Justyna Adamczyk

1. Polish Regulatory Authority’s experience from implementation of the outcomes from INSARR mission to the Maria research reactor Justyna Adamczyk Department of Nuclear SafetyNational Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) International Conference on Research Reactors: Safe Management and Effective Utilization IAEA HQ, Vienna 16-20 Nov 2015

2. Overview • Introduction: • PAA’s mission and activities • Maria research reactor – major facility under PAA’s supervision • INSARR for Maria RR & timeline • Main issues and recommendations from the INSARR mission: • Safety Analysis Report • Safety Analysis Chapter • OLCs Chapter • Integrated Management System • Ageing management and Maintenance programme • Radiological protection programme improvement • Inspections – Safety culture • Conclusion • Lessons learned

3. NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (PAA) - Mission & Activities • Mission: • Through regulatory and supervisory activities PAA aims to ensure that activities involving exposure to ionizing radiation are conducted safely both for workers, the general public and the environment. • Activities: • Involvement in developing national regulations • Issuing regulatory recommendations • Granting authorization and issuance of personal licenses • Monitoring and emergency preparedness • Review and assessment • Regulatory inspections of facilities and their activities • Enforcement of the compliance with the PAA requirements • International cooperation

4. MARIA RESEARCH REACTOR – Major facility under PAA’s supervision Operator: National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ)

5. INSARR for Maria RR & timeline Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors is conducted at the request of the Member State (operating organization - NCBJ) in order to review of the safety of the Maria research reactor

6. Main issues and recommendations from INSARR • INSARR team observed issues and made suggestions in following areas: • Safety Analysis Report • Integrated Management System • Ageing management • Maintenance programme • Radiological protection programme • Emergency plan and preparedness • Inspections –Safety culture

7. Safety Analysis Report (SAR) • INSARR team observation • Significant inconsistencies among the different chapters of the SAR • SAR was not reflecting the actual status of the reactor facility, caused by conversion to LEU and technical improvements in the cooling system • Regulatory body action • Request of revised documentation in accordance with updated Polish regulations and the IAEA safety standards (NS-R-4) • Request of updated SAR, especially with updated technical drawings, correction of technical inconsistencies between supporting documentation • Regulatoryfollow-up inspections during the License Renewal process • Result • Need additional safety analysis calculation • Need a revision of the Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs)

8. Safety Analysis Report (SAR) – Safety Analisys Chapter • INSARR team observation • Need to perform additional calculations for identified postulated initiating events • Need to perform additional safety analysis for maximum allowable neutron fluence of the beryllium and graphite blocks • Verification of the coolant flow limit • Regulatory body action • Requirement to perform additional calculation covering each accident situation with the evaluation of radiological consequences, impact of the releases to the environment, detailed procedures of emergency actions • Requirement of the safety analysis for the critical coolant flow of the individual fuel assembly calculations (for the ONBR = 1 and 1,2) • Safety Analysis Section in the PAA performed dose calculation, releases calculation and critical flow limit simultaneously • Result • Changes of Operational Limits and Conditions Chapter

9. Safety Analysis Report (SAR) – OLCs Chapter • INSARR team observation • The OLCs do not reflect the actual status of the reactor facility, some sections still referred to a core with full HEU fuel assemblies and did not reflect the refurbishment and modifications of the facility • Need to include a section on periodic testing • Need to include a section on administrative requirements • Regulatory body action • Requirement of updated SAR and Safety Analysis subsequently lead to updates in the OLCs Chapter • Result • Changes of the coolant flow regime - modification of the maximum allowable limits • Emergency plan was broadened to the calculated dose rates inside the reactor building, the fission product releases to the environment, and the dose rates on-site and off-site • Section on administrative requirements and reference to a section on periodic testing was added

10. Integrated Management System • INSARR team observation • Quality Assurance programme (QA) which was established, was covering all activities important to the reactor safe operation, maintenance, radiation protection, modification and refurbishment projects. • The basis of the QA programme was the national standardsand outdated IAEA safety standards • Regulatory body action • Requirement of a plan for transition from the existing Quality Assurance programme (QA) to the Integrated Management System (IMS) • Result • Development of IMS was finalized in 2015 before the license renewal process completion

11. Ageing management & Maintenace programme • INSARR team observation • Lack of a systematic ageing management programme • Ageing management programme should be established and should cover all the SSCs important to the reactor safety • Lack of a formal preventive maintenance programme • Maintenance, periodic testing and inspections activities were conducted through the so-called “revision book”. • Regulatory body action • Requirement from the operator to perform a verification of reactor SSC’s from the ageing perspective and update internal procedures following the IAEA safety standard SSG-10 • Requirement of development of the maintenance, periodic testing and inspection programme in accordance with the IAEA safety standards NS-R-4 and NS-G-4.2 • Result • Requirement added to conditions of the issued licensefor operation (April 2015)

12. Radiological protection programme improvement • INSARR team observation • Formal operational radiation protection programme should be developed • Recommendations on radiological classification of working areas and labeling of controlled areas • Modernization in the facility (reparation of gaps and cracks on the floor and damaged painting of the walls) • Regulatory body action • Requirement of a new classification and labeling of controlled areas followed-by regulatory inspections • Results • Operator established zones within the controlled areas in accordance with potential contamination and radiation hazards with a proper access control • Locations and items with high radiation level or contamination has been appropriately marked indicating the radiological risk • Operator is in the process of implementing the renovation of flooring in the controlled zone

13. Inspections – Safety culture • INSARR team observation • Frequent interaction between the regulatory body and the operating organization and the comprehensive character of the regulatory inspection activities, which cover most of the safety areas • Regulatory body action • PAA established: • The quality assurance programme in the scope of the inspection • Regulatory inspections dedicated to follow-up the implementation of the recommendations provided by the INSARR mission – mainly fulfilled during the license renewal process • Legal requirements that the operating organization will report on events having safety significance

14. Conclusion INSARR mission in Poland

15. Lessons learned

16. Thank you for your attention!