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It is probable that all heavy matter possesses – latent and bound up with the structure of the atom – a similar quantity of energy to that possessed by radium. If it could be tapped and controlled what an agent it would be in shaping the world’s destiny! The man who
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It is probable that all heavy matter possesses – latent and bound up with the structure of the atom – a similar quantity of energy to that possessed by radium. If it could be tapped and controlled what an agent it would be in shaping the world’s destiny! The man who put his hand on the lever by which a parsimonious nature regulates so jealously the output of this store of energy would possess a weapon by which he could destroy the earth if he chose. F. Soddy,1904
World Nuclear Plant Distribution 443 Total Nuclear Generating Facilities (364.9 GW) Sources: International Nuclear Safety Center and Energy Information Administration Regional Analysis
Wedges Billion of Tons of Carbon Emitted per Year 14 14 GtC/y Currently projected path Seven “wedges” O Historical emissions 7 GtC/y 7 Flatpath 1.9 0 2104 1954 2004 2054
Nuclear Power and Global Warming Compared to a modern coal plant, nuclear would save about 186 g C/kWh or 680 g CO2/y Total emissions today is about 7 gigatons C/y Business as usual to 2050 projects about 14 gigatons C/y 700 GW nuclear could save about 1 gigaton C/y
Some Countries in 1500 GW World Algeria Pakistan Armenia Philippines Azerbajian Poland Belarus Romania Georgia Thailand Indonesia Turkey Iran Turkmenistan North Korea Uzbekistan Malaysia Venezuela Mexico Vietnam
Lashkar A’bad Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002 Ardekan Gachin
Lashkar A’bad Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002 Ardekan Gachin
Natanz Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Complex Covered electric transformer station Dummy bldgs to conceal Ventilation shafts Dummy bldg to conceal entrance ramp AFTER: 20 JUN 04 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image • Covert facility in remote location, could enrich uranium for weapons • Dummy structures to prevent detection and identification • Concealed underground, hardened, well defended
“Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes … can be used to make a nuclear weapon… Reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states. Theft of separated plutonium, whether weapon-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk.”US Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposal Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, Washington, D.C., January 1997.
Materials Pathways for Advanced Separations/Recycling Separation Plant (>99.9999% U) Receipt (>99% Tc) (>99.9% Cs/Sr) High Radiation Moderate Radiation Low Radiation and Storage (>99.99% Pu/Am/Cm) (>99.9% Np) Transportation Reactor Complex (>99.99% Pu/Am/Cm) (>99.9% Np) (<0.1% lanthanides) Note: no high-level liquid waste requiring underground tank storage
SOME NEW “IRANS”? Countries with negligible nuclear power today, but lots in 2050: Italy, South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Thailand, North Korea, and several former Soviet republics. GNEP would reverse 30+ years of no reprocessing in U.S. In that time no new commercial reprocessing anywhere.
SUSTAINABILITY OF A TWO-TIER WORLD? , “I am concerned about a trend that we see reflected in the U.S.-India nuclear deal where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and governments. Such an approach opens up divisions among the world’s nuclear powers, with each making a list of ‘friends’ who can be trusted with nuclear technology, and ‘foes’ who are dangerous risks,” “Iran’s nuclear ambitions – a modest proposal,” Brent Scowcroft, The National Interest, Spring 2006.
A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY Prepared for THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY by a Board of Consultants Washington, D. C. March 16, 1946
… there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods. The reasons supporting this conclusion are not merely technical but primarily the inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations, each free to develop atomic energy but only pledged not to use bombs. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may be carried out by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so great a pressure on a system of enforcement by police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly cope with them.