National Preference Formation and the Question of Influence in the EU

1. National Preference Formation and the Question of Influence in the EU Dr. Nathaniel Copsey Aston Centre for Europe UACES, Angers, 4 September 2009

2. Plan (1) About the ESRC project Research questions; research design (2) Preliminary findings: What we have learnt about the nature of new Member States’ preferences? What we have learnt about the nature of new Member States’ capacity to exercise influence?

3. About the Project • Project set out to examine whether a new Member State – here, Poland – could be an influential Member State in the European Union in the field of relations with the eastern neighbours • Focus on upward form of ‘Europeanization’: expanding area of academic enquiry in recent years, new Member States, unlikely power brokers etc. • Problematic nature of ‘power’; problems of measurement/causality • Thus project examines the capacity of a new Member State to exercise ‘influence’ within the EU • Draws on Lukes’ second dimension of power

4. Assumptions about Influence • Capacity of states to exercise influence in EU seen as determined by two factors: (1) intensity with which it holds a given preference and is willing to argue for it (Moravcsik); and (2) its capacity to secure a desired outcome (determined by a number of dependent and independent variables) (see Copsey and Pomorska, 2009)

5. Main Research Questions What are Poland’s policy preferences in the field of the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbours, and how many of these objectives has it achieved? How are these preferences formed? How successful has the Polish government been in achieving its policy objectives and why?

6. Sources of Data • ‘New data’ comes primarily from in-depth interviews in Warsaw and Brussels with interest groups, foreign policy specialists, officials, ministers, politicians • Plus, of course, official documents, reportage etc.

7. Preliminary Findings:National Preferences I • We should be careful in making assumptions about the nature of national preferences based on ‘ideal-type’ models or based on the experiences of old Member States (see Copsey and Haughton, 2009) • Of course, in many instances newer Member States may not have a preference at all – not surprising • Or they may not know what their national preference should be – this is more surprising • Notion of defence of ‘national interest’ without any means of knowing what these national interests truly are • Often lack the reliable data (cost–benefit analyses) that could point towards what a preference should be

8. Preliminary Findings:National Preferences II • Above all, we should not assume that the policy-making process resembles, for example, Dahl’s descriptions of pluralism in the United States • Consultation with interest groups, such as trade unions, lobbyists, or business confederations remains very underdeveloped • In consequence, policy-makers tend to overemphasize ‘catch-all factors’ in explaining why a particular policy has been adopted: i.e. geopolitics, history, security • These factors offer ex post justification for a particular action but do not explain why a state ought to have acted in that in the first place • Thus the notion of national preferences in the EU-27 requires some thorough re-examination and a revised theoretical framework

9. Preliminary Findings:New Member States’ Capacity for Influence in the EU • Most newer Member States do not have, and may never have, the capacity to exercise ‘influence’ in the way that we understood older Member States to have done in the past • Crucially, many newer Member States are not interested in being ‘influential’ let alone ‘powerful’ • Poland is, however, different in this respect

10. Preliminary Findings:New Member States’ Capacity for Influence in the EU • Administrative capacity remains the principal weakness – this is also true of many other older Member States - Demoralization of elite segments of civil service - Weakness of coordination of European policy - Failure to foster productive networks between Poles working in Brussels and Warsaw – and occasional active discouragement! • Problems of ending conditionality: less willingness to undertake annoying reforms; less willingness to learn from best practice in other Member States and adapt it to match local particularities; time for a ‘rest’ mentality

11. So has Poland been Influential? • Negative influences: veto of discussions on a new agreement with Russia • Positive influences: eastern partnership with Sweden • Policy learning/adaptation to EU ‘style’ and rhetoric: case of Polish minority living in Belarus, focus on ‘human rights’ or ‘minority rights’ and thus learning to sound European/become ‘good Europeans’ • Certainly a very mixed balance sheet, but it is fair to say that there has been a solid degree of adaptation and learning over the first five years of membership – much as one would expect • Other weaknesses: political coordination; alliance building; receptiveness of other Member States

12. Conclusions: Where Next? • Remaining project findings will be complete by end of 2009 • What may be needed next: - Revised concepts, frameworks and theories to explain better the notion of national preferences and how they are formed - More comparative work on how European policy is made in the newer Member States

13. More information • Copsey and Haughton (2009) ‘The Choices for Europe’. JCMS, Vol. 47, No. 2. • Copsey and Pomorska (2010) ‘Poland’s Power and influence’. Comparative European Politics, forthcoming July 2010. • Copsey and Pomorska (2010) ‘The Influence of the Newer Member States in the European Union’. Europe-Asia Studies. • Contact Nat Copsey, Aston Centre for Europe, n.copsey@aston.ac.uk