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The fishing capacity problem and its management. David Agnew. 47 Princes Gate, London d.agnew@imperial.ac.uk. Definitions and measurement.
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The fishing capacity problem and its management David Agnew 47 Princes Gate, London d.agnew@imperial.ac.uk
Definitions and measurement • OVERCAPACITY is, for a given resource condition, the situation where the amount of fish that can be caught over a period of time by the fully utilised (unconstrained) fleet is greater than required to ensure a target level of sustainable exploitation. • Ct = q.E.Bt • Bt+1 = p(Bt) + Rt - Ct • using CPUE, E, B characterise q for fleets • Estimate maximum possible Cmax • Cmax should be <= YMAX
Causes of overcapacity • Non-maleable capital • Open access creates individual incentives • Government intervention (subsidies) – in and out • Overseas subsidies – export of capital in access agreements • Technology developments – effort creep • Management systems • That encourage capital stuffing/race to fish • With intrinsic boom/bust cycle mismatches • Unstable management reference points – MSY
Example – North sea cod Subsidised building
Arctic cod Unstable management systems • Management by output control (TAC) assumes full knowledge and compliance • Output management does not usually track capacity (or q) • YMAX should be limit not target reference point
Consequences • Economic waste • Resource overexploitation • Capital transfer – exporting the problem • IUU • Discarding, highgrading, blackfish • Overcapacity problems often negate all other management attempts, eg ecosystem based management
Management of capacity • IPOA • Efficient transparent and equitable management of capacity by 2003 (!) or 2005
Incentive blocking • Limited entry • Non-domestic capacity • Buy back • Gear and vessel restrictions, catch limits • TACs • Easy to implement, particularly suited to mixed developing country fisheries • Combinations of limited entry & TAC work but require monitoring • Encourage competition and race to fish – likely to end up here again!
Incentive adjusting • ITQs • ITEQ individually transferable effort quotas • Taxes & royalties • Territorial user rights to fish (TURF) • Saving (rather than recapitalising) supra-normal profits • Inspire responsibility/ stewardship • Remove incentives to overcapitalise • Complex to implement
Conclusions • Monitor and continually adjust capacity • Move away from YMAX brinkmanship • Change management approaches to deal with boom-bust • Subsidies …. Refs: Report of the technical working group on the management of capacity, 1998. FAO fish tech papers 386 & 409.