NDIA / USMC War Game 2006 “Adapting to Change”

1. NDIA / USMC War Game 2006 “Adapting to Change” Cell 1 Outbrief

2. Distributed Operations • Strong Points • The USMC is formalizing and professionalizing long-standing an operational concept • Have been doing this historically on an ad hoc basis without a formal structure • The formal operational concept of DO will now drive the development of the sustainment elements • DO will better match the MAGTF to the current operational environment (GWOT and irregular foe) • Weak Points • Doubtful that large-scale DO operations can be supported with logistics or fires from existing sea-base capabilities • Further experimentation for the DO concept should be conducted in • urban areas • coalition operations • Current acquisition, training and manpower systems do not support the DO concept • Current DO concept increases the individual’s Marine’s load

3. Distributed Operations (Cont) • Capability Shortfalls • Training for Battalion and Company commanders on how best to employ their DO platoon capabilities • Ground maneuver organic support capability • Small unit maneuver over larger distances and difficult terrain • Ability of organic fires to support the AO • Lack of organic ISR capability • Availability of vertical lift • Assumes air supremacy for the AO • Assumes a persistent sea-base • Weather will have exponential effect on sustainment capabilities

4. Distributed Operations (Cont) • Recommendations • De-couple sustainment from human factors • Unmanned • Para-foils • Determine the detailed requirements for aerial sustainment vehicle • Perform a dedicated look at COTS for DO operational constraints • Perform dedicated look-back at historically similar operations • Incorporate simulation-based training as a way to scale DO training across the USMC • Identify training requirements for Bn and Co commanders who will be employing DO capabilities

5. D. O. Sustainment • Strong Points • Understand the severity of the problem • Standardized kitting is a good approach • Solving DO sustainment will help drive the LOG Modernization initiative in the USMC • Lots of available technologies “out there” to address re-supply • The USMC can communicate Commander’s Intent very well internally • Logistics footprint is small • Weak Points • Continuity of personnel working the problem • Transition from S&T to acquisition to the Fleet • Lack of awareness of other technologies / solutions being looked at in other services and other agencies (e.g., NASA) • Lack of integration between the various agencies that are looking at solutions (DARPA, ONR) • The USMC is not good at communicating the Commander’s Intent to Industry • The distribution system is not adequate to support operations • Frequency of re-supply operations will compromise OPSEC • OPSEC not addressed adequately in terms of the debris, packaging, etc

6. D. O. Sustainment (Cont) • Capability Shortfalls • Battlefield distribution system • Bulk fluids • Water availability • Production • Distribution • Communication • Lack of BLOS communication capabilities for the CSS element who must support the DO platoon • Decision support to understand and de-conflict multiple re-supply requests from multiple DO platoons or squads • Sense and Respond logistics • Automatically notified of supply status • Ability to anticipate re-supply needs • Timely Casualty evacuation • “Platinum 15 min” or the “Golden Hour”

7. D. O. Sustainment (Cont) • Recommendations • Identify what part of the T/E can be considered disposable • Need to determine how to get the best use of the multiple air platforms that will be supporting DO ops • Improve knowledge management on sustainment issues and solutions across DOD • USMC needs to talk to the S&T community and other services on a regular basis about how they may be able to support DO ops • DOD-wide websites that publicize the work that is being done across the DOD to address sustainment issues • Design a customizable CSS package

8. Logistics Modernization • Strong Points • Organizing and training the way we fight • Matches up logistics elements directly with their supported unit counterparts • Recognition from the USMC that S&R Logistics is the way forward • Weak Points • Organization / CONOPS not ready to maximize S&R Logistics capability • Cultural gap • Resourcing not available to effect S&R Logistics • The initiative has re-organized the old FSSG structure into the new MLG structure, but it did not do this reorganization from a bottom-up, “what capability is needed” perspective • May inherit the same constraints and problems of the previous structure • The logistics elements may be Force Protection burdens for their supported units

9. Logistics Modernization(Cont) • Capability Shortfalls • The logistics modernization effort has not been resourced • MLG skeleton has to get filled • MLG TO and T/E has to get filled • Connectivity between mission area responsibilities • We are not prepared to use S&RL capabilities

10. Logistics Modernization(Cont) • Recommendations • Integrate all the various log systems currently in use • Understand the capabilities available and be able to use them (e.g., be able to identify a given system and what it can do for you – AFATDS, C2PC, etc) • Properly resource enabling technologies such as S&RL • Analyze and determine the impact of S&RL on doctrine, organization, training and CONOPS • Rapidly evaluate the point solutions being developed at the small-unit levels and determine which of those should be adopted for larger use across the USMC