Chaim Braun Consulting Professor Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)

1. Relative Roles of Breeders vs ALWRs In India’s Nuclear System, and U.S.’s and India’s Perceptions of the 123 Agreement Chaim Braun Consulting Professor Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University Presented at the University of Reading Conference on the India – United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Reading, U.K., September 14, 2009

3. U.S.-India Nuclear Deal India agrees to: • Separate civilian from military facilities • Civilian sites subject to IAEA safeguards • Support Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and continue unilateral moratorium on testing U.S. agrees to: • Cooperate on civilian nuclear technology development • Assure reliable supply of nuclear fuel • Congressional approval obtained • Nuclear Supplier Group consensus obtained

4. India’s Perceptions of its Nonproliferation Status Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement • India views itself as an effective Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), having in place most of the requisite attributes: - It tested both fission and fusion weapons - It developed strong indigenous materials protection control and accounting system (MPC&A) - It has a significant system of operating nuclear power plants of Indigenous design - It demonstrated and operates an entire closed nuclear fuel cycle for both military, civilian uses - It didn’t export proliferating or dual-use nuclear technologies to suspect end-users

5. India’s Perceptions of its Nonproliferation Status Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.) • India refrains from further nuclear weapons testing despite demands from some weapons designers • India, however, didn’t sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) claiming the Treaty inherently unequal • India refused to abide by NPT disarmament provisions (Article VI), while claiming rights of NWS under Article I, III, and IV • India refuse to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Unclear position on Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

6. India’s Plans for Nuclear Electricity Generating System • India developed its ‘Three Phases’ nuclear energy growth scenario: - First phase – PHWRs – (‘HINDU’ CANDU), of limited total capacity due to insufficient Uranium supplies & mining capacity. PHWRs produce Plutonium supplies to fuel Second Phase reactors - Second Phase FBRs – 1,000 Mwe breeders, high gain breeding, metallic Plutonium fuel. Large capacity growth – 250,000 MWe by 2052. Large 4,000 – 6,000 MWe FBR stations, each with dedicated fuel reprocessing & re-fabrication plant.

7. India’s Plans for Nuclear Electricity Generating System (Cont.) • Third Phase – Transition of FBRs system to operate on Pu-Th fuel cycle. Main fissile material is U-233, bred in FBR Thorium blankets. Introduction of Advanced converter (AHWR) to burn excess fissile material. Long-term equilibrium operation of FBRs-AHWRs system based on Thorium fuel cycle • Central Role of FBRs technology, first large demonstration plant – 500 MWe PFBR, now under construction in Kalpakkam. Operation by 2012 • Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) viewed as limited stop-gap measures, useful until FBRs capacity takes off

8. India Near-Term Nuclear Capacity Projections

9. Projected Installed Nuclear Power Capacity build-up – Reactor Type Breakdown

10. Nuclear Power Plants in India - Sites • 3360 MW in operation • 3920 MW under construction • 8800 MW new sites identified 2820 MWe 4460 MWe

11. Role of ALWRs in India’s Nuclear Program • Imported ALWRs will have to import their lifetime Uranium fuel requirements, due to lack of indigenous fuel supplies • ALWRs viewed by DAE as near-term capacity-fillers until domestic FBRs program matures • DAE concerned that imported ALWRs will: - Create competition by foreign vendors, construction companies -Create regional nuclear generating corporations independent of NPCIL - Siphon-off Engineering talents from DAE reactors, R&D programs - BREAK DAE’s NUCLEAR MONOPOLY • Ambivalent attitude to nuclear technology imports constraining domestic nuclear development program

12. U.S.’s Proliferation-related Perceptions Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement • U.S. global nonproliferation concerns different than India’s domestic, regional positions • U.S. cannot accept India’s claim for recognition as NWS status: - Impossible by NPT definitions - Similar demands could be raised by Pakistan, Israel – other NPT non-signatories - North Korea, ultimately Iran, could demand equal status based on developing capabilities - New ‘Pandora’s Box’ of latent nuclear weapons states could emerge, eventually claiming future similar status to India

13. U.S.’s Proliferation-related Perceptions Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.) - Concessions to India on terms of 123 Agreement will complicate similar Agreements then entering review with Korea, UAE, other Middle East countries - India’s Nonproliferation record not so pristine : - India clandestinely imported centrifuge enrichment technology (not unlike Pakistan) - India tested nuclear weapons twice: In 1974 (prompting the creation of the NSG) In 1998 (Prompting testing by Pakistan) - India maintained nuclear, missile proliferation-related contacts with Iran - India refused to sign NPT, CTBT, FMCT(?), etc

14. U.S. Perceptions of India Nuclear Energy System • India had only limited success with domestic PHWRs program – 4,000 MWe, 6 Nuclear plant sites, all developed in forty years • PHWRs program afflicted by lack of Uranium fuel, reduced generation, declining capacity factors • Importing ALWRs will significantly increase India’s nuclear capacity. Just three GE-Hitachi ABWRs (1,340 MWe each) equal to total PHWRs capacity India installed in forty years • ALWRs are proven, commercially ready, large-scale, fast-growth, nuclear electricity option for India

15. U.S. Perceptions of India Nuclear Energy System (Cont.) • It could be to India’s benefit to give up its experimental, proliferative PFBR, fuel cycle, in exchange for ready ALWRs, fresh Uranium supplies to existing PHWRs • Giving up PFBR: - Small price to pay for large-scale benefits - Will burnish India’s nonproliferation credentials - Will hinder other countries demands for closed fuel cycle, ‘sensitive’ fuel cycle facilities - Will slow the spread of dreaded ‘Plutonium economy’

16. India’s Proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of the 123 Agreement • India considers it got a ‘clean’ i.e. unconditional exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Conditions of supply: - It can import Uranium for its operating PHWRs - It requires foreign ALWR vendors to provide Uranium supplies for lifetime of reactors imported - It demand rights to import enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies, given its equivalent NWS status, NSG exemption: - Enrichment plants to convert fresh Uranium supplies to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel for future ALWRS

17. India’s Proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.) - Reprocessing plants to reprocess spent ALWRs, PHWRs spent fuel, extract Plutonium for its evolving FBRs program - It demands ‘blanket approval’ rights to reprocess U.S. origin fuel , or spent fuel from U.S. ALWRs, as part of implementing negotiations following signing of 123 Agreement - It demand rights to export, under safeguards, its PHWRs technology to developing countries, despite proliferative characteristics of PHWR design • General approach of ’Lets hit the iron while its hot’

18. India’s Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor Imports • India’s Singh Government paid high political price to pass the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement) in Indian Parliament • India supported U.S. positions regarding Iran’s nuclear program in IAEA, UN Security Council • India cancelled its participation in Iran Pakistan India (IPI) natural gas pipeline project • General feeling of sacrificing legitimate regional energy, security concerns, for global goals of U.S. • India’s Government possibly needed to dress-up benefits obtained from 123 Agreement to justify political costs incurred

19. India’s Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor Imports (Cont.) • Main benefits now claimed by India’s Government: - Fresh Uranium supplies to operating PHWRs - Inflated numbers of ALWRs expected to be installed by 2020 – 60 GWe, rather than 8 GWe in pre- Agreement estimate (2005) - Inflated numbers of all nuclear plants to be installed: 63 Gwe by 2030, increasing to even 470 GWe by 2050 “If the Country Thinks Big and Executes its Plans Correctly” per Prime Minister Singh, on September 2009 - Exporting Indian PHWRs to less developed countries to demonstrate India’s technological prowess

20. India’s Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor Imports (Cont. II) • Important role of domestic FBRs seem forgotten in ‘irrational exuberance’ over importing ALWRs • Introduction of foreign vendors, deals with Indian suppliers, could reduce Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)’s monopoly over Indian nuclear program

21. U.S.’s Proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of 123 Agreement • U.S. cannot accept India’s claim as effective NWS • U.S. insisted on India signing comprehensive safeguards Agreement (CSA) with IAEA, filing Facility Attachment document for each reactor, fuel cycle facility, to be safeguarded, & bringing signed India-specific CSA into force • U.S. still needs India nonproliferation assurances to approve nuclear technology export (Part 810) licenses • U.S. not enthusiastic about blanket reprocessing approval. Issue now under discussion. Could complicate pending 123 Agreement negotiation with Korea

22. U.S.’s proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.) • U.S. opposed to India’s requests to import ENR technologies: - On long-term policy basis (1978 NNPA) - Since India did not sign NPT - Inconsistent with NSG Conditions of Supply (India’s exemption not completely ‘clean’) - Contrary to requirements of 2006 Hyde Act - Contrary to G8 Statement of May 2009 • U.S. concerned about renewed nuclear testing in India following claims of 1998 thermonuclear test fizzle. Singh Government tries to finesse situation, claiming test results were sufficient, no more required now

23. U.S. Perceptions on Reactor Exports to India Following Passage of 123 Agreement • Very limited progress to date, but cautiously optimistic • Only available, licensed sites handed to Russian, French reactor vendor Corporations • U.S. nuclear vendors’ sites identified only in August 2009. These include Mithi Virdi in Gujarat State, Kovada in Andhra Pradesh State. Licensing status of both sites yet unclear • Limited progress on third-party liability laws in India, India signing to 1998 Vienna Convention, updating coverage limits. India Government promised action by 2009 year-end • Need to resolve negotiations on blanket reprocessing approvals, India ENR technologies import rights. Supporting India’s claim conflicts with G8 Statement

24. U.S. Perceptions on Reactor Exports to India Following Passage of 123 Agreement (Cont.) • Need to de-conflict with UAE’s, other Middle East countries’, Draft & pending 123 Agreements, where a ‘Return Clause’ has been inserted. Will U.S. insist on similar right in India’s 123 Agreement? Under what circumstances? How to implement? • Part 810 export licenses to U.S. vendors not yet issued pending clarifications on open nonproliferation issues • U.S. supported India’s applications, spent political capital, in securing NSG exemption, passage of 123 Agreement in Congress, yet major economic benefits promised are presently claimed by Russians, French

25. The Path Forward – Resolving Past Differing Interpretations – Personal Observations • India could now be defined as Virtual NWS within nonproliferation regime • Such definition allows each side to interpret it any way it wishes. Face is saved all around • Real test is in finding acceptable solutions to specific issues, while each side maintains its basic positions • On ENR technologies – India already posses rudimentary enrichment, reprocessing technologies. If India further develop these technologies using its own resources, constructs, operates its plants under IAEA safeguards – this represents best near-term option

26. The Path Forward – Resolving Differing Interpretations – Personal Observations (Cont.) • In time, as confidence builds in implementation of 123 Agreement, & in India’s nuclear program, sensitive technology imports could be considered, as parts of large ALWRs orders • India might be able to construct ~ 8-12 GWe of ALWRs by 2020, > 30 GWe by 2030 • ALWRs program will buy India time in developing FBR reactor technology, FBR fuel cycle facilities commercialization, using mostly its own resources, unless FBR technology is brought under safeguards • Future cooperative progress will be made, but at slower pace than currently estimated

27. BACKUP SLIDESIndia’s Breeder Program

28. Relative Roles of Breeders vs ALWRs In India’s Nuclear System, and U.S.’s and India’s Perceptions of 123 Agreement - Introduction • India and U.S. had different perceptions of India’s nonproliferation situation & expansion mode of nuclear electricity generation system • These differences complicated, slowed down, negotiations for the Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement) • There have occurred reversals in some of the positions of the two sides after the passage of the Agreement, as compared with the initial positions • Several issues still need to be resolved before the full value of the 123 Agreement is realized

29. THREE STAGE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM • Stage – I PHWRs • 16- Operating • 4- Under construction • Several others planned • Scaling to 700 MWe • Gestation period being reduced • POWER POTENTIAL  10,000 MWe • LWRs • 2 BWRs Operating • 2 VVERs under • construction • Stage - II • Fast Breeder Reactors • 40 MWth FBTR - Operating • Technology Objectives realised • 500 MWe PFBR- • construction commenced • POWER POTENTIAL  540,000 MWe • Stage - III • Thorium Based Reactors • 30 kWth KAMINI- Operating • 300 MWe AHWR- Under Regulatory Examination • POWER POTENTIAL  Very Large. Availability of ADS can enable early introduction of Thorium on a large scale

30. COMPARISON OF PHWR AND PFBR CORES

31. FBR PROGRAMME IN INDIA • India started FBR program with construction of FBTR • FBTR is a 40 MWt (13.5 MWe) loop type reactor. Design is same as that of Rapsodie-Fortissimo except for incorporation of SG and TG (agreement signed with CEA, France in 1969). • FBTR is in operation since 1985. • 500 MWe Fast Breeder Reactor Project (PFBR) through Indigenous design and construction • Government. granted financial sanction for construction in Sep 2003. • Construction of PFBR has been undertaken by BHAVINI. • PFBR will be commissioned by 2011. • Beyond PFBR: 4 units of 500 MWe FBR (twin unit concept) similar to PFBR with improved economy, enhanced safety, by 2020. • Subsequent reactors would be 1000 MWe units with metallic fuel

33. Reactor Vault

34. Safety Vessel with Thermal Insulation Panels

35. Fuel Fabrication for PFBR • Fabrication Technology for MOX Fuel Established • Experimental irradiation of PFBR MOX fuel (with U-233) in FBTR: fuel has reached 60 GWd/t burn-up • Fuel specifications optimized for product recovery as well as performance • R&D on metallic fuel for achieving shorter doubling time PFBR type MOX pins for experimental irradiation Annular MOX pellet

36. Constraints on Implementing India’s Fast Breeder Reactors Program • Successful Completion & Startup of PFBR • Closing Nuclear Fuel Cycle in PFBR & Follow-up FBRs - On-site Reprocessing & Re-Fabrication • Fuel Cycle Transition from Oxide to Metal Plutonium Fuels, Thorium-U-233 Fuels • Funding Future FBRs, Fuel Cycle Facilities Construction • Constructing ~250 GWe in Forty Five Years - Past Record ~ 7 GWe in Forty Years • Managing Interfaces between FBRs constructors, Operators, Fuel Cycle Providers & Regulators at each site • Opening up New FBR Sites –One to Two Sites/Year for Forty Years - Past Record - Seven New Power Plant Sites in Forty Years • Training Manpower for all FBRs, Fuel Cycle Facilities, Construction corporations, regulators • Industrial Fabrication Capacity dedicated to DAE Missions