping the Iraqi clandestine program • “chase the disc”, IAEA 2 • “the parking lot”, IAEA 6 • the Haider Chicken Farm documents • Destruction, removal, rendering harmless
SOUTHAFRICA --A CASE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT-
SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • The program existed for at least 20 years (1969-1989) • The white South Africa government was motivated by a deep fear of a black uprising and of communism • South Africa possessed sufficient indigenous technical capabilities and materials • The key was the capability to enrich uranium; the facility was located at a nuclear research installation at Pelindaba near Pretoria • The South Africa AEC produced sufficient highly enriched uranium for 7 gun-type nuclear weapons
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NPT • South Africa began discussions pursuant to signing the NPT in 1987 • With the collapse of the Soviet Union, amid heavy international pressure and an imminent change of government, South Africa signed the NPT on 10 July 1991 • South Africa’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency entered-into-force on 16 September 1991
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS • At the 1991 General Conference, a group of African States pushed through a C resolution requesting the Board to instruct the DG to verify the completeness of South Africa’s initial report -This was a first- • The DG’s “completeness team” began its work in South Africa a couple of months later
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.) • The focus, of course, was the uranium enrichment activities • the pilot plant (Y plant), and • the semi-commercial plant (Z plant) • a unique enrichment process and the availability of extensive operating records covering the Y Plant operating history • in March 1993, South Africa formally acknowledged the former existence of a nuclear weapons program and the completeness exercise took on a disarmament dimension
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.) • in 1994, the Agency concluded that the HEU declared and presented – largely material recovered from dismantled weapons – was consistent with what reasonably could have been produced, and • that there was no indication that all nuclear weapon components, designs and related infrastructure had not been destroyed or otherwise rendered harmless
DPRK’s NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (1) • The programme dates to a 1959 nuclear cooperation agreement with the USSR • The USSR supplied an IRT 5000 Research Reactor and an isotope production laboratory that became operational in 1965 • Safeguards were first implemented at the RR under an INFCIRC/66 type of agreement
DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (2) • Across the 1980’s, DPRK constructed and operated • a 5 MWe natural uranium fueled, graphite moderated, gas cooled reactor • conversion/fuel fabrication facility • reprocessing facility • DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985, but did not meet its Article III obligation to conclude a CSA until 1992
DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (3) • Entry-into-force of DPRK’s CSA occurred 10 April 1992, the submission of their initial report followed quickly (4 May 1992) • Ad hoc inspections to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the initial report began immediately • The DPRK pledged a high level of cooperation with “anytime, any place access”
THE AD HOC INSPECTIONS • There were 6 ad hoc inspections during the remainder of 1992, inconsistencies between inspection data and DPRK declarations regarding the operational histories of the 5 MWe reactor and the reprocessing facility soon developed • In broad terms, the DPRK declared that the core of the 5 MWe reactor was the original core and that there had been one “hot” reprocessing campaign involving a mixture of damaged, lightly irradiated fuel and fresh fuel
PRINCIPAL INCONSISTENCIES • The waste declared and presented as having resulted from the single reprocessing campaign was not compatible with inputs and the Pu product • Environmental samples taken in the Pu finishing area contained • Puisotopically different from the declared Pu product • The ingrowth of Am in Pu particle indicated three points in time when Pu separations were done, not one
SATELLITE IMAGERY leading to a request for a special inspection, which has never happened
DPRK AND STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS • Provided added impetus to efforts to strengthen safeguards • Provided additional evidence of the power of environmental sampling • Tacit acceptance by the Board that the Agency would accept and make use of third party information