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Devices That Tell On You: Privacy Trends in Consumer Ubiquitous Computing

Devices That Tell On You: Privacy Trends in Consumer Ubiquitous Computing. 16th USENIX Security Symposium. T. Scott Saponas Jonathan Lester Carl Hartung Sameer Agarwal Tadayoshi Kohno. August 8, 2007. Old Technology: Known Privacy Issues. Old Technology: Known Privacy Issues.

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Devices That Tell On You: Privacy Trends in Consumer Ubiquitous Computing

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  1. Devices That Tell On You:Privacy Trends in Consumer Ubiquitous Computing 16th USENIX Security Symposium T. Scott Saponas Jonathan Lester Carl Hartung SameerAgarwal Tadayoshi Kohno August 8, 2007

  2. Old Technology: Known Privacy Issues

  3. Old Technology: Known Privacy Issues

  4. Old Technology: Known Privacy Issues

  5. Old Technology: Known Privacy Issues

  6. New Technology: “Unknown” Privacy Issues

  7. mobile sensing platforms RFID EEG Gaming large displays ambient displays smar t phones wearables Health displays New Technology: “Unknown” Privacy Issues

  8. Nike+iPod Sport Kit Slingbox

  9. unique identifier

  10. Bob Bob Unwanted Music & Pictures Interesting Music & Pictures Alice block spoofed MAC

  11. Weak Identifiers Strong Identifiers Tracking Location Evading Blocking

  12. Slingbox Streams (encrypted) Media Slingbox Network

  13. Variable Data Rate Encoding Slingbox Slingbox

  14. Movie Fingerprint From Throughput trace 1 trace 2 trace 3 5 sec throughput 100 ms throughput

  15. Collected 26 Movies Traces

  16. Throughput for Content Identification unaligned traces aligned traces average trace movie signature minimum distance query signature query sliding window distance

  17. 26 Movie Experiment 1 2 … 50 Compare best match ERROR movie database

  18. VBR Leaks Information • 10 Min: 62% true positive (chance 4%) • 40 Min: 77% true positive (chance 4%) • 40 Min: 15 movies ≥ 98% true positive 10 Minute 40 Minute

  19. VBR Leaks Information • Encryption is Not Enough • Traffic Analysis • Throughput Fingerprint • Limitations • 26 movie library • Lab setting • Extensions • Recognizing specific movies • Watermarking

  20. Thanks! Acknowledgements: Yaw Anokwa, Kate Everitt, Kevin Fu, J. Alex Halderman, Karl Koscher, Ed Lazowska, DavidMolnar, Fabian Monrose, Lincoln Ritter, Avi Rubin, Jason Schultz, Adam Stubblefield, Dan Wallach, and David Wetherall http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/security/usenix07devices.html ssaponas@cs.washington.edu T. Scott Saponas, Jonathan Lester, Carl Hartung, SameerAgarwal, Tadayoshi Kohno

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