ITOPF INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR SPILL PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND COMPENSATION Madrid, 2 December 2004 Peter M. Swift

1. ITOPF INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR SPILL PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND COMPENSATION Madrid, 2 December 2004 Peter M. Swift

2. Have we learnt the lessons from PRESTIGE ?

3. Should this ship have been allowed to break up ?

4. Was this well coordinated and the best course of action ? • Towing route of ”the Prestige”

5. Should this man have been detained for more than two years without trial ?

6. The principal lessons • Industry’s performance is falling short of Society’s expectations • Society’s tolerance for such accidents is effectively zero

7. Other lessons • Preparedness • Response • Lack of understanding and trust - inadequate dialogue

8. The immediate aftermath • Newsworthy accident invites comments from ALL interested parties • Respondents and commentators have their own agendas

9. Understanding the agenda • Significance of event to local interests routinely underestimated • Industry facts are of limited interest to most • Public and politicians expect ”action” quickly • Scapegoats may be necessary to deflect culpability from others • Media need a good story • Many parties hope to capitalise on the opportunies • Industry is often overcautious – public may doubt the value of investigations, etc.

10. Seeking solutions • - Everyone has the answer ! • Politicians and legislators propose political and legislative solutions • Industry offers technical, operational and procedural solutions • Politicians and public want quick fixes • Industry takes longer term view and cautions against hasty, ill-considered solutions

11. Seeking solutions • Technical versus Political • Industry advocates heavy fuel oil in only double hulls • Politicians demand accelerated single hull phase-out and extra surveys • Industry advocates new measures at global level • Politicians demand regional and local legislation • Industry pushes for Places of Refuge • Politicians demand information on ’dangerous’ ships and cargoes • Industry refers to UNCLOS, MARPOL and SOLAS • Politicians challenge UNCLOS and MARPOL, and support PSSAs • Industry pushes for Reception facilities • Politicians support interceptions and tanker tracking

12. INTERCEPTION ON THE HIGH SEASThe “political” solution

13. Seeking solutions • Technical versus Political • Was industry ”listening” ? • Do the public and politicians care what industry says or thinks ? Or only in what they do or do not do ?

14. As time goes by… • The cold light of day Two years after the accident : • Legal cases pending • Still much speculation • Flag State Accident Investigation Report published

15. Accident Investigation

16. Accident Investigations • Accident investigations and reports leave much to be desired • Industry generally has very poor feedback mechanisms • Many impediments to information sharing • More can be learnt from more minor incidents and near-misses • Confidential incident reporting (and subsequent analysis) requires more support

17. As time goes by… • The cold light of day Two years after the accident: • Action still needed on Places of Refuge • Still more ”sticks” than ”carrots” • Continuing push on ”criminalisation” • Continuing push to increase financial liability • New European safety package in the pipeline • HNS and Bunker Conventions still awaiting sufficient ratifications • CLC and Fund Convention still challenged despite recent revisions • Revisions being sought to UNCLOS and possibly MARPOL

18. As time goes by… • The cold light of day Two years after the accident : • Some advances in preparedness – ITOPF, EU/EMSA et al • Some advances in response planning – owners, cargo interests but lacks real co-ordination Spotlight on : • Flag state competence and IMO audits • More effective Port State Control targeting • Classification societies • International Group of P&I Clubs • ”Image” of shipping industry

19. Have we learnt the lessons ? Hopefully YES

20. Have we learnt the lessons ? • Conclusions Industry’s deliverables: • More transparency • Greater understanding and trust of public and their representatives • Better Preparedness • Better Response planning • Input to more effective regulation • Commitment to continuous improvement

21. Place of Refuge Would this have helped ?

22. Have we learnt the lessons ? • Conclusions Individually we can do much. Together we can do even more.