1 / 17

Reexamining Education Fairness: An Experimental Study of College Admission Policies in China

Reexamining Education Fairness: An Experimental Study of College Admission Policies in China. Yang Zhang May 7, 2013. College Admission Policies in China. College Entrance Exam ( Gaokao ) A nation-wide comprehensive exam in every June

stacy
Download Presentation

Reexamining Education Fairness: An Experimental Study of College Admission Policies in China

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Reexamining Education Fairness: An Experimental Study of College Admission Policies in China Yang Zhang May 7, 2013

  2. College Admission Policies in China • College Entrance Exam (Gaokao) • A nation-wide comprehensive exam in every June • Universities only consider Gaokao scores in recruiting new students. • College Admissions • Competition for college education is limited within each province because of the quota system. • Local variations in college admission policies • Immediate acceptance (most provinces) vs. deterred acceptance (e.g. Shanghai). • Exam content • Timing of application

  3. Timing of Application Gaokao Exam Result Distribution • Low information • Not knowing your own and others’ Gaokaoscores. • Private/asymmetric information • Estimating your own score based on the official answers, but not knowing others’ scores. • Complete information • Knowing your rank among all students.

  4. Research Questions • How does timing of application affect students’ strategies in college application? • How does timing of application affect the distribution of admission outcomes?

  5. Three Games 1. Mimic Exams 2. College Entrance Exam • Randomly pick one mimic exam score.

  6. Three Games Cont’d 3. College Application • Choose one university from Harvard and the UI. • Get 2 dollars from Harvard and 1 dollar from the UI. • Three games only differ in the timing of application. 4. College Admission • Each university only admits one student.

  7. Defining Admission Fairness • Expected Rank Distribution • Ideal Outcome Distribution

  8. Available Information in College Choice (e.g Student A) • Complete Information • Expected rank distribution (unnecessary) • A, B, and C’s Gaokao scores • Private/asymmetric information • Expected rank distribution • A’s Gaokao score • Low information • Expected rank distribution

  9. Experiment • Subjects • 10 groups and 30 subjects • 21 Chinese (15 experienced), 6 Americans, 1 Taiwanese, and 2 Koreans • 8 groups for each treatment (complete, private, and low information) • Post-game discussion • Which games are fair and which are not fair? • What was your expectation of other players’ choices (belief)? • Does the experiment well reflect the reality? • Other thoughts?

  10. Complete Information Game: Evaluating the Expected Strategies • Nash Equilibrium(a) • Observed Strategy Distribution

  11. Complete Information Game: Evaluating the Expected Admission Outcomes • Expected outcome distribution • Luck in getting a higher score • Observed outcome distribution • Adjusted outcome distribution

  12. Private Information Game: Evaluating the Expected Strategies

  13. Private Information Game: Evaluating the Expected Admission Outcomes • Expected outcome distribution • Adjusted outcome distribution

  14. Low Information Game: Evaluating the Expected Strategies • Bayesian Equilibrium • Observed Strategy Distribution

  15. Low Information Game: Evaluating the Expected Admission Outcomes • Expected outcome distribution • Adjusted outcome distribution

  16. Conclusions • Observed Strategies • Complete information: the experimental results perfectly fit the Nash equilibrium that A chooses Harvard, B chooses the UI, and C is indifferent between the two. • Private information: A is more likely to choose Harvard, and B is more likely to choose the UI no matter which score they pick. C chooses the UI most of the time. A bigger sample is needed to further evaluate the PBEs. • Low information: As the Bayesian equilibrium suggests, A always chooses Harvard and C always chooses the UI. B is risk-seeking that she applies for Harvard most of the time. • Adjusted Outcome Distributions • Complete information yields ideal outcome distribution. • Private information greatly favors C and slightly favors A at the cost of B. • Low information is biased against both A and B, but in favor of C, which contradicts the Bayesian equilibrium.

  17. Future Research Directions • Under deterred acceptance algorithms, how will different levels of information affect college choices? • Two-sided matching game • Statistically evaluate the theoretical predictions with agent quantal response equilibrium. • A problem of chi2 test. • Policy innovation and diffusion in an authoritarian country. • “The adoption of a design is at least partly a political process. (Roth 2002: 1345)”

More Related