Computer Security

1. Spring 2006 CS 155 Computer Security Dan Boneh and John Mitchell

2. What’s this course about? • Some challenging fun projects • Learn about attacks • Learn about preventing attacks • Lectures on many topics • Application security • Operating system security • Network security • not a course on Cryptography (take CS255)

3. General course info (see web) • Prerequisite: Operating systems (CS140) • Textbook: none – reading online • Coursework • 3 projects, 2 homeworks, final exam • grade: 0.3 H + 0.5 P + 0.2 F • Teaching assistants • Colin Jackson, Eu-Jin Goh • Office hours: see web site • Optional section • Friday, 3:15 - 4:05, Gates B01 (live on E3)

4. Why computer security? • People attack systems and do damage • Why do they do it? • Bored teenagers, Ukrainian criminals, rogue states, industrial espionage, angry employees, … • How do they do it? • Physical access, network attacks • Exploit vulnerabilities in applications and security mechanisms • How can we prevent attacks and/or limit their consequences? • No silver bullet; buggy code is serious problem • Large collection of specific methods for specific purposes

5. Security concepts and terms • Secure • Guarantee specific properties against a class of possible attacks • Sample security properties • Confidentiality, integrity, availability, … • Threat models • Access to network, keyboard, memory bus • Can install code on system? As what user? • Password dictionary, timing information, …

6. How big is the security problem? CERT Vulnerabilities reported http://www.cert.org/stats/

7. Why does this happen? • Lots of buggy software... • Why do programmers write insecure code? • Awareness is the main issue • Some contributing factors • Few courses in computer security • Programming text books do not emphasize security • Few security audits • C is an unsafe language • Programmers are lazy • Legacy software (some solutions, e.g. Sandboxing) • Consumers do not care about security • Security is expensive and takes time

8. Ethical use of security information • We discuss vulnerabilities and attacks • Most vulnerabilities have been fixed • Some attacks may still cause harm • Do not try these at home • Purpose of this class • Learn to prevent malicious attacks • Use knowledge for good purposes

9. Law enforcement • Sean Smith • Melissa virus: 5 years in prison, $150K fine • Ehud Tenenbaum (“The Analyzer”) • Broke into US DoD computers • 6 mos service, suspended prison, $18K fine • Dmitry Sklyarov • Broke Adobe ebooks • Prosecuted under DMCA

10. Example: voting machine • Standard hardware • Commercial OS • Many run WinCE • Programmable • Specify election • Smartcard authentication • Invalidate card when done • Data output • Network, or • Place disk in another computer

11. Basic security analysis • What is voting system supposed to do? • Correctly count votes • One person, one vote • Voter privacy • Prohibit vote selling • Allow recount, provide confidence in results • Who might attack system? • Voter wants to vote twice • Election worker • Programmer working for voting machine company

12. Assurance • Testing • “Testing can reveal the presence of bugs but not their absence” • Follow design and coding process • Many certification processes involve process but not quality of results • Code analysis • Third-party code walkthroughs • Automated tools

13. T. Kohno, A. Stubblefield, A. Rubin, D. Wallach Diebold Case Study • Proprietary system • Certification mandated by election laws • Without public review: Security through obscurity • Diebold system leaked • AccuVote-TS DRE system, Oct 2000 - April 2002 • Available on open ftp server • Identified by activist Bev Harris • Some zip files, cvs repository • DMCA concern over zip “encryption” • Available on New Zealand site

14. Some problems • Encrypted votes and audit logs • #define DESKEY ((des_key*)"F2654hD4") • No authentication of smartcard to voting terminal • Insufficient code review

15. Sample comment in code // LCG - Linear Conguential Generator // used to generate ballot serial numbers // A psuedo-random-sequence generator // (per Applied Cryptography, // by Bruce Schneier, Wiley, 1996) Unfortunately, linear congruential generators cannot be used for cryptography” Page 369 Applied Cryptography, by Bruce Schneier - BallotResults.cpp Diebold Election Systems

16. Other problems • Smartcards use no cryptography • Votes kept in sequential order • Several glaring errors in cryptography • Inadequate security engineering practices • Default Security PINs of 1111 on administrator cards • Windows Operating System • tens of millions of lines of code • new “critical” security bugs announced frequently

17. Difficult problem: insider threat • Easy to hide code in large software packages • Virtually impossible to detect back doors • Skill level needed to hide malicious code is much lower than needed to find it • Anyone with access to development environment is capable • Requires • background checks • strict development rules • physical security slides: Avi Rubin

18. Example insider attack • Hidden trap door in Linux, Nov 2003 • Allows attacker to take over a computer • Practically undetectable change • Uncovered by anomaly in CVS usage • Inserted line in wait4() • Looks like a standard error check • Anyone see the problem? if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && (current->uid = 0)) retval = -EINVAL; See: http://lwn.net/Articles/57135/

19. Example #2 • Rob Harris case - slot machines • an insider: worked for Gaming Control Board • Malicious code in testing unit • when testers checked slot machines • downloaded malicious code to slot machine • was never detected • special sequence of coins activated “winning mode” • Caught when greed sparked investigation • $100,000 jackpot

20. Example #3 • Breeder’s cup race • Upgrade of software to phone betting system • Insider, Christopher Harn, rigged software • Allowed him and accomplices to call in • change the bets that were placed • undetectable • Caught when got greedy • won $3 million http://horseracing.about.com/library/weekly/aa110102a.htm

21. Software dangers • Software is complex • top metric for measuring number of flaws is lines of code • Windows Operating System • tens of millions of lines of code • new “critical” security bug announced every week • Unintended security flaws unavoidable • Intentional security flaws undetectable

22. Ken Thompson • What code can we trust? • Consider "login" or "su" in Unix • Is RedHat binary reliable? • Does it send your passwd to someone? • Can't trust binary so check source, recompile • Read source code or write your own • Does this solve problem? Reflections on Trusting Trust, http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95/

23. Compiler backdoor • This is the basis of Thompson's attack • Compiler looks for source code that looks like login program • If found, insert login backdoor (allow special user to log in) • How do we solve this? • Inspect the compiler source

24. C compiler is written in C • Change compiler source S compiler(S) { if (match(S, "login-pattern")) { compile (login-backdoor) return } if (match(S, "compiler-pattern")) { compile (compiler-backdoor) return } .... /* compile as usual */ }

25. Clever trick to avoid detection • Compile this compiler and delete backdoor tests from source • Someone can compile standard compiler source to get new compiler, then compile login, and get login with backdoor • Simplest approach will only work once • Compiling the compiler twice might lose the backdoor • But can making code for compiler backdoor output itself • (Can you write a program that prints itself? Recursion thm) • Read Thompson's article • Short, but requires thought

26. Social engineering • Many examples • We are not going to talk about social engineering a lot, but good to remember that there are many attacks that don't use computers • Call system administrator • Dive in the dumpster • Online version • send trojan in email • picture or movie with malicious code

27. Questions?