An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgement

1. An fMRIInvestigation of Emotional Engagement in MoralJudgement Ching-Ju (C.J) Tseng & Noralie Krepel 04/14/2014 Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley, Jonathan D. Cohen

2. Abstract Reasonandemotion are likelytoplay important rolesin moraljudgement, however, little is knownabouttheirneuralcorrelates, the nature of theirinteractionand the factors canmodulatetheirinfluences. “We arguethatmoraldilemmasvarysystematically in the extenttowhichtheyengageemotional processing andthat these variations in emotional engagement influencemoraljudgement” (Greene et al., 2001)

3. Introduction Dilemma: the trolley dilemma & the footbridge dilemma “There is no set of consistent, readilyaccessiblemoralprinciplesthatcapturespeople’sintuitionsconcerningwhatbehavior is or is notappropriate in these andsimilar cases” (Greene et al., 2001) Sothen, what is itthatmakespeopleconcludethat in the trolley dilemma it is acceptableto hit the switch, but in the footbridge dilemma it is notacceptableto push the stranger off the bridge?

4. “We maintainthat, from a psychological point of view, the crucialdifferencebetween the trolley dilemma and the foodbridge dilemma lies in the latter’stendencytoengagepeople’semotionsin a way that the former does not” (Greene et al., 2001) Hypothesis: “Somemoraldilemmas (thoserelevantlysimilarto the footbridge dilemma) engageemotional processingto a greaterextentthanothers (thoserelevantlysimilarto the trolley dilemma), and these differences in emotional engagement affect people’sjudgement” (Greene et al., 2001)

5. Predictions 1. Duringcontemplation of dilemmassuch as the footbridge dilemma, brainareasassociatedwithemotionwouldbemore activeas comparedtocontemplation of dilemmassuch as the trolley dilemma. 2. “A pattern of behavioralinterferencesimilartothatobserved in cognitivetasks in whichautomatic processesinfluence responses” wouldoccur (Greene et al., 2001). (3. Individualsthatwouldfindpushing the stranger off the bridge in the footbridge dilemma acceptableexhibit a longerreaction time as a result of countervailingtheiremotional response).

6. Methods 60 practical dilemmas “moral” “non-moral” “non-moral”: taking the train or the bus “moral” moral-personal: up close, personal, more emotional (?), footbridge moral-impersonal: less personal, lessemotional (?), trolley Judge the actions bysaying “appropriate” or “inappropriate” Twoexperiments: in each experiment, nineparticipantsrespondedto the 60 dilemmaswhileundergoingbrain scanning usingfMRI

7. Results Experiment 1 *Areasassociatedwithworking memory have been found tobecomeless activeduringemotional processing. In thisstudy, both BA 46 and BA 7/40 were found tobecomelessactiveduring the moral-personal condition as comparedto the moral-impersonaland non-moralcondition.However, they do not say to have found that these areaswereassociatedwithmoral-impersonal or non-moraljudgements. Theysimplywerenotassociatedwithmoral-personal judgements.

8. Experiment 2Trolley Problem (Moral-impersonal)

9. Footbridge problem (moral-personal)

10. Non-moral decisions

11. Purpose: to replicate the results of experiment 1 and provide data concerning reaction time • Results: Almost identical to experiment 1, except: No difference in Brodmann’s Areas 9/10 between moral-impersonal and non-moral. No difference for BA 46.

12. Reaction time According to the predicting theory,In the moral-personal condition, responses of “appropriate” is “emotionally incongruent”, whereas responses of “inappropriate” is “emotionally congruent”.

13. Conclusion The moral-personal condition had an effect significantly different from the moral-impersonal & non-moral condition. Brain areas associated with emotion showed increased relative activation in the moral-personal condition. Moral-impersonal judgments resembles more to non-moral judgments than to moral-personal judgments.

14. Discussion Psychological puzzle: How do people “manage to conclude” that it is acceptable to sacrifice one for the sake of five in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma? Answer: There are systematic variations in the engagement of emotion in moral judgment. Pattern of neural activity in emotion-related brain areas differs between the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma.

15. Philosophical puzzle: Why is it acceptable to sacrifice one person to save five others in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma? Answer:

16. Philosophical puzzle: Why is it acceptable to sacrifice one person to save five others in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma? Answer: