Today’s Readings

1. Today’s Readings • Hardin, G. 1968. Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162:1243-1248. • Berkes et al. 2006. Globalization, Roving Bandits and Marine Resources. Science 5767. 1557-1558

2. Managing Common Pool ResourcesLecture 7: Natural Resource Management

3. Management • Actively making decisions about • “Commons Management” is really “people management” • Question about how to influence behaviors of resource use

4. Managing Common Pool ResourcesLecture 7: Natural Resource Management

5. Common-Pool Resources (CPR) A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.

6. Common-Pool Resources (CPR) A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.

7. Common-Pool Resources (CPR) A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Collectively owned and not individually owned

8. What are the commons, how should they be managed and by whom? • Garret Hardin and his notion (1968) • Problem definition and solution • The Old Commons/The New Commons • ElinorOstrom and her notion (1970s-) -- Problem definition and solutions • Cooperation and establishing Rules and Behaviors

9. Learning Goals Describe competing theories to solving the problem of the commons (and their history) Explain mechanisms for commons management Evaluate the role of incentives in policy development in the context of CPR

10. Garrett Hardin • Garrett Hardin 1915-2003 • Ecologist, microbiologist, Professor, UC Santa Barbara • “Tragedy of the Commons” 1968; “Living on a Lifeboat” 1974 • “Tragedy of the Commons” reprinted in over 100 anthologies; tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science

11. Garrett Hardin • Garrett Hardin 1915-2003 • Ecologist, microbiologist, Professor, UC Santa Barbara • “Tragedy of the Commons” 1968; “Living on a Lifeboat” 1974 • “Tragedy of the Commons” reprinted in over 100 anthologies; tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science Environmental/Resource problems were tied to directly to overpopulation of the earth!

12. The Old Commons Tragedy of the commons: every farmer will tend to maximize their own profits by increasing their herd or increasing their gathering of resources without regard to the long-term depletion of the land. This is rational because the benefit to the individual farmer (of, for example, grazing one more animal on the commons) is larger than that farmer’s share of the overall depletion of the shared resource (i.e. the commons).

13. The Old Commons Tragedy of the commons: every farmer will tend to maximize their own profits by increasing their herd or increasing their gathering of resources without regard to the long-term depletion of the land. This is rational because the benefit to the individual farmer (of, for example, grazing one more animal on the commons) is larger than that farmer’s share of the overall depletion of the shared resource (i.e. the commons). Individual benefit > overall resource decline

21. Each actor has 2 interests; individual interest and collective interest

22. Exam Results

23. Exam Results

24. Normally Distributed?

26. Complaints Department • Pass back exams at the end of class • Take note of what you felt was incorrectly marked wrong • Go to office hours and bring evidence from notes or lectures of why you were correct

27. Paper Assignment • A common-pool resource (CPR) is a type of good consisting of a natural or human-made resource system (e.g. an irrigation system or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Because of difficulties associated with the exclusion of potential beneficiaries, several scholars have defined the overuse of CPR as a “tragedy” especially as global populations and resource consumption continue to rise. To address these issues, scholars have proposed competing management schemes which all seek to maintain/sustain CPR and reduce costs associated with these unique resources. Please describe competing theories of common-pool resource management. Include in your description (1) major scholars who have contributed to this field of research (e.g. Hardin versus Ostrom); (2) differences in how the tragedy of the commons is defined (e.g. what is considered to be the “root” of the problem”) (3) potential solutions based on different problem definitions (4) two examples of CPR and the communities that manage them that might be appropriate for different types of resource management arrangements (private property, community-based management, government management, etc.)

28. What to include (1) major scholars who have contributed to this field of research (e.g. Hardin versus Ostrom); • (2) differences in how the tragedy of the commons is defined (e.g. what is considered to be the “root” of the problem”) • (3) potential solutions based on different problem definitions • (4) two examples of CPR and the communities that manage them that might be appropriate for different types of resource management arrangements (private property, community-based management, government management, etc.)

29. Basics • Length 20-25 pages

30. Basics • Length 20-25 pages (APRIL FOOLS!)

31. Basics • Length 4-5 pages • 5 Peer review citations (journal articles): • Additional Ostrom and Hardin article not included. • Include 2 examples of CPR that are/could be sustainably managed under different CPR management arrangements

32. “tragedy” example: fisheries • - Fish are commonly held good • Fish provide15% protein for 3 billion people • worldwide • - Generally agreed that overfishing is taking place Worm et al. Science, 2006 Fig. 1. Global loss of seafood species. Shown is the current trend in fisheries collapses (data points, based on United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization data base), and extrapolated to 2050 (solid line)

33. “tragedy” example: fisheries Roving Bandits: Mobile agents can take advantage of resources then move on before the locals can respond… Globalization, Roving Bandits, and Marine Resources (Berkes et al 2006, Science)

34. Who owns what part of which ocean? Early and mid-20th Century: • 3 miles out was considered marine domain • 1945 Truman extends US jurisdiction to continental shelf (fishing and oil resources; 1947 first oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico) UN: Law of the Sea (1973-1982) enforced 1994 • EEZ 0 – 200 nautical miles (Exclusive Economic Zones) • Nations can manage their business, environment, and marine resources • US has signed by not ratified b/c of International Seabed Authority (which would establish authority to regulate seabed mineral exploration)

35. Who owns what part of which ocean?

36. “tragedy” 2.0 Roving Bandits: The internet has fueled the ease at which bandits can roam… Kaiser’s Spotted Newt

38. Hardin’s Problem Definition Hardin’s main concerns: Self Interest (with a biological basis) and Overpopulation “Freedom to breed is intolerable” Overpopulation harms the world as a whole. The more people there are, the fewer resources there are available to each person. As long as we have a welfare state, people will continue to have more children than is good for society. Rational agents maximize their own good (more children), when the cost to them is relatively low because the cost is shared in common with society as a whole.

39. …but what about conscience and education?

40. …but what about conscience and education? Conscience, education, etc., won’t work, he says, because it is in one’s self-interests to breed. Hardin: contends that individual conscience will not solve the tragedy of the commons because: 1) It discriminates against people of good conscience, and tends to eliminate them from the population.It won’t work in the long run. Nature’s revenge. People without conscience with outbreed the others, and population will increase again eventually. 2) It is not psychologically healthy to force people to act against their own interests on the basis of conscience.

41. The only “rational” solution Rights and freedoms must be restricted for the good of everyone! Mutual coercion to solve population problem (government regulation on number of offspring allowed) and other problems of the commons which are externally imposed. Enclose the commons as private property which will give incentive to the right holder to maintain the resource for his/her benefit.

42. “Tragedy” can only be solved by taking one of two roads Privatization of common property Central Authority Common property

43. 1. Private Property (Personal Incentive) Only have a personal interest That support the private good (“protect what is mine”) Promote the sustainability and augmentation Protects the resource

44. 1. Private Property (Personal Incentive) 2. Institutional Management Institutions  Rules  Behaviors  Limit Only have a personal interest Has no self interest That support the private good (“protect what is mine”) That support the public good (“protect what is everyone’s) Promote the sustainability and augmentation Promote the sustainability and augmentation Protects the resource Protects the resource

45. Rules and Behaviors Harvesting Limitations on Ocean fisheries Time: Season Limitations Space: Marine Protected Areas/Closures Resource Type: Size Total Allowable Catch: Weight Technology: Only Specified Types

46. Sitka Herring Fisheries “Last season the fishery had five openings from March 22 to April 2, the shortest was 15 minutes and the longest two hours and 30 minutes, for a total of seven hours of fishing and a total catch of 14,776 tons of herring.” www.JuneauEmpire.com December 18th 2009 Klas Stope

47. You can only fish during the season

48. You can only fish during the season

49. You can only fish during the season and during that season you can only be out for 3 days at a time

50. You can only fish during the season and during that season you can only be out for 3 days at a time