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Brief history of post-WWII European integration

Brief history of post-WWII European integration. Prof. Marquis Lecture of 31 March 214 University of Verona. Outline. Today: some history … 1950s >> Treaty establishing the EEC 1960s >> [The rise of intergovernmentalism] 1970s >> Economic crisis and policy stagnation

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Brief history of post-WWII European integration

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  1. Brief history of post-WWII European integration Prof. Marquis Lecture of 31 March 214 University of Verona

  2. Outline • Today: some history … • 1950s >> Treaty establishing the EEC • 1960s >> [The rise of intergovernmentalism] • 1970s >> Economic crisis and policy stagnation • 1980s >> La rilancia • 1990s >> Toward European ‘Union’ • 2000s >> The rise and fall of a ‘constitution’ • t • Tomorrow: [finish history, then:] the EU institutions • The institutions of the EU as defined by the Treaty of Lisbon

  3. Ragazzi:non provare a scrivere tutto …Andro’ troppo veloce!Avrete comunque gli slide, quindi: Tranquillo!

  4. 1950s: Treaty establishing the EEC

  5. 60 years ago...The story of European ‘union’ began with an important initial success followed by aspectacular failure

  6. Before the Treaty of Rome • Monnet(1888-79) and Schuman launched ‘Europe’ with the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community (‘ECSC Treaty’) • t • Singed 18 April 1951. Effective 24 July 1952 • Also called the ‘Treaty of Paris’ • Expired in 2002 • t • ECSC established new institutions: • ‘High Authority’ • & European Court of Justice (ECJ) • T • But – what was the purpose of this Treaty?

  7. Coal and steel >> tanks, artillery, aerial bombers • t • ECSC was a way to retain some control of West German coal and steel • t • In view of the expectation that W Germany would in a few years regain its sovereignty (which it did in 1955) • t • But Monnet saw it as cooperation in one sector that would expand to cooperation in all sectors • L’Europe des petits pas • And driven by a vision of a federal Europe • Because states in a federation do not war against each other

  8. But then, the first crisis of European integration:The ‘European Defence Community’

  9. Oct. 1950: French P.M. Pleven proposed the establishment of a European Defence Community (EDC) • t • With the Soviets next door, and with the Korean war breaking out, security was a top priority • t • So: Integrate the armed forces of all NATO members, including those of West Germany, and place them all under the command of a European Minister of Defence • t • The EDC almost became a reality...

  10. EDC Treaty signed by the Six govts. in May 1952 • t • Thanks to P.M. Spaak, EDC was not limited to military integration • t • Also provided for political union in an attached Treaty establishing a European Political Community(EPC) t • i. economic integration (customs union); • t • ii. federal decision-making institutions, including a Parliament with strong powers; • t • iii. commitment to human rights protection

  11. French rebellion: Treaty ratified in D and BNLX... But the Assemblée Nationalerejected the text on 30.08.54. Why? • t • French army was in Indochina (1946-54); so a ‘European Army’ implied a largely German Army • t • And the Right (the Gaullists) opposed the transfer of French sovereignty to supranational institutions • t • Già nel 1954: a clash between ‘supranationalism’ and the ‘Souverainistes’ • t • A recurring theme in EU history

  12. But in June 1955, the Six were in Messina to negotiate a new Treaty • t • Impetus from BNLX, esp. Wim Beyen, Dutch MFA • He proposed a customs union(BNLX since ‘44) • t • But the failure of EDC/EPC had a profound effect • For the ‘Europeans’, best strategy was to limit the scope of the project to the economic sphere • t • But the ultimate goal was to move beyond economic integration • Ernst Haas (IR scholar), Jean Monnet: concept of ‘spillover’ (‘Neofunctionalism’)

  13. Beyen Plan and Messina Conference lead to … the EEC

  14. At Messina, Spaak was appointed to study the possible avenues of integration • t • Spaak Report (21.04.56: presented to the MS of the ECSC) • Identified a need to create a ‘common market’ among the Six • t • Furnished the basis for further negotiations among the FMs, and an intergovernmental conference (IGC) was launched

  15. The FMs accepted the Spaak Report in Venice in May 1956 • Then Spaak and committees started drafting • t • ... and in Rome, on 25.03.57, the Six signed two Treaties of Rome: • t • The Treaty establishing a European Economic Community (EEC Treaty); and • The Euratom Treaty • Of special interest to France, dealing with: • Trade in supplies of fissile materials like uranium and plutonium • Safety and operations of nuclear power plants

  16. Preamble (EEC): The founders of the Community “resolve to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty” • So: integration as a means of avoiding renewed conflict • t • Called for: • an improvement of living and working conditions in the EEC; and • a progressive abolition of trade barriers • t • And established numerous principles and mechanisms …

  17. creation of a common market; • adoption of common policies (CAP, transport); • elimination of internal customs duties and quantitative restrictions; • free movement of goods, services, workers & capital; • assurance of undistorted competition; • establishment of a common commercial policy; • promotion of coordination of policies regarding employment, the environment, the competitiveness of industry, and R&D; • eradication of discrimination on the basis of nationality • i.e., for those coming from the Six

  18. Legislation: in relation to economicintegration the EEC Treaty (like the ECSC) provided for supranationalist legislative procedures • t • Commission proposes legislation for the Councilto consider • t • Votes of the MS were weighted so that those of FR, D and IT counted for more than those of BNLX. This was the original definition of Qualified Majority Voting(QMV) • t • QMV implies a partial surrender of sovereignty • t • But in ‘non-economic areas’, MS retained their veto • t • Es.: Taxation or migration of labor, etc.

  19. EEC Treaty entered into force on 01.01.58 • t • In those days, the MS would not have imagined putting that Treaty to a popular vote • t • The Treaty was concluded for an unlimited period of time • t • But has been modified many times • t • Today we call it the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union(the ‘TFEU’) • Or in Italian: the TFUE • last amended: 2009

  20. [1960s: The rise of intergovernmentalism]

  21. President De Gaulle (1959-69) held Monnet (who, as first President of the High Authority, represented supranationalism) in contempt • Favored increased funds for the CAP, but opposed any strengthening of the Community’s institutions • July 1965: when the Council met – no France! (the ‘empty chair crisis’) • A crisis about who really had sovereign powers • France no longer accepted decisions of the Council on the basis of QMV • De Gaulle saw the Community as an international organization acting as an agent for its principals • Each principal should have the right to vetoany Community initiatives

  22. Compromise finally reached in LUX, 29 Jan 1966. According to the ‘Luxembourg Accord’: • t • When very important interests of a MS were at stake, the MS would ignore the QMV rule and seek to reach a solution acceptable to all of the MS • t • De facto, this become a rule of unanimous voting • This is the essence of intergovernmentalism • t • LUX Accord >> slow ‘positive’ integration in the 1970s and early 1980s

  23. 1970s:Economic crisis and policy stagnation

  24. In the 1970s, the problem was ‘Eurosclerosis’ (stagnation) • t • Following the EEC’s establishment of a customs union in 1968, it was difficult for the Community to advance any farther (3 problems) • t • 1. The essential problem was gridlock(bloccaggio) in the Council’s decision-making • t • The gridlock resulted from a compromise made in 1966, leading to a de facto veto for the MS

  25. 2. Another factor slowing down legislation: Council tended to refer decisions to the HSG. But HSG only met twice a year; not very efficient • t • 3. In the 1970s, a number of events shifted attention toward domestic problems • t • OPEC raised oil prices, exacerbated a more general energy crisis • Productivity was sluggish, and labor costs were increasing • Some European producers were at a competitive disadvantage compared to their rivals in the US and Japan • So MS resorted increasingly to NTBst • t • In general, lack of vision for the EEC

  26. 1980s: il Rilancio.Completing the internal market(‘Objectif 1992’)

  27. 1970s and early 1980s, European producers (different ones) were distressed: • t • NTBs and fragmented markets made it difficult for them to profit from economies of scale • So business groups in Europe tried to stimulate more liberalized trade in goods and services • t • Ad es.: the CEOs of Philips and Volvo set up the Roundtable of European Industrialists in 1983 • t • Dekker produced a proposal for the creation of a common market

  28. Then an official report by Lord Cockfield (Commissioner for the Internal Market, 1985-89 ) in June of 1985 • t • The Cockfield Report set out a detailed plan for the completion of the common market by 1992 • t • The plan included proposals for 282 new pieces of legislation to harmonize national laws and to reduce or eliminate NTBs • t • All of this was to be accomplished within 6 or 7 years

  29. But the 282 proposals faced the obstacle of unanimous voting in the Council • t • So in late 1985 and early 1986, the MS began to negotiate the first significant revision of the (30 year-old) EEC Treaty • t • The Single European Act (SEA / Ehlermann) was signed in February of 1986, and entered into force on 01.07.87 • t • SEA increased the scope for QMV (except tax, labor..) • In effect, abolished the de facto vetos of the MS (thus overturning the formally illegal Luxembourg Accord ) • ... e poi ...

  30. SEA institutional reforms: • t • 1. The European Council • Recognized for the first time, but nothing said about its functions • t • 2. The Assembly formally became the ‘Parliament’ • t • 3. (de facto) The Commission became more more important as a driver of the legislation necessary to ‘complete’ the common market • t • So after 20 years, the Community returned to an ethos of supranationalism and integration

  31. In the new favorable environment, why not go further with the political dimension?1990s: Toward European ‘Union’

  32. European Council met in Maastricht in Dec 1991 and agreed a Treaty on ‘European Union’ (TEU) • t • Signed in Feb 1992, took effect on 01.11.93 • t • But the Union did not replace the Community! • t • Union co-existed with the Community and shared the same institutional structure • t • But it operated through different decision-making procedures • t • 4 notesabout significance of the TEU...

  33. 1. Created a 3-pillar (3 pilastri) structure • I. the three Communities (the EC, the ECSC, and Euratom) • II.Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) • III. Justice and Home Affairs • Police and judicial cooperation on crime, • Visas, asylum, border controls, etc. (the ‘Schengen Acquis’) • Today, JHA commonly called Freedom, Security & Justice • PILLAR STRUCTURE ABOLISHED in 2009

  34. 2. The TEU launched the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) • t • In 2002, Euro became the single currency for 12 of 15 MS (today 18 of 28) • t • Politically, EMU was extremely delicate • t • Giving up a national currency and monetary control (above all, the DM) was a significant surrender of political sovereignty • t • Reflected by the opt-outs granted to the UK and Denmark

  35. 3. Enhanced the role of the Parliament (EP) • Before Maastricht, EP was weak. Merely advised and passed resolutions • t • Critics often spoke/speak of a democratic deficit • t • Majone responded with arguments of ‘output legitimacy’ • Another response is: are we sure the committee work of national parliaments is democratic? • t • Maastricht did not make the EP co-equal with Council but it finally made the EP a legislator • t • Specifically, it established the ‘co-decision procedure’ (today called the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’)

  36. Co-decision: Commission proposes / approved by both the Council and the EP • Council and the EP each had/have a veto • t • TEU introduced the co-decision procedure for: • t • Measures relating to the internal market; • Environmental protection; • R&D; • Some aspects of public health; • Consumer protection; • Education and Culture • t • So at Maastricht the competences of the Community grew to cover many more policy fields • This probably contributed to the 4th point, cioe’ ...

  37. 4. Maastricht also introduced a new ‘veto player’ – the citizens of the MS • t • When the EU modifies its Treaties, each MS must ratify the new agreement in accordance with its constitutional requirements • t • In Denmark, when the people were asked, they said Nay! (51%, June 1992) • t • So this was the first referendum crisis (end of the era of ‘permissive consensus’) • t • But the Danes eventually accepted the Treaty in a second referendum (57%, May 1993)

  38. [Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, effective 1999)]

  39. SEA and TEU Treaty revisions happened within just 5 years of each other. After the TEU the pace of Treaty reform in fact accelerated • t • Already in 1996, diplomats began discussing new reforms in the context of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Torino • t • The basic goal was to make changes necessary to accomodate the next (fifth) enlargement • i.e., the let the former Soviet States (Czech, Hungary, Poland, Baltic States, etc.) into the EU

  40. Following IGC of 1996, the MS signed Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 Oct 1997, entered into force on 1 May 1999 • t • The Treaty was supposed to introduce institutional reforms to improve the ability of the EU to cope with a larger membership; • But these issues were too controversial and had to be postponed • t • Called the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’

  41. 2000s: The rise and fall of a ‘Constitution’

  42. Another IGC in 2000 >> Treaty of Nice, Feb 2001 • Mainly noteworthy for two things: • t • 1.Re-defined QMV in a way that gave disproportionate power to Spain, Poland, France, etc. -- at the expense of Germany. Unsustainable. • t • 2. Treaty stopped in June 2001 by Irish voters (54% rejection) • t • Ireland had to hold a second referendum in October 2002: accepted by 63%

  43. Then: Laeken Summit, Dec. 2001. European Council called for a ‘convention’ to consider EU’s future development, e.g.: • Simplification of the Treaties • ‘Greater democracy, transparency and efficiency’ in the Union • The Convention worked in 2002-03 and, in June 2003, produced a draft ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ • Submitted to the European Council in the summer of 2003

  44. IGC of 2004 adopted a draft ‘Constitutional Treaty’ not too different from the text prepared by the Convention • Signed 29 October 2004 in the Campidoglio • Was supposed to enter into force on 1 November 2006 • By mid-May of 2005 the CT had been ratified by 9 MS • But in May and June, rejected in France (55%) and Netherlands (62%) • Dutch vote largely to protest against unpopular politicians • But French vote was a deliberate rejection

  45. So: another referendum crisis, like Maastricht and Nice • In June 2007, the European Council decided to abandon the project of a ‘Constitution’ • Launched another IGC, but removing the rhetoric and symbols of a constitution • But the final text, signed in December 2007 in Lisbon, did not deviate radically from the text of 2004 • (French, Dutch voters not given another chance to vote) • t • But – uh oh! The Irish voters had to approve it!

  46. Did the Irish voters approve it? • The Irish voters did not approve it! • Rejected in June 2008 (53%) • Second Irish referendum in October 2009, with a strong yes (67%) • So 8 years after the Laeken Declaration, the Lisbon Treaty finally entered into force on 1 December 2009 • Attention: The EU is not governed by a single ‘Treaty of Lisbon’ …

  47. ToL amended the EC Treaty (now TFEU) and the TEU • So there are STILL TWO MAIN TREATIES: • 1. the TEUestablishes the institutional framework and foundational principles; • 2. the TFEUis a more detailed legal instrument aimed, inter alia, to establish a common market • N.B. Both Treaties of equal rank • And other important instruments too, such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights • Now binding primary law (but – general principles and ECHR already applied before) • Binds the EU institutions and MS when they implement EU law or act within its scope

  48. Main impact of the Treaty concerns institutional reform (tomorrow) • Is the Lisbon Treaty sufficient for the EU? • A far-reaching Treaty revision seems unlikely for now… many MS and key figures and institutions suffer from Treaty fatigue • But few people were fully content with the ToL • For example, many felt the EU was ill-equipped to deal with macroeconomic problems • And a micro-Treaty entered into force in 2013 with the aim of addressing the sovereign debt crisis (IRE, PRT, GRC…) and achieving greater financial stability

  49. 2013 Fiscal Compact • Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the ‘TSCG’) • t • Entered into force, 01.01.13 for 16 MS, incl. Italy • Applies mostly to Eurozone countries (plus DMK) • The point of the Treaty is greater fiscal discipline to avoid repeats of the debt crisis

  50. A MS of the Fiscal Compact is required to adopt a domestic law establishing an almost-balanced budget • This means mandatory limits (‘caps’) on deficits, under the monitoring of a fiscal advisory council • t • [The technical part] General budget deficit must be less than 3% of GDP (PIL); and the • Structural deficit (SD – i.e., ignoring the cyclical shortfalls in revenue) must be less than • 1% of GDP if the debt-to-GDP ratio is significantly below 60% - or, • for countries deeper in debt, the SD must be below 0.5% of GDP

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