Transformation of Russia and Ukraine: Social Bases of Reform and Anti-Reform

1. Transformation of Russia and Ukraine: Social Bases of Reform and Anti-Reform David Lane Cambridge University

2. System collapse • Inherent instability of state socialism • political actors, led by ‘elites’, manage socio-economic change • new elites replace faulty institutions of state socialism with markets, private property and democratic institutions

3. Absence of any mass base • What of ‘bottom up’ forces? • Lack of any class analysis • Joseph E.Davis: study of collective identity and political action; • Social movements are amorphous bodies with a shifting focus; political parties lose their saliency • ‘group struggles’ - ‘race, ethnicity, nationality, gender and sexuality

4. Shift from production to consumption • Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, ‘...[P]ost-communist politics cannot be usefully analyzed using the class paradigm • Class formation from state socialism was weak • Absence of empirical backing, assertive in character

5. Public Opinion Polls: Social identification • Russia, April 2005, 1,600 people • Ukraine, 2015 people, September 2005 • Evaluation of: the reform process, privatization, market economy • Political Identifications: Communist, Social-Democrat, Agrarian, Rus/Ukr Nationalist, Liberal, ‘Hard Hand’

6. Communist Identification by Occupational Background

7. Subjective identification • Your generation • Russian/Ukrainian nation • businessmen • Intelligentsia • Workers • Peasants • Students

8. Multiple Identification of Communists • Ukraine: Russian Nation – 93 per cent of communists • Russia: ‘much in common with the working class’ - 79 per cent also identified with communist ideology • Ukraine: those with communist views, 80 per cent had positive identification with working class; 72 per cent pos identification with peasantry • Close identification between working class and communists

9. Communists by Gender • Ukraine, slightly more women than men (17.9 per cent as opposed to 15.4 per cent of the respective gender groups) • Russia, the same: 17.9 per cent of women supported the communists and 15.3 per cent of men

10. Communists: Regional Spread • % of respondents in region with communists views: • Russia: not significant difference • Ukraine: Significant • West: 7.3 • West central: 11.2 • East Central: 15.9 • South: 23.1 • East: 27.3

11. Nationalists • Russia: • Fairly well divided between occupations (more students), gender groups, age groups (rather more younger), regional differences (more in Far East, Central, North-West) • Ukraine: • Significant occupational differences: Students (31% of students), intelligentsia (13.6% of group); age significant – 18 to 29 year olds, 31% of nationalists. Regional differences: West – 38.4% of population, South – 1.8%, East- 2%.

12. Liberal support, by occupation

13. Liberal Views: Social background • Slightly more men than women (% of group) • Strong correlation with age: The younger the more liberal • Russia, 25 to 39 years – 39 per cent of total; Ukraine: 38.9 per cent of category 18 to 29. Both significant at .001 level • Regional: Russia - stronger Moscow, Far East; Ukraine – stronger in West than East

14. Support and Opposition to Reform Policies • Three basic questions: • How do you evaluate the formation of a market economy, with private property and business • The government should provide citizens with work and a normal standard of living • The Government should own the basic • industrial assets of society

15. Support of market economy, by occupational status

17. Support of Market Economy • In Russia, 46.8% women against, 28.2 per cent of men. (.001 level); • in Ukraine, 24% men against34 per cent of women against – significant at .01 • Russia: 72% of under 39 yrs in support ; 36% for over 55 age group • Ukraine: 14% of 18 to 29 cohort against, 55% - over 70s • Ukr. Region: West 87% in favour; South/East 65/68%

18. State Ownership • Widespread support: A Russia, B Ukraine • A:58% B: 62 complete; • A: 28% B: 21 reservations; • A: 10.7% B10 oppose with reservations; • A: 1.5% B4 completely

19. Opposition to state ownershipBy occupational group

20. Opposition to State Ownership Age: Russia, 18-24 years, 16.9%; over 55, 8% Ukraine: 18-29 years, 22.9%, 60-69, 6.1%

21. Summary of Findings • There is a common pattern of ideological orientations in Russia and Ukraine. • Political ideology in both societies is strongly correlated to social background. • Support and opposition to key left-right issues are also related to the same variables and to a similar extent. • Main difference between Russia and Ukraine: a distinct regional bias of the Western Ukraine towards national ideology and more right wing policies.

22. Why Little Systemic Opposition to Reforms Programme? • Potential for political opposition, even counter revolution

23. Elite consensus has neutralised opposition • Lack of organisation of opposition • Coloured Revolutions – support of market • De-ideologised political opposition • Weak basis of ‘civil society’ organisations under communism and since • ‘Sponsored’ civil soc undermined the state • Lack of ideological alternative