PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security

1. PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security Lecture 8 – Organizing for Homeland Security

2. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Policy problem. • Maintaining public security is the quintessential function of government. • Existing administrative procedures generally assume a stable, organizational environment with regular procedures operating under normal conditions with time to plan actions, allocate resources and attention, and identify and correct errors before they cause failure.

3. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Policy problem (contd.). • Sudden, threatening events require a rapid shift in perspective, a capacity to absorb damaging information, the mental agility to re-assess the situation in the light of changing events, and an ability to formulate new strategies of action in uncertain environments. • Demands placed on decision-makers in urgent, stressful environments are cognitive, physical, emotional, organizational, and cultural.

4. Comprehensive Emergency Management • Mitigation. • Intelligence and information sharing. • Domestic counterterrorism. • Border and transportation security. • Preparedness. • Critical infrastructure protection. • Defending against catastrophic terrorism. • Response and recovery. • Emergency preparedness and response.

5. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Policy problem (contd.). • These demands exceed human capacity to function effectively under standard administrative procedures. • The rational model is too slow and frequently wrong as situation changes. • Most experienced personnel rely on rapid assessment of the situation, matching to similar situations, and creating a plausible strategy of action from available resources.

6. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Organizational fragility curves. • Buildings and organizations do not collapse all at once. Stresses and strains cumulate until structural viability fails. • Buildings are made of materials; organizations operate primarily with communication and coordination. Primary resource is information used by multiple members to achieve goals. • We know a lot about why buildings collapse. We know almost nothing about organizational capacity for adaptation and capacity to function under stress.

7. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Organizational fragility curves (contd.). • World Trade Center collapsed when steel heated beyond its melting point. • Airport security checks failed. Standard hijacking procedures failed. Emergency management procedures failed. • An interorganizational system. • Disaster response process standard: bottom-up. Describe.

8. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Shared risk. • Natural disasters, technological disasters, and civil disasters are all examples of shared risk (public bads). • Actions taken by one member of the community can affect the risks of other members of the community. • Mitigation of risk also shared. • The critical function is communication and the capacity to access, store, transmit, receive, and comprehend information in real time as events are unfolding.

9. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Shared risk (contd.). • A community’s capacity to mitigate risk and respond to damaging incidents when they occur depends on its ability to assess its own vulnerabilities, monitor its own performance, and mobilize resources in response to threat. • The classic mechanisms for coping with threat include denial, resistance, flight, or the creation of a new system that includes threat as a component. • The latter provides the most effective approach.

10. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Shared risk (contd.). • We must examine current systems. • The primary burden will fall on local first responders and local infrastructure, the levels with least access to resources, training, and capacity to make rapid assessments of risk and build rapidly evolving response systems to reduce or contain threatening events. • Enabling local agencies to share information and resources an important first step.

11. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Complex adaptive systems in disaster environments. • The capacity to adapt to new information and reallocate resources and actions is “self-organization”. • The “edge of chaos”. • The capacity to learn from incoming information in a dynamic environment alters the operating context for organizations. • Dependent on access to information. (Flight 93). • Quality of technical information infrastructure is critical.

12. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Types of adaptation in response to threat. • Articulation of commonly understood meanings between a system and its members. • Sufficient trust among leaders, organizations, and citizens to enable members to accept direction. • Sufficient resonance between the emerging system and its environment to gain support for action. • Sufficient resources to sustain collective action under varying conditions. • The most critical is the first.

13. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Three different sets of characteristics. • Technical structure, organizational flexibility, and cultural openness. • Four types of adaptive systems. • Nonadaptive – low on all three. – Three flights. • Emergent – low, medium, medium. – Flight 93. • Operative – medium, medium, medium. – Government response. • Auto-adaptive – high, high, high. – None.

14. Governance Under Fire: Organizational Fragility in Complex Systems • Next steps. • We may improve interorganizational performance in the complex environment of disaster by studying systematically the conditions under which organizations fail, and identifying the break-points in the system that are vulnerable to threats. • Emergency operations are nonlinear and dynamic and not rational. Emergency response is not linear but dynamic and interjurisdictional that escalates and deescalates. • Maintaining public security in the face of threats will require a substantial investment in information technology.

15. Structures for Organizing Homeland Security • Coordination office in Executive Office of the President. • Advantages. • Presidential attention. • Increased coordinative capacity. • Overlapping jurisdiction. • Disadvantages. • Lack of statutory authority. • Lack of budgetary authority.

16. Structures for Organizing Homeland Security • Cabinet-level agency. • Advantages. • Statutory authority. • Budgetary authority. • Legitimacy. • Centralization. • Disadvantages. • Coordination problems. • Bureaucratic inertia. • Slowness of response.

17. Gilmore Commission, 2nd Report • The United States has no coherent, functional national strategy for combating terrorism. • The next President should develop and present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office.

18. Gilmore Commission, 2nd Report • The organization of the Federal government’s programs for combating terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable. • The next President should establish a National Office of Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President, and should seek a statutory basis for this office.

19. Gilmore Commission, 2nd Report • The Congress shares responsibility for the inadequate coordination of programs to combat terrorism. • The Congress should consolidate its authority over programs for combating terrorism into a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism – joint or separate – and Congressional leadership should instruct all other committees to respect the authority of this new committee and to conform strictly to authorizing legislation.

20. Gilmore Commission, 2nd Report • The Executive Branch and the Congress have not paid sufficient attention to State and local capabilities for combating terrorism and have not devoted sufficient resources to augment these capabilities to enhance the preparedness of the nation as a whole. • The Executive branch should establish a strong institutional mechanism for ensuring the participation of high-level State and local officials in the development and implementation of a national strategy for terrorism preparedness.

21. Gilmore Commission, 2nd Report • Federal programs for domestic preparedness to combat terrorism lack clear priorities and are deficient in numerous specific areas. • Specific functional recommendations. • Collecting intelligence, assessing threats, and sharing information. • Operational coordination. • Training, equipping, and exercising. • Health and medical considerations. • Research and development and national standards. • Providing cyber security against terrorism.

22. Hart-Rudman Commission, 3rd Report • Five goals. • Ensuring security of the American homeland. • Recapitalizing America’s strengths in science and education. • Redesigning key institutions of the Executive branch. • Overhauling the U.S. government’s military and civilian personnel systems. • Reorganizing Congress’s role in national security affairs.

23. Hart-Rudman Commission, 3rd Report • Securing the homeland. • The creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. • Built around FEMA, Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol. • Cabinet status, advisor to National Security Council.

24. Hart-Rudman Commission, 3rd Report • Securing the homeland (contd.). • Recommend a new office of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security in Department of Defense. • Recommend the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission. • Recommend Congress reorganize itself to accommodate the executive branch realignment and create select committee for homeland security.

25. U.S. Government Accounting Office – Homeland Security • Elements of a national homeland security strategy. • Clearly define and establish the need for homeland security and its operational components. • Clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities and build a framework for partnerships for coordination, communication, and collaboration. • Create specific expectations for performance and accountability, including establishing goals and performance indicators.

26. U.S. Government Accounting Office – Homeland Security • National strategy development and implementation. • A regular update of a national-level threat and risk assessment effort. • Formulate realistic budget and resource plans to eliminate gaps, avoid duplicate effort, avoid “hitchhiker” spending, and protect against substitution. • Coordinate the strategy for combating terrorism with efforts in cyber security. • Coordinate agency implementation by reviewing agency and interagency programs to accomplish the national strategy. • Carefully chose the most important policy tools of government to best implement the national strategy and achieve national goals.

27. U.S. Government Accounting Office – Homeland Security • A central focal point or agency should be established statutorily to coordinate and oversee homeland security. OHS should continue job even with DHS.

28. U.S. Government Accounting Office – Homeland Security