Some Hope for Intuitions A Reply to Weinberg

1. Thomas Grundmann Universität zu Köln Workshop “Armchair in Flames?” Cologne, Sept. 22-24, 2008 Some Hope for IntuitionsA Reply to Weinberg

2. Introduction 1 • Intuition (broad sense): “we will call any judgment an intuitive judgment, or more briefly an intuition, just in case that judgment is not made on the basis of some kind of explicit reasoning process that a person can consciously observe.” (Gopnik/Schwitzgebel 1998, 77)  source-unspecific • Refinements:  Intuitions persist in the face of conflicting knowledge Not beliefs (judgments), but propositional seemings or attractions to assent!

3. Introduction 2: contents of intuitions

4. Introduction 3 • We have the capacity to say whether hypothetical cases, if they were actual, would be cases to which a certain concept X applies (extensional intuitions). • Constitutive of our capacities to make judgments • Essential to conceptual analysis (method of cases, philosophical thought experiments) We are testing philosophical claims about the definition or essence of X against our extensional intuitions about hypothetical scenarios.

5. Introduction 4 Common sense practice & conceptual analysis claim: “Extensional intuitions constitute evidence.” Experimental philosophy: “Let us do empirical research on extensional intuitions of people, instead of relying on the idiosyncratic intuitions of certain philosophers.”

6. Introduction 5 Varieties of X-Phi: 1. Constructive view (Nadelhoffer): The method of cases in philosophy should better rely on those intuitions which empirical research finds widely shared. 2. Critical view Radical eliminativism (Stich) Intuitions never provide evidence! Restrictionist view (Weinberg) Extensional intuitions about philosophically relevant (bizarre) cases do not provide evidence.

7. Introduction 6 What are the standard arguments of the critically minded proponents of X-Phi? 1. Strong variation of extensional intuitions (Stich) R This only shows the fallibility of intuitions. (Sosa 2008, BonJour 1998) 2. Callibration objection: missing independent metajustification of the source (Cummins 1998) R This objection would apply to all basic sources of evidence:  global skepticism (Sosa 2007, p. 64).

8. Introduction 7 Weinberg’s new argument – in short (in Weinberg 2007a): There is a condition X which any trustworthy source has to satisfy. Condition X: We must be able to detect and correct errors of the source. Then, the source will be called “hopeful.” Typical sources of evidence (as perception) are hopeful. But the philosophers’ appeals to intuition (PAI) are not hopeful. We can justify that condition X holds without relying on PAI.

9. Overview 1. Reconstruction of Weinberg’s case against PAI Significance and epistemic status of “hope” there is no evidence against and some evidence for the view that PAI is hopeful 2. The threat of epistemic inconsistency in Weinberg’s case against PAI

10. Weinberg’s case against PAI Hopeless sources do not provide us with evidence. A source is hopeful iff it satisfies at least one of the following criteria: (A) it is open to external corroboration, or (B) it is open to a coherence check, or (C) its margins of errorare detectable, or (D) we have at least a rudimentary theory of its proper function. PAI clearly does neither satisfy (A) nor (C) nor (D). Folk intuitions about philosophical cases are unstable. The intuitions used by PAI do not rely on any special, exclusively philosophical sources. The intuitions used by PAI are unstable. (from 4,5) We cannot make coherence checks on the basis of unstable intuitions. PAI is hopeless. (from 2, 3, 6, 7) PAI does not provide us with evidence. (from 1, 8)

11. Weinberg’s premise (1.) (1.) Hopeless (and fallible) sources do not provide us with evidence. Weinberg (2007a, p. 325): “The line I wish to push is that it is our capacity to detect and correct errors (= the property of being hopeful, TG) that makes the difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy source.”

12. Weinberg’s premise (1.) • Weinberg himself does not say that hopeless sources do not provide us with evidence. That’s my interpretation. He says that they are not trustworthy. Two readings of being trustworthy • being an highly virtuous epistemic source. • satisfying the minimal conditions for being an acceptable epistemic source (= providing evidence). If Weinberg prefers reading (1.), then the result of his whole argument is rather weak: we should not trust PAI (340) (= should not assume that PAI is a highly virtuous source), but it does not follow that we should not use PAI as a proper source of evidence. PAI may still be good enough. Only reading (2.) can support the conclusion that we should withhold from PAI, until it is elaborated as a hopeful source.

13. Weinberg’s premise (1.) • Therefore, I choose reading (2.) to be adequate. • The capacity of error-correction is surely helpful! • Cancelling out errors (diachronic improvement on the truth-ratio) • Rational resolution of disagreements • The important question is whether this capacity is necessary for being a source of evidence.

14. Weinberg’s premise (1.) Two objections: O1 Even if hopefulness is useful, it is not necessary for being a genuine source of evidence. Assume that a reliable source produces intra- and intersubjectively consistent true results in most cases. But in the rare cases of disagreement, we cannot decide which side is correct. This source is not hopeful (we are not able to detect and correct errors), but we can isolate errors and overcome disagreement (by withholding judgment). This source seems clearly to provide evidence.

15. Weinberg’s premise (1.) O2 Weinberg assumes that being a reliable source is not sufficient for being hopeful. Hopefulness belongs to “epistemic factors other than reliability” (325). This cannot be correct! A If a source is fairly reliable on the whole and if its results are not completely unrelated to each other, then it will always be possible to correct errors by coherence considerations or (narrow) reflective equilibrium. Under normal conditions reliable sources will be hopeful.

16. Weinberg’s premise (2.) According to (2.), we have (at least) four different ways to detect errors: (A) external corroboration (B) internal coherence (C) detectability of margins (D) theoretical understanding

17. Weinberg’s premise (2.) Comments: Basic sources are often exclusive sources such that there is only one source with respect to a domain of facts (e.g. color perception, testimony of experts). Theoretical understanding of basic sources always comes historically late. Internal indicators of margins are specific to perception. Conclusion: Errors of basic sources are often detected by the internal coherence checks(B). Other criteria apply only to some, but not all basic sources.

18. Weinberg’s premise (3.) (3.) PAI clearly does neither satisfy (A) nor (C) nor (D). Comments: (A) Judgments about far-fetched possible cases can only rely on conceptual intuition: intuition is an exclusive source. (D) We have only a rough (pre-scientific) understanding of conceptual intuitions. They are judgments (seemings) exclusively based on competence to use the concept in question. We also have an explanation of how conceptual intuitions can be reliable: Our capacity to apply a concept to hypothetical cases fixes the reference of that concept (epistemic theory of concepts). (C) Brute errors only occur if our judgments about hypothetical cases are determined by factors other than conceptual competence. Since the sources of these judgments are opaque, we cannot easily use this criterion to correct errors.

19. Weinberg’s premise (4.) (4.) Folk intuitions about philosophical cases are unstable. “broad disagreement can arise in even such key discipline-defining intuitions as the Gettier cases in the theory of knowledge (…).” (Weinberg 2007a, 337) Comments: Folk intuitions about philosophical cases radically vary with contextual factors such as culture, socio-economic status, affects, order of thought experiments. This fact is established by empirical surveys of X-Phi.

20. Weinberg’s premise (5.) (5.) The intuitions used by PAI do not rely on any special, exclusively philosophical sources. Comments: Esoteric sources of philosophical intuitions (intellectual perception of abstract reality) are highly implausible. But then philosophers don’t have other general sources of evidence than ordinary people: conceptual competence!

21. Weinberg’s crucial step … (4.) Folk intuitions about philosophical cases are unstable. (5.) The intuitions used by PAI do not rely on any different, exclusively philosophical sources. (6.) The intuitions used by PAI are unstable. (from 4,5) Weinberg: this argument is based on non-deductive reasoning (the inference is defeasible). Nevertheless the argument is supposed to make the truth of (6.) likely.

22. … is a non-sequitur 1 Non-deductive (inductive) reasoning is valid, if the sample whose features are generalized is representative. Are folk intuitions representative of philosophers’ intuitions? Extensional folk intuitions (of untutored laypersons) about hypothetical cases: Spontaneous judgments (seemings, attractions) whose source is hidden to the subject Not source-specific Based on: Experience Background theories Predjudice Conceptual competence All kinds of psychological effects

23. … is a non-sequitur 2 X-Phi shows that there are sources of folk intuitions that are different from conceptual competence. 1. Relativity to cultural background could be explained by culture-relative concepts (the Western concept of knowledge is different from the East Asian concept). BUT: radical intersubjective instability even within homogeneous cultural backgrounds: Westeners disagreement on the Gettier cases Inconsistent intuitions (Gettier cases – barn façade case)

24. … is a non-sequitur 3 X-Phi shows that there are sources of folk intuitions that are different from conceptual competence. 2. Many folk intuitions are under the influence of psychological effects as the priming effect (Truetemp) or affects (attribution of moral responsibility). 3. Shared folk intuitions are sometimes radically different from the intuitions shared by all philosophers (Barn façade case).

25. … is a non-sequitur 4 Official view of philosophers’ intuitions used by PAI: based on conceptual competence only: conceptual intuitions the capacity to apply a concept to hypothetical cases (conceptual competence) fixes its reference Care, training, familiarity with bizarre cases, conceptual sophistication leads to a superior performance of conceptual competence.

26. … is a non-sequitur 5 • Philosophers assume that their extensional intuitions about bizarre cases reflect conceptual competence much more often than the extensional intuitions of the folk. • What would be a good explanation of this difference? H1 Philosophers are much better in selecting conceptual intuitions from the pool of source-unspecific intuitions. “As (the thought experiment, TG) is a reflective exercise, it also presupposes that the subject of the thought experiment is able to distinguish between judgments solely based on competence (…).” (Ludwig 2007, 135) O Sources of intuitions are introspectively opaque!

27. … is a non-sequitur 6 H2 Conceptual competence is sufficient to determine intuitive responses to hypothetical cases only, if the subject deeply understands the relevant aspects of the case. Ordinary cases: There is no difference between the folk and philosophers’ intuitions. Bizarre cases: • Philosophical training and expertise about the topic enables philosophers to be sensitive to the case’s relevant aspects. • The folk misses deep understanding of the case. Relevant aspects are not salient.

28. … is a non-sequitur 7 • Is it the degree of reflection that makes the difference? (Kauppinen 2006) • This is not my view! • Philosophers gain a deeper understanding of the case. • They are able to see the case in the light of relevant contrasts that often are hidden to the layperson, no matter how long and carefully she is reflecting on the case.

29. … is a non-sequitur 8 • Example: Truetemp case No purely conceptual intuitions about this case, unless we understand the case in the light of the following conceptual framework: • Truetemp does not have any evidence for his belief about the temperature. • Truetemp does not have any evidence for his capacity being reliable. • The newly acquired capacity does not have any proper function. Saying all of this explicitly may mislead the untutored subject:  Truetemp is not justified in his belief.

30. … is a non-sequitur 9

31. … is a non-sequitur 10 What Weinberg could reasonably claim is this: If the sources of philosophers’ intuitions were sufficiently similar to that of folk intuitions, then the empirically established instability of folk intuitions would be a good reason to expect philosophers’ intuitions to be unstable, too. Weinberg does nothing to establish the antecedent! Therefore, the inference from the instability of folk intuitions to the instability of philosophers’ intuitions is invalid. Philosophers need not demonstrate stability in advance. This would be shifting the burden of argument!

32. … is a non-sequitur 11 • The moral: Don’t speculate but do serious empirical research on the intuitions of philosophers!

33. Philosophers’ Intuitions are not unstable 1 (6.) also seems to be false: the philosopher’s intuitions are not (at least not in general) unstable. Argument: Most of the crucial intuitions are uncontroversial even between philosophical opponents. If philosophers’ intuitions were as unstable as Weinberg assumes, the defeated positions would regularly claim opposing intuitions. But they don’t. In philosophy, intuitions are treated as reflecting facts. If philosophers want to hold on to a view in the face of opposing intuitions, the usual move is to accommodate these intuitions, not to disclaim them.

34. Philosophers’ Intuitions are not unstable 2 Examples: Kripke’s Gödel-case: “it has turned out that almost all philosophers share the intuitions elicted by Kripke’s fictional cases, including most of his opponents. Even contemporary descriptivists allow that these intuitions have falsified traditional forms of descriptivism (…).” (Machery e.a. 2008, 48) Gettier-cases: “In the period immediately preceding (…) Gettier’s (…) article (…), this JTB analysis was affirmed by virtually every writer in epistemology. Then Gettier (…) changed the course of epistemology. He did this by presenting two clear and undeniable counterexamples (…).” (Pollock 1986, 180)

35. Philosophers’ Intuitions are not unstable 3 Examples: Frankfurt’s counterexample against the assumption that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise: “Most contributors (…) have deemed the objection successful. Compatibilists have used it in criticizing incompatibilism (…), and some incompatibilists have attempted to accommodate Frankfurt’s moral in refined incompatibilist views.” (Mele/Robb 2001, 242) Further examples: Leher’s Truetemp accepted by exernalists (Swain e.a. 2008, 140); BonJour’s Norman accepted by externalists (Goldman 1986, 112)

36. Philosophers’ Intuitions are not unstable 4 Why Weinberg’s attempt to explaining away the appearance of stability fails: Philosophers with deviant intuitions will not be accepted by the scientific community. “having the ‘right’ intuitions is the entry ticket to various subareas of philosophy” (Weinberg 2007a, 337) R If this were correct, only those intuitions that fit with the majority view would be accepted. But then the power of revolutionary intuitions (e.g. Gettier) could not be explained.

37. Philosophers’ Intuitions are not unstable 5 Why Weinberg fails (continued) 2. Philosophical intuitions are the product of our respective background theories (theory contamination). (Weinberg 2007a, 338) R1 The Gettier intuition is not based on any theory. R2 This view leaves unexplained the stability of philosophical intuitions between rival theorists. 3. Primacy effects: “especially thoughtful people tend to lock in their initial judgments, and their very thoughtfulness allows them to rationalize away those considerations that might have led to future revisions.” (Weinberg 2007a, 338) R This is incompatible with the existence of revolutionary intuitions!

38. What has been demonstrated so far Hopeless sources do not provide us with evidence. (FALSE) A source is hopeful iff it satisfies at least one of the following criteria: (A) it is open to external corroboration, or (B) it is open to coherence check, or (C) its margins are detectable, or (D) we have at least a rudimentary theory of its proper function. PAI clearly does neither satisfy (A) nor (C) nor (D). Folk intuitions about philosophical cases are unstable. The intuitions used by PAI do not rely on any different, exclusively philosophical sources. The intuitions used by PAI are unstable. (from 4,5) (NON-SEQUITUR, FALSE) We cannot make coherence checks on the basis of unstable intuitions. PAI is hopeless. (from 2, 3, 6, 7) PAI does not provide us with evidence. (from 1, 8)

39. Some conclusions C1 Weinberg fails to show that philosophers’ intuitions are unstable. C2 The instability of philosophers’ intuitions can and should be (but has not yet been) empirically tested by X-Phi. Any claim about their instability is at this moment completely speculative. C3 If philosophers’ intuitions turn out to be instable, PAI will be hopeless. C4 But that would not be the main fault of PAI (since (1.) has turned out to be incorrect). C5 Rather, an unstable source is automatically unreliable.

40. Is the challenge to PAI self-refuting? 1 Bealer’s objection (1992): All challenges to PAI rely on arguments including at least one premise which cannot be justified without PAI itself.  If the conclusion is true (PAI is not trustworthy), then it is not justified (epistemic inconsistency). Applied to Weinberg’s challenge: In order to justify the conclusion (9.) PAI does not provide us with evidence we need premise (1.) Hopeless sources do not provide us with evidence. But (1.) has to be justified by PAI. Hence: Weinberg’s challenge is epistemically inconsistent.

41. Is the challenge to PAI self-refuting? 2 Weinberg’s reply: The crucial premise (1.) – the epistemic norm – can be justified empirically (or by uncontroversial intuitions about ordinary cases), without using PAI. We can find out empirically (or by using uncontroversial intuitions about ordinary cases)that “we want our epistemic norms to do a good job of producing true beliefs.” (Weinberg 2007a, 340) We then will discover that being hopeful is truth-conducive and hence a good means to achieve what we want. 2. We can find out empirically that epistemic norm (1.) “is well established in both our folk and scientific practices.” (Weinberg 2007a, 340)

42. Is the challenge to PAI self-refuting? 3 Objections to Weinberg: Granted that we want our epistemic norms to do a good job in producing true beliefs, I simply do not see why any aim you like should fix the true standards of epistemic norms: it must be epistemic aims! I also want that living in accordance with our moral norms does a good job in producing individual well-being. But this does not fix the true standard of moral norms. In order to understand that truth is the definingaim of our epistemic norms, we cannot avoid analyzing epistemic concepts by PAI. We have to evaluate a lot of bizarre, far-fetched cases in order to gain good inductive evidence supporting this strong modal claim.

43. Is the challenge to PAI self-refuting? 4 • Objections to Weinberg: 2. Assume that our successful folk and scientific practices are hopeful. This demonstrates that hopeful sources are trustworthy. But it does not demonstrate that hopeless sources are not trustworthy (as (1.) claims).

44. Is the challenge to PAI self-refuting? 5 • Let us further assume that it also has turned out empirically that hopeless sources are not successful within folk and scientific practices. • But this does not show that hopeless sources are nowhere (in no discipline) successful (as (1.) claims). Why should the standards of the folk and the sciences apply across the board (i.e. also to philosophy)? • Analogy: It seems that within folk theory and scientific practices the only successful methods are empirical. But it surely would be a non-sequitur to conclude that empirical methods are the only successful methods in general. • There seems to be no way to establish (1.) without relying on PAI.

45. Final conclusions • Weinberg does neither show that sources of evidence must be hopeful nor does he show that PAI is hopeless. • Hence, Weinberg’s challenge to PAI is not successful. • But Weinberg’s challenge could not even possibly succeed, since it has turned out to be epistemically inconsistent in so far it is completely general. • If it will turn out that even philosophers’ intuitions are unstable, then this could a most justify a certain restriction of the extent to which philosophers legitimately rely on intuitions. It never could justify global scepticism about PAI since this view would be epistemically inconsistent.

46. References Bealer, George (1992): The Incoherence of Empiricism, in; The Aristotelian Society 66, pp. 99-138. Bealer, George (1998): Intuition and Autonomy, in: DePaul/Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition, Lanham, p. 201-239. BonJour, Laurence (1998): In Defense of Pure Reason, Cambridge. Cummins, Robert (1998): Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium, in: DePaul/Ramsey, pp. 113-128. Goldman, Alvin (1986): Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge. Jackson, Frank (1998): From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford. Kauppinen, Antti (2006) (Ms.): The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. Ludwig, Kirk (2007): The Epistemology of Thought Experiments, in: Midwest Studies 31, pp. 128-159.

47. Machery, Edouard e.a. (2008): Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style, in: Joshua Knobe/Shaun Nichols, Experimental Philosophy, Oxford, pp. 47-58. Nadelhoffer, Thomas and Nahmias, Eddy (Ms.): The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. Pollock, John (1986): Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, London. Sosa, Ernest (2007): Intuitions, in: Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford, pp. 44-69. Sosa, Ernest (2008): Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition, in: Knobe/Nichols, pp. 231-240. Weinberg, Jonathan (2007a): How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically without Risking Skepticism, in: Midwest Studies 31, pp. 318-343. Weinberg, Jonathan and Alexander, Joshua (2007b): Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy, in: Philosophy Compass 2, pp. 56-80.