190 likes | 403 Views
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 14 Minds and Bodies #3 (Jackson). By David Kelsey. Contemporary dualism. Dualism revisited: Contemporary philosophical defenders of dualism have rather different views from those Descartes had. They are more interested in consciousness.
E N D
Introduction to PhilosophyLecture 14Minds and Bodies #3 (Jackson) By David Kelsey
Contemporary dualism • Dualism revisited: • Contemporary philosophical defenders of dualism have rather different views from those Descartes had. • They are more interested in consciousness. • Even if Physicalism can explain a lot of things, it can’t explain conscious experience.
Qualia • Conscious Experience: • When philosophers talk about consciousness, we have a very precise type of issue in mind. • By Conscious experience, philosophers mean issues about what it’s like to have certain experiences: • What it’s like to see red. • … • These mental states are called qualia. • Also called raw feels or sense data.
More on Qualia • Qualia: • The easiest way to get the idea of qualia is to think about people who are experiencing the same things you are, but have different qualia. • The colorblind person… • The Qualia of Driving: • Have you ever had the experience of a long drive? • Zoning out and the missing Qualia…
Inverted Qualia • Inverted Qualia: • Suppose that there’s someone who, from birth, when they see red, has just the experience you have when you see blue and vice versa. • Their red and blue qualia are reversed, or inverted. • They call the color of a ripe tomato ‘red’ even though their qualia is like your blue qualia… • Can you tell from someone’s behavior that they’re suffering from inverted qualia?
Physicalism and Qualia • Qualia: trouble for Physicalism: • What we’ve said about qualia so far is already trouble for some kinds of physicalism. • The Behaviorist can’t allow for the possibility of inverted qualia, since people with inverted qualia would behave just like the rest of us. • What about the identity theorist?
Jackson • Frank Jackson (1943-present) • An Australian philosopher. • Most famous for his knowledge argument for dualism. • He has actually given up dualism now, but he still thinks the argument is valid. • He is known for giving very convincing, commonsensical arguments
Jackson &What Mary didn’t know • The Mary Thought Experiment: • Imagine a woman Mary • Mary is a brilliant scientist who’s been imprisoned for life in a room painted entirely black and white. • Even Mary herself is painted. • She conducts experiments (viewing the results through black and white TV) and learns every physical fact about the mind. • The physical properties of color and the eye’s response to light… • What Mary doesn’t know: • Even after Mary has learned every physical fact, she still doesn’t know what it’s like to see the color red. • Imagine what happens when she steps outside of the room for the first time and sees a ripe tomato.
Thought Experiments • Thought experiments: • Jackson’s example of Mary is a thought experiment. • A thought experiment is a constructed case which is used to test our intuitions about some philosophical puzzle... • So Jackson constructs the Mary thought experiment to test our intuitions about Dualism. • In particular, the Mary experiment is supposed to lead us to the intuition that Mary learns a non-physical fact…
The Knowledge Argument • The Knowledge argument: • Jackson takes the Mary thought experiment as evidence against Physicalism • His argument is known as the Knowledge argument: • 1. Mary knows every fact about the physical world. • 2. Mary learns a fact about qualia, which she didn’t previously know, when she steps out of the black and white room. • 3. Thus, facts about qualia are facts about the nonphysical. • 4. Thus, Physicalism is false. • 5. Thus, Dualism is true.
Epiphenomenalism • Epiphenomenalism: • A thing is epiphenomenal if and only if it can be caused by other things, but never causes anything itself. • According to Jackson, Qualia are epiphenomenal. • Qualia are caused by physical states, such as brain states, but they do not have any physical effects. • So there are two types of Dualists: • Interactionists like Descartes: the non-physical aspects of the mind have physical causes and physical effects. • Epiphenomenalists like Jackson: the non-physical aspects of the mind have physical causes but no physical effects.
Epiphenomenalism and beliefs • Although the Epiphenomalist thinks Qualia are non-physical states, he does allow that some mental states are physical states. • Belief states and desire states are physical states: • According to the Epiphenomenalist, only physical states can cause other physical states. • Belief states and Desire states cause you to act. • Beer in the fridge example…
Objection #1: Zombies • The Problem of other minds: • Epiphenomenalism suffers from the problem of other minds… • Someone who lacks all Qualia is called a zombie. • According to epiphenomenalism, zombies would be physically just like us… • So how could I tell that you’re not a zombie?
Objection #2: Could we know that epiphenomenalism is true? • Could we even know Epiphenomenalism was true: • Suppose epiphenomenalism was true. • Suppose I’ve convinced you all with Jackson’s argument. • At no point did qualia play any causal role in the argument that convinced you. • How then can the Knowledge argument be a good reason to believe its conclusion?
Physicalism and Qualia • Qualia are a problem for Physicalism: • How should the Physicalist think about qualia? • What should the Physicalist say about inverted qualia? • How should the Physicalist reply to the knowledge argument? Two options: • Mary wouldn’t learn anything new when she leaves the black and white room. • Mary would learn something, but not a new fact.
Denying the Intuition • The first Physicalist response is to Deny the intuition: • Some physicalists deny that Mary would learn anything new when she leaves the black and white room. • We can only have the intuition that she learns if we are genuinely able to imagine the case as described. • Maybe we can’t imagine Jackson’s Mary experiment: • …because we can’t imagine what someone would do who knew every physical fact. • Jackson’s reply: • but you only have to imagine Mary knows every relevant fact.
The Ability hypothesis • The Second Physicalist response: Mary doesn’t learn a new fact: • Mary doesn’t learn a new fact, she acquires the ability to distinguish red things from dark grey things… • Riding a bike: • Learning to see red is like learning to ride a bike: they can’t be learned in a book… • So Knowing how to do something is not the same as knowing that something is true. • Jackson’s reply: • But Mary always had the ability to distinguish red things from dark grey things. • Is this response adequate? • Question: is what Mary learns like an ability or is it like a fact?