H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Hostile Action Based Exercise – May 21, 2013

1. H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Hostile Action Based Exercise – May 21, 2013

2. Discussion Topics • Fixed Nuclear Facilities affecting South Carolina • Types and frequency of exercises • Risk County vs Host County • Darlington County and the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant • Events types and Emergency Classifications • Exercise planning and preparation • Exercise conduct • What can you do to prepare for your next exercise or event?

4. Frequency and Types of Exercises • The State, County and plants are required to conduct biennial • (every two (2) years) exercise. The Robinson Plant exercises • are conducted in the odd numbered years. • During 8 year cycles; • Conduct a HAB exercise with a minimal or no release • scenario - 2013. • Conduct a HAB exercise with a radiological release - 2021. • Conduct an Ingestion Pathway exercise that involves the 50- • mile EPZ - 2015. This will be an NLE involving close to 1000 • players, controllers and evaluators. • A natural or technological hazard exercise that causes a • radiological release or other damage to the facility that • affects the 10-mile EPZ - 2017 & 2019.

5. Risk vs Host County • Risk County – Includes the county where the • plant is located and all counties in the plant’s • 10-mile EPZ. Darlington County is a Risk only county. • Host County – County that provides congregate care facilities (Reception Center and Shelters) for the Risk County. • Florence County is the Host county for Darlington County. They provide a Reception Center at the Florence Civic Center and Shelters at local schools. • Some counties are both Risk and Host – providing congregate care facilities for their citizens. Chesterfield and Lee County are risk/host counties.

8. Types of Events A fire that may or may not result in the release of radiological material if not extinguished immediately A radiological event resulting from a problem with the reactor or the reactor cooling system that occurred as a result of a natural, manmade (other than terrorism) or technological hazard.

9. Types of Events An aircraft crash on site involving either a military or civilian aircraft. An act of terrorism that does not meet the HAB definition.

10. Types of Events A Hostile Action: A Hostile Action is defined as “an act towards a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes an attack by air, land or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles or other devices used to deliver destructive force.” A hostile action will involve a deliberate act(s) with the intent to take control of the plant or seriously damage the plant’s ability to safely operate the plant.

11. Fission Product Barriers The Plant uses a Pressurized Water Reactor with an enclosed cooling system, called the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) that is designed to prevent a radiological release (“The Little Green Nasties”) from the RCS. Those barriers are the Fuel Cladding, the RCS and the containment building (the dome). The Little Green Nasties 3d Fission Product Barrier - Containment Dome with the Reactor Lake water is taken in to create steam and then water is released back to the lake to cool. 2d Fission Product Barrier – Reactor Coolant System 1st Fission Product Barrier - Fuel Rods

12. Emergency Classifications or Emergency Action Levels (EAL) Accidents or events at Nuclear Power Plants are divided into four classifications or EALs: Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) Alert Site Area Emergency (SAE) General Emergency (GE)

13. NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE) Unusual Events are minor events which have occurred, or are in progress, which indicate a potential for degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are not expected, unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. Hostile Action EAL: A credible site specific security threat notification OR Security event as determined and reported by Security Shift supervision OR a valid site-specific notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

14. ALERT Alert conditions are events which have occurred or in progress that involve actual or potential significant degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Minor releases of radioactive material are possible during the events associated with an Alert, however, any release that occurs is expected to be a very small fraction of the allowed exposure levels. Hostile action EAL: Security event in the plant Protected Area as determined and reported by Security Shift supervision OR a valid notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat <30 minutes away OR a notification from Security Shift supervision that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact or other hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Owner Controlled Area.

15. SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) A Site Area Emergency declaration implies events which are in progress or have occurred that involve actual or likely failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. The potential of significant releases of radioactive material exists, but these releases are not expected to exceed exposure limits (except possibly near the site boundary). Hostile action EAL: Security event in a plant vital area as determined and reported by the Security Lieutenant or designee OR notification from Security Shift supervision that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact or other hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area.

16. GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) The highest level of action is the General Emergency. This classification is characterized by events in progress, or that have occurred, which involve actual or imminent substantial core damage with the potential for the loss of containment integrity. The release of radioactive material can be expected to exceed protective guidelines. Hostile action EAL: A hostile force has taken control of plant equipment such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions (i.e., reactivity control, RCS inventory, secondary heat removal or spent fuel pit cooling.)

17. Exercise Planning and Preparation • Initial Planning Conference (IPC) – September 2012 • Midpoint Planning Conference (MPC) – March 2013 • Final Planning Conference (FPC) – April 2013 • Two preparatory exercises prior to the graded event • A TTX held in March 2013 at SIMT in Florence and a • A dress rehearsal exercise held in April 2013 • The graded exercise was conducted on May 21, 2013 with out of sequence Medical Services exercise conducted on May 22, 2013

18. Areas of Concern • 1st HAB exercise in SC • 2d HAB exercise in US – 1st exercise was TMI • Role and functionality of the Incident Command Post • Flow of information between ICP, EOC and SEOC • Scenario - a HAB with a minimal or no release or • a HAB that with a radiological release? • How do we integrate a gunfight into a radiological • exercise? • Several bus routes travel by the plant and in the2-mile EPZ.

19. Areas of Concern • 9 public schools, 9 private schools and Coker College in 5-mile • EPZ. • Location of functional and special medical needs populations. • 79 functional and special medical needs residents in the 10-mile EPZ with 10 residents living in the 2-mile EPZ. • Four (4) assisted living/nursing homes, Carolina Pines RMC, 9 DHEC/DMH DDSNB facilities located in the 5-mile EPZ. • Twenty-nine (29) separate daycares in 10-mile EPZ ranging from 6 kids to over 200 kids each added to evacuation total, an additional 1259 children added to the evacuation total.

20. Areas of Concern • Most daycares are “mom & pop” operations and not prepared to be “self evacuating”. • Coordination between county and state due to sensitivity of law enforcement information. • Plant Security’s ability to downgrade information from a • “Safeguard” to “FOUO” classification so information could be • easily shared with first responders. • Recognized early in the planning process that in the first 1 to 2 hours of a HAB the County would have to operate independent of the State.

21. Areas of Concern • First 90 minutes during exercise were going to be crucial in any response to a HAB. • Public information – extremely critical in a HAB. • The right information at the right time! • Safety of residents adjacent to the plant - reduce the • potential for a “friendly fire” incident. • Safety of the emergency responders going to the plant. • Immediate public and media awareness of the event. • The need to begin releasing information immediately. • Emergency News Release vs an EAS message. • Prescripted press releases used extensively and • modified as needed in follow on releases.

22. 2013 HBRSEP “Hostile Action” Exercise • HAB exercise began as a deliberate attempt to severely damage or take control of the plant. • Established an ICP with a Unified Command System. • Response was multi-agency/multi-discipline. Darlington, Chesterfield, Florence, Lee and Marlboro County Sheriff’s Offices, Hartsville and Darlington Police Departments, DCEMS and Fire, SLED, SCHP, SCDNR, SCEMD and SCDHEC, and the FBI involved initially. • Initially DCSO assumed command, transitioned to DCEMS and DCFD, then transitioned back to DCSO

23. 2013 HBRSEP “Hostile Action” Exercise • EOC was activated/staffed with ESFs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, & 16 and Tech reps or LNOs from HBRSEP, SCEMD and SCDHEC. • The Joint Information Center activated and staffed later in the • event. • Access and Traffic Control Points could be the current static points or developed on the fly as the situation dictated. • No immediate threat to schools, but bus routes become an issue. • PADs are event threat based. • County followed radiological plan.

24. Exercise Scenario • 0733 – Security observes a commercial armored vehicle on Silo Rd. This is reported by telephone to the County’s 911 Center. The 911 Center Director, Emergency Services Director and Sheriff are simultaneously notified of the event. County Alert Roster and department specific Alert Rosters activated. DCSO initiated immediate response to the plant with follow on response by the DCEMS and Fire District. Immediate activation and staffing of the EOC. DCSO requested mutual aid from the Chesterfield, Lee, Florence and Marlboro County Sheriff’s Offices, the Cities of Darlington and Hartsville’s Police Departments and support from SLED and the FBI. An Incident Command Post is established at the Lake Robinson Rescue Squad building approx 1/8 mile from plant.

25. Exercise Scenario • 0735 – Adversaries set an explosive charge on the OCA gate and attack and destroy protected area fencing. • Shift Manager declares a Site Area Emergency based on HAB EAL. • Security observes armored vehicle driving backwards through 2 gates near fuel building. Adversary opens rear door of armored vehicle and fires military style weapon to blast through Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger (SFPC HX) room door • Security officer observe explosion in area of SFPC HX door. Smoke and flame engulf area and intruding vehicle. • Staging area for EMS, Fire resources established at old BiLo Shopping Center on W. Bobo Newsome Hwy in Hartsville.

26. Exercise Scenario • Staging area for law enforcement resources established at Pine Ridge Station 8 adjacent to ICP. • W. Bobo Newsome Hwy between New Market Rd and W. Old Camden Rd shut down, traffic detoured and highway used as ingress and egress routes for emergency responders. • Law enforcement and Plant Security neutralize adversaries. • Fires are extinguished by onsite plant Fire Brigade and DCFD. • Casualties are evacuated and treated by DCEMS and transported to appropriate medical facilities. • Adversary fatalities are left on scene for explosives search and action by Coroner’s Office. • Law enforcement and Security conduct sweep to insure site is secure and all adversaries are accounted for or neutralized.

27. Exercise Scenario • Exercise ran for approximately 5 hours. First 90 minutes, extremely intense. • Incident Command Post established and performed as trained – excellent job. • EOC staff performed as trained – excellent job. • Communications between ICP and EOC accomplished by radio, telephone (landline and cell) and through WEBEOC. • Over 240 entries made into WEBEOC by EOC and ICP staff. • Public information program activated as soon as Sheriff arrived in EOC. • DCSO’s PIO and Emergency Services PIO approved/coordinated all press releases.

28. How can the Healthcare Coalitions help • “Weave a thread between community • and healthcare preparedness”? • Education - Planning - Preparation - Practice • Education – Know the hazards that affect your facilities and how they affect your patients and clients. • Planning – Determine how you are going to respond to the hazard and then recover from the hazard. • Preparation – Have a plan that addresses each hazard and then coordinate the plan with local Emergency Service agencies. • Practice – Train your personnel on the plan and then practice the plan during exercises

29. How can you help? • Know the hazards that affect your facilities. Are the facilities located in the EPZ for a FNF? What natural, technological or manmade hazards affect the facility? Facility often plans do not address the specific impact hazards identified in County plans. • Home health services providers should encourage their clientele to mail the special needs cards in to the FNF and local EMA. • Coalition members should be willing to share information on functional needs and special medical needs clients with their local EMA. • Understand the definition and criteria for a functional need and special medical needs clients.

30. How can you help? • Encourage clientele to have an emergency plan - then know where & how they will get to their evacuation location. • Assisted living and nursing home facilities - coordinate their emergency plans with their local EMA. • Partners should know their local EMA personnel by name, where they are located and how to contact them 24/7. • How soon do you need to make an evacuation decision? • What is required prepare your patients for evacuation? • Resources required for a 100% evacuation of your facility?

31. How can you help? • Ambulance service contracts for evacuation: • Require the service to demonstrate their ability to evacuate your facility. • Do they have contracts with other facilities – if so how many and where are the other facilities located. • Discuss the time required to prepare, load and transport the most critical patient in your facility. • Can the service transport all of the patient meds? Will DHEC allow EMS to transport all medications during an event? Can you provide “just-in-time” training to the Paramedics on the medications before transport? • How many patients can each ambulance carry? • Can your patients be transported on a bus?

32. What did we learn? • ICP and UCS worked far better than expected. • Public safety agencies used NIMS ICS to manage the incident. • Communications and information flow between the plant, the Command Post, the County EOC and SEOC was excellent. • If conflicting information was received, we were able to either verify that the information as valid, or prove the information to be false. • Both formal and informal exercises before the graded exercise validated our plans.

33. What did we learn? • Be critical of our plan – don’t be afraid to question the plan. • Insure that your plan will work and that your staff has confidence in the plan. • Checklist – develop event checklists, test them and use them. • Don’t box yourself in! • Give flexibility in your plan; be able step out of the box. • Don’t be afraid to change the plan. • Then - Follow the plan!

34. END RESULT? A VERY SUCCESSFUL EXERCISE!

35. Questions?