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“They shouldn´t” or “Thou shalt not”: The impact of minimal or maximal goal-type on explicit negative intergroup behaviour. Bastian Lücke, Thomas Kessler, Amélie Mummendey, Anne Berthold.
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“They shouldn´t” or “Thou shalt not”:The impact of minimal or maximal goal-type on explicit negative intergroup behaviour Bastian Lücke, Thomas Kessler, Amélie Mummendey, Anne Berthold
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Introduction Aims of the research: 1. Distinction between minimal and maximal goals (goal-type) as factor affecting explicit negative behavior towards outgroups. 2. Experimental study of explicit negative behavior towards outgroups (research paradigm).
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Theory: Minimal and maximal goals The distinction between minimal and maximal goals: (Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert & Waldzus, submitted; Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey & Neumann, 2009; Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler & Lücke, submitted) Example Groups: Economists and Social Psychologists Goal: No deception in experimental studies (e.g. Cook & Yamagishi, 2008; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2002) Minimal goal: NO DECEPTION whatsoever (dichotomous evaluation). Maximal goal: As little deception as possible (graded evaluation).
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Deception Example: Minimal goal Maximal goal additional information no deception some deception massive deception
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Definition goal-types Maximal goal: Goal that should be achieved as much as possible → graded evaluation. Minimal goal: Goal that can either be achieved or not → dichotomous evaluation. Minmax Hypothesis (H1) More explicit negative behavior is shown by members of an IG if a goal is violated by the OG that is represented by a members of the IG as a minimal goal, less negative behavior is shown if the violated goal is represented as a maximal goal. Moral Outrage Hypothesis (H2) The impact of goal-type on negative behavior by members of an IG towards the deviant OG is mediated by moral outrage towards the OG.
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Manipulation of goal-type Public Good Game Contribution rate Minimal goal Maximal goal 100 % 60 % 50 % 0 %
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I • Goal: Making money by contributing a share of the initial endowment Maximal goal condition: Gradual Public Good Game Contribute as much as possible. Minimal goal condition: Step level Public Good Game Threshold: 60 %. IG OG - Minimal groups: Other 2 IG players contribute more than 60 % Entire OG contributes less than 60 % - Exact amount of the initial endowment uncertain - Exact same contributions of other 5 co-players in both conditions!
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I Minimal goal condition: 62 %; SD=22,98 Contributions: Maximal goal condition: 77 %; SD=14,26 New DV: The „lottery item“ → Generalized social exclusion Identification: M=5.29; SD=1.03 (Cronbachs α=.94) Monetary punishment / identification r=.233, n.s. Moral outrage / identification: r=.360, p=.012 Exclusion (lottery item) / identification r=.394, p=.006
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I: Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.92) Monetary punishment of OG-members Minimal goal M = 3.19 SD = 2.06 Maximal goal M = 2.15 SD = 1.84 Minimal goal M = 4.46 SD = 2.00 Maximal goal M = 3.45 SD = 1.92 F (1, 46) = 4.055, p = .025, η2 = .08 F (1, 46) = 3.124, p = .042, η2 = 0.06
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I: Results Social Exclusion (lottery-item) Exclusion (from future rounds) Minimal goal M = 4.54 SD = 2.34 Maximal goal M = 3.09 SD = 1.90 Minimal goal M = 5.69 SD = 1.67 Maximal goal M = 4.86 SD = 1.55 F (1, 46) = 5.411, p = .012, η2 = .11 F (1, 46) = 3.133, p = .042, η2 = .06 Monetary punishment / exclusion (future rounds): r=.692, p<.001 Monetary punishment / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026 Exclusion (future rounds) / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I: Criticism Conceptual differences between payoff matrices in a gradual public good game and a step-level public good game Payoffs from Public Good Individual payoff Individual payoff step-level gradual Δ p1 Δ p1 Δ p2 average contribution rate average contribution rate Conceptual difference, even if payoffs and Δ p1 are kept constant!
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study II Framing of goaltype Exact same – gradual – payoff matrix in both goaltype-conditions. Only difference: Group goal that participants are supposed to suggest is either framed as minimal or maximal.
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study II: Results Participants contributions: Minimal goal condition: 63 % (SD=19.84) Maximal goal condition: 75 % (SD=14.10) Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.83) Max M = 2.41 SD = 1.35 Min M = 3.43 SD = 1.76 F (1, 46) = 4.991, p = .015, η2 = .10
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study II: Results Monetary punishment of OG-members Social exclusion of OG-members Min M = 5.38 SD = 1.38 Max M = 4.35 SD = 1.64 Min M = 4.79 SD = 1.79 Max M = 3.57 SD = 1.95 F (1,46) = 5.422, p = .012, η2 = .11 F (1,46) = 5.044, p = .015, η2 = .10 Monetary punishment & social exclusion: r = .487, p = .001
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Studies I – III: Summary Combined sample Similar experimental design and the same hypotheses and dv - No interactions between the factors „study“ and „goal-type“ - No significant differences over the 3 studies with regard to level of identification, negative emotions towards OG, social exclusion, contribution; (exception: punishment)
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Studies I – III: Summary Effect of goal-type on moral outrage towards OG: F (1, 153) = 14.27, p < .001, η2 = .09 Effect of goal-type on social exclusion of members of the OG: F (1, 153) = 10.20, p = .002, η2 = .08 Effect of goal-type on monetary punishment of the OG: F (1, 153) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .09 Behavioral measures: „Monetary punishment“ and „social exclusion“: r = .577, p < .001
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Studies I - III: Summary outrage towards OG β = -.293 ** β = .582 ** goal-type social exclusion β = -.251 ** (-.088 n.s.) Test of the indirect effect: Bootstrapping (N=2000) b=-.68, p=.0006, BCa(95%)=[-1.0523,-.3257].
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Studies I - III: Summary outrage towards OG β = -.293 ** β = .534 ** goal-type monetary punishment β = -.293 ** (-.149 *) Test of the indirect effect: Bootstrapping (N=2000) b=-.56, p=.0009, BCa(95%)=[-1.0583,-.3182].
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups VII Summary • Working experimental paradigm to research explicit negative • behavior towards OG-members - H1: Minimal goal-representation leads to more explicit negative behavior towards the OG than a maximal goal-representation H2 : This relation is mediated by moral outrage towards the outgroup. • Several replications of these results, excluding possible influence of • the research paradigm
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Thank You!
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 71 %; SD=14,37 Maximal goal condition: 76 %; SD=21,61 Cronbachs α=.91 Identification: M=5.25; SD=1.40, Monetary punishment / identification with IG: r=.279, p=.037 Moral outrage / identification with IG: r=.457, p=.001
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I - Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.78) Monetary punishment Minimal goal Maximal goal Minimal goal Maximal goal M = 4.53 SD = 2.06 M = 3.30 SD = 1.97 M = 3.77 SD = 1.53 M = 2.92 SD = 1.50 F (1, 59) = 5.61, p = .011, η2 = .09 F (1, 59) = 4.67, p = .018, η2 = .08 No effect of relative difference in payoff on behavior and emotion!
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Study I - Criticism In minimal goal condition, goal level was given, in maximal goal condition not. → Possible influence of authority/ justification/ attribution. Study II Self selection of group-goal Goal selection: Participants were allegedly randomly selected to suggest a contribution between 10% and 100% as group goal. New DVs: The „lottery item“ – Generalized social exclusion Exclusion from future rounds