Primitive Rule Utilitarianism

1. Some definitions: The conformance utility of a rule, R, is the sum of the utilities of all the acts prescribed by R that would be performed, if everyone in the situation governed by R who could do the act prescribed by R were to do that act. Rule R is correct = no alternative to R has higher conformance utility than R has. Primitive Rule Utilitarianism (PRU): An act is morally right if and only if it is prescribed by a correct moral rule for its situation. Basic idea of PRU = the best rule creates the most happiness in the situation it applies to; the right thing to do is to do what the best rule for that situation says. Primitive Rule Utilitarianism

2. A Decisive Objection to PRU The “Extensional Equivalence” Objection. Two theories of morality = “extensionally equivalent” if and only if they classify exactly the same acts as right and exactly the same acts as wrong. Let rule R* = “Whatever situation you are in, perform the act that maximizes utility.” Clearly, R* has the highest conformance utility of any rule, since if everyone successfully did as R* prescribes, then utility would be maximized. So it turns out that the Primitive Rule Utilitarian will follow only rule, namely, R*­ -- but this rule just is the defining principle of Act Utilitarianism! So there is no difference between Act Utilitarianism and Primitive Rule Utilitarianism. PRU is not a distinct alternative, after all.

3. Ideal Moral Code Theory Some definitions: A person subscribes to rule R if and only if she sincerely accepts it as a correct moral rule. This entails that she will try to abide by R should the occasion arise, she will feel guilty if she believes she failed to follow R, she will think less of others who fail to follow R, and so on. Moral code C is current in society S = it is common knowledge that most people (90%) in society S subscribe to each of the rules in code C. The currency utility of moral code C for society S is the net good per person that would be produce by C’s currency in S. Moral code C is ideal for society S = there is no moral code that has higher currency utility for S than C does. Ideal Moral Code Theory (IMCT): Act A is right in society S if and only if the ideal moral code for S permits A.

4. IMCT is not extensionally equivalent to AU Claim: IMCT is not extensionally equivalent to act utilitarianism. Reason = A code with one rule, namely, “Always perform the act with maximal utility,” would not have the highest currency utility. Why not? Answer: The rule “Always maximize utility” is so general it is hard to apply, and hence there are lots of possibilities for mistaken calculations. Also, since the rule is so general, it is easy to bias the application of it in one’s favor. Finally, the calculations it requires are time-consuming; its demandingness would generate resentment and/or guilty feelings. So more utility would be produced by people’s subscribing to a simpler code, namely, list of discrete, simpler rules (“Tell the truth...”, “Keep your promises....”, “Don’t steal...” etc.)

5. Possible objections to IMCT • The “Which Society?” Objection: How does one define the relevant society? For example: Mafia society or American society? • The “Rule Worship” Objection: Suppose in a given situation the ideal moral code says to do A, but you know that B will create more happiness overall. IMCT says you should still follow the code and do A. But isn’t this irrational? Since like all utilitarian theories the IMCT aims at maximizing happiness, how can it coherently require you to do an act that fails to maximize happiness?

6. 3. The “Excessively Ideal” Objection: This objection claims that IMCT gives bad advice in cases where actual social practices are significantly out of line with the deliverances of the ideal moral code. Consider two cases. First, suppose it turns out that because many more people are right-handed than left-handed, societies in which people drive on the right turn out to have fewer car accidents than societies in which people drive on the left. Hence the ideal moral code will instruct people to drive on the right. But if so, then according to IMCT, it is morally right to drive on the right side of the road, even if one is in Britain! Surely that is incorrect. Second, suppose it turns out that, say, lifelong monogamous marriages are not the optimal family arrangement in terms of happiness; suppose communal childrearing and multiple sexual partners would lead to more overall happiness, say. Then married couples here and now are behaving wrongly inasmuch as they are departing from the actions recommended by the ideal moral code. But is that really what we should conclude, even if the ideal code rejects monogamous unions?