300 likes | 498 Views
Firewalls. CS591 Topics in Internet Security November 15 1999. Steve Miskovitz, Steve Peckham, Kan Hayashi. Outline. Overview/Motivation Packet Filtering Application Gateway. Overview/Motivation. Why Do We Need Firewalls? Design Issues Firewall Characteristics Typical Setups/Analysis.
E N D
Firewalls CS591 Topics in Internet Security November 15 1999 Steve Miskovitz, Steve Peckham, Kan Hayashi
Outline • Overview/Motivation • Packet Filtering • Application Gateway
Overview/Motivation • Why Do We Need Firewalls? • Design Issues • Firewall Characteristics • Typical Setups/Analysis
Why Do We Need Firewalls? • Prevent unauthorized access to private networks • Prevent unauthorized export of private information
Design Issues • That which is not expressly permitted is prohibited • firewall is designed to block everything, services are enabled on a case-by-case basis • can be seen as a hindrance by users • That which is not expressly prohibited is permitted • reactive, must predict what kinds of actions would compromise the security of the firewall
Firewall Characteristics • Damage Control • If the firewall is compromised or destroyed what kinds of threats does it leave the private network open to? • Zones of Risk • How large is the zone of risk during normal operation?
Firewall Characteristics • Failure Mode • If the firewall is broken into or destroyed, how easy is it to detect? • How much information is retained to analyze the attack? • Ease of Use • How much of an inconvenience is the firewall? • Stance • Permissive or prohibitive?
Typical Setups • Screening Router • Dual Homed Gateway • Screened Host Gateway • Screened Subnet
Screening Router • Basic router with some kind of packet filtering capability • Typically will be able to block traffic between networks or specific hosts on an IP level
Analysis of Screening Router • Damage control is difficult because you would need to examine every host for traces of a break-in • Zone of risk is the all the hosts on the private network because direct communication is permitted • Usually set up as permissive
Analysis of Screening Router • In the case of destruction of the firewall it is very hard to trace because commercial routers generally do not keep logs • Can fairly easily get around the screening using tunnelling • Popular because they allow fairly free access from any point in the private network
Dual Homed Gateway • Has a system on both the private network and the Internet , with TCP/IP forwarding disabled
Analysis of Dual Homed Gateway • Often used and easy to implement • Hosts on the private network can communicate with the gateway, as can hosts on the Internet, but direct traffic between the networks is blocked • If the gateway is compromised then the whole private network is accessible • Zone of risk is only the gateway host
Analysis of Dual Homed Gateway • Permissiveness dependant on the stance of the gateway • logins on gateway is permissive • application gateways is prohibitive • Can be adapted more easily to keep logs which can help with tracing what went wrong and which machines on the private network were compromised
Screened Host Gateway • Combines a screening router and a dual homed gateway. The screening router is configured such that the gateway is the only system reachable from the Internet
Analysis of Screened Host Gateway • Can be configured to block traffic to the gateway on certain ports, permitting only a small number of services to communicate with it • Generally very secure, while fairly easy to implement • Router is configured to only permit Internet access to the gateway
Analysis of Screened Host Gateway • Zone of risk is the gateway and the router • Gateway can be on the private network so connectivity is good for local users • Stance is dependant upon the gateway • Similar to a dual homed gateway
Screened Subnet • An isolated subnet is created, between the private network and the Internet • isolate the private network using screening routers with varying levels of filtering
Analysis of Screened Subnet • Generally, both the Internet and the private network have access to the subnet but traffic across the screened subnet is blocked • Usually configured with one host as the sole point of access on the subnet • Zone of risk is host and any screening routers that connect the subnet • Appealing for firewalls that use routing to reinforce the existing screening
Analysis of Screened Subnet • Forces all services to be provided by application gateways • Strongly prohibitive • Much harder to break into since you need to compromise multiple systems • Can be an inconvenience since hosts that are not addressed correctly cannot use the firewall properly
Packet FilteringOverview • Control data traffic using header of each packet • source IP address • destination IP address • etc • Screened (Host, Subnet) Setups
Static Packet Filtering • “Static” = “doors” are open at all times • Advantages • Low overhead / High throughput • Inexpensive or free • Good for traffic management • Disadvantages • Allows dangerous direct connections • Leaves holes open • Unsuitable for complex environment • No user authentication
Dynamic Packet Filtering • “Dynamic” = opens and closes “doors” according packet header data • Can keep track of context information about a session. (stateful filtering) • Advantages • Only temporarily opens holes in Network Perimeter • Low overhead / High throughput • Supports almost any service • Disadvantages • Allows direct IP connections • No user authentication (requires application gateway)
Application GatewaysOverview • First Generation vs. Second Generation (transparent) • TCP connection state and sequencing are maintained. • Prevents direct access to services on the internal network. • Outgoing traffic appears to be coming from the firewall rather than the internal network. • Works on an application (or service) level.
Application GatewaysLawyer Example B Unapproved Message B’s Lawyer Approved Message A
Application GatewaysAdvantages • Doesn’t allow direct connections between internal and external hosts (proxy). • Supports user-level authentication. • Ability to analyze application specific commands inside traffic. • Can keep logs of traffic.
Application GatewaysDisadvantages • Takes time to check requests. • Doesn’t support every type of connection.
References • Thinking About Firewalls V2.0: Beyond Perimeter Security (1997) • http://www.clark.net/pub/mjr/pubs/think/index.htm • Application Gateways and Stateful Inspection: A Brief Note Comparing and Contrasting (Avolio & Blask 1998) • http://www.avolio.com/apgw+spf.html