Travel Risk Management: An Enterprise Wide Approach

1. Travel Risk Management:An Enterprise Wide Approach Presented by:John G. Rendeiro, Jr. Vice President, Global Security and Intelligence International SOS Assistance, Inc.

2. Agenda • Context for Today’s Traveller • Requirements for Travel Risk Management • Framework of Travel Risk Management System • Governance • Planning • Training • Tools • Travel Risk Management Implementation Process • Success Factors • Benefits • Successful Outcomes

3. Steps to Success in Travel Risk Management • Assess the level of risk in your travelers’ environment • Prepare your travelers and your organization for travel and to respond in the event of a crisis • Be aware of what a successful outcome should look like

4. Risk Environment: Context is everything…

5. “Extreme Risk” Locations: Somalia • Kidnappings, armed banditry, residential thefts, brutal killings • Assaults against travelers on roads and highways are widely prevalent Afghanistan • Foreign aid workers targeted for violence and kidnapping • The NGO, ‘Doctors Without Borders’ withdrew due to safety reasons • Kabul experiences high levels of robbery and carjacking Iraq • Kidnapping has surfaced as a major threat to foreigners, including journalists and relief workers West Bank/Gaza • Traditionally, foreigners have not been directly targeted by Palestinian criminal gangs or militants • In recent months armed gunmen have abducted foreigners in Gaza and the West Bank

6. “High Risk” - NepalCritical Security Issues: • Increasing reports of Maoists regularly collectinga "tax" from foreign visitors, particularly on trekking routes in Western Nepal • The risk to foreigners of kidnapping for ransom, while not common, remains significant • Occasional bombings, political unrest • Security-related evacuations have been necessary in recent years

7. Colombia:High Risk • Risk from violent crime is high • Highest rates of kidnappings in the world • Leftist guerrillas, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), control significant portions of territory throughout the country • Driving conditions in Colombia are dangerous, due to the chaotic nature of the traffic in urban areas and the precarious security situation outside urban areas • Travelers are advised to maintain a low profile and limit the time spent in public places, such as bars, supermarkets and recreational venues

8. “Moderate Risk” - MexicoRelative Extremes: • Cancun • Relatively low crime • Opportunistic thefts common • Guadalajara • Street thieves tend to work in teams • Create diversions to rob unsuspecting persons • Criminals have disguised themselves as police officers • Express kidnappings on the rise • Victims abducted from unlicensed taxis and outside street ATMs • Street clashes occasionally erupt between rival drug gangs with innocent bystanders caught in crossfires

9. Or Russia (Moscow): • Major Events • 2002 - Theatre siege • 2004 - Suicide bombings • 2004 - Metro bombing • 2004 – Beslan School Hostage Crisis • Outward Appearances • Dazzling wealth • Glitzy shops • Conspicuous consumerism – yet • Attacks on ethnic and racial minorities • Threats/barriers to business associates • Result of activity • Tightened security • Heavy police presence • Private security guards • Gated entrances to public buildings • Police power to check ID and documentation

10. “Low Risk” Spain - Madrid:Not considered a dangerous place • Since the attacks…. • Madrid, the city has sobered • Bombings produced a sense of solidarity • Despite the brutality of the attacks, it has been ‘business as usual’ • No noticeable impact on the economy

11. Or United Kingdom (London): United Kingdom, London, 7 July 2005 • Islamic terrorists detonated explosives • Three Underground trains • One "double-decker" bus • Over 50 people died • Several hundred were injured • Two weeks later… • London transport system attacked again • Second attack did not yield the same destructive results • Attacks demonstrated the United Kingdom will remain a target for international terrorist organizations for the foreseeable future

12. Security Threat Breakdown

13. Background| Drivers • World is Flat • Every business is international • Risk Management capabilities for international travel and assignments • Complex in that it entails; business travel, proprietary and sensitive info, business operations, new or existing market expansion, etc. • Organizations taking greater risk on emerging markets • Enterprise-Wide Program • Tendency is to focus on short-term fixes (which are more cost effective) rather than solutions

14. Travel Risk Management|Defined Travel Risk Management is a proactive, risk-based program that establishes a clear and sustainable framework for an organization to mitigate the various risks associated with international travel and assignments.

15. Travel Risk Management| Requirements Best practice in travel risk management requires the ability to: • Prepare your people for travel and preparing your organization to support them • Tracking personnel and maintaining the capability to identify where they are at any point • Informing staff and managers in a with situational updates on developing threats • Advisingwith regionally focused, all hazards expertise • Responding to emergency situations as they unfold

16. Travel Risk Management| Framework Key Components: • Key modules, established framework • Governance, Planning and Training

17. Travel Agency Travel Agency Travel Agency Travel Agency Traveler Risk Management Solution Prepare Respond Track Inform Advise Travel Risk Management| Governance

18. Travel Risk Management| Governance(Track) • GDS Independent • Agency Independent • Real-time Data • Location, Risk, Event, Name and Date specific search criteria

19. Travel Risk Management|Governance(Track) • Flexible data sorting, exporting • 24x7 access via the Internet or telephone • Access on a need to know basis

20. Travel Risk Management|Governance(Approvals) • Collect Supplemental Trip Details • Make informed decision • Automated control of approval process for high risk travel • POS delivery, capture High Risk Travel as it is booked

21. Travel Risk Management|Planning Key Components: • Key modules, established framework • Governance, Planning and Training

22. Travel Risk Management|Planning • 24 hr Alerts • Proactive Notification • Instant Assessment

23. Travel Risk Management| Communications • Integrated Communication Module • Contact Targeted Travel populations • Multiple methods of communication

24. Travel Risk Management| Training Key Components: • Key modules, established framework • Governance, Planning and Training

25. Travel Risk Management| Training • POS Delivery • Timely Information • Destination Specific • Passive Process, business as usual

26. Travel Risk Management Development Process • Doctrine (Policy & Procedures) • Process for Travel Risk Management • Assess • Design • Implement • Maintain • Review • On-Site Support

27. Benefits| Deliverables • Auditing & Compliance – Process Improvement • Operational Efficiencies – Lean • Travel Risk Management – “Duty of Care” • Business Enabler – Vehicle for Successful Market Entry

28. Case Study Lebanon Evacuation - July 2006

29. 12 July Larnaca Events: 12 July. Hezbollah militants attack an Israeli army patrol on Israeli soil, killing three and capturing two soldiers. Five other Israeli soldiers die pursuing the militants. Byblos • International SOS Activity: • Situation Update posted to Security Online site • Early planning begins

30. 13 July Larnaca Events: 13 July. Israel bombs the runways at Rafik al-Hariri International Airport in South Beirut. The Israeli Navy starts a sea blockade of Lebanon. Twenty-four Palestinians die in Gaza from Israeli military operations. Byblos • International SOS Activity: • International SOS posts Security Warning Notificationand emails to clients. Escalates to Alert later that day. • Crisis Management Team stands by in London • Incident Management Team (IMT) deployed to Syria International SOS Security London & Dubai deploy to Damascus

31. 14 July Reception team deploys Larnaca Route Reconnaissance & Risk Assessment Byblos Events: 14 July. Israeli warplanes continue to attack transportation infrastructure and the home of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. • International SOS Activity: • IMT inserts to Lebanon and undertakes reconnaissance of routes north to Syrian border • Reception Teams mobilized for Larnaca, Cyprus and Damascus, Syria Reception team deploys

32. 15-24 July Larnaca Evacuation by bus convoy Byblos • International SOS Activity: • Evacuation notice issued • 350 clients evacuated overland to Damascus by bus • Coordination of onward flights for all • Evacuation operations cease

33. Case StudyLebanon Crisis – July 2006 • Results: • 350 people safely evacuated from Beirut to Damascus • 2 Charter flights coordinated for evacuees • Charter flight and medical escorts provided to government evacuations from Larnaca • Close liaison with clients and international agencies • Appropriate risk assessment in all phases

34. Case Study Peru Evacuation - July 2007

35. Incident Overview • Mon. 9 July: International SOS forecasts civil unrest associated with a General Strike in Peru • Wed. 11 July: 48 Hour General Strike commences in Peru • Thur. 12 July: • Peruvian President Alan Garcia visits Juliaca sparking intense protest activity • Protests turn violent, rioting ensues, protestors seize the airport shutting down flight operations • Two Members are trapped in Hotel Royal Inn in Juliaca • International SOS receives call from Members

37. Hotel Royal Inn Puno Docks Bolivian Border • Primary Option: • Road Juliaca/Puno • Hydrofoil Puno/Copa/ Huatajata • Road Huatajata/La Paz • Alternate Option: • Road Juliaca/Puno • Road Puno/Desaguadero • Road Desaguadero/La Paz

38. Evacuation Timeline

39. Outcome Evacuation • Members safely evacuated from a highly volatile and dangerous situation • Transported to the nearest international Safe Haven Logistic Support • International SOS facilitated onward movements Communication • Parent organizations kept informed • Involved in the planning process throughout the incident

40. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 Azerbaijan

41. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • August 8 - Russian troops enter South Ossetia, forcing Georgian security forces to retreat. The Russian move follows an attack by Georgian forces to regain control of the region. • August 9 - Russian planes attack targets in Georgia - three military bases near Tbilisi, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, port city of Poti. Reports of an air attack on town of Gori. • August 10 - Russian aircraft on 10 August drop bomb around 200 meters from runaway at Tbilisi International Airport.

42. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • August 10 - US Embassy authorizes departure of family members of staff from Georgia. • August 11 - The advance of Russian troops into Georgian territory represents a significant development in Russia's campaign. The outcome is unpredictable.

43. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • August 8 – International SOS/Control Risks convene Crisis Management Team (CMT) in London Center. • August 8 - Plans made to insert Incident Management Team (IMT) in Tbilisi. • August 9 - First two IMT members depart for Tbilisi; airport closed, so reroute via Baku, Azerbaijan and travel overland to Georgia, arriving August 10.

44. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • August 9 – Third IMT member departs U.S. for Baku. • August 11 – First evacuee met at Georgia-Azerbaijan border by IMT member, placed in hired vehicle to Baku, IMT member joins colleagues in Tbilisi.

45. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • August10-15 - IMT operational at hotel in central Tbilisi, monitoring situation and maintaining close contact with clients in region.

46. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • After Russia announced it was halting its military operations, and a cease-fire was agreed upon later in the week, remaining clients considering evacuating decided to remain.

47. Caucasus Crisis - August 2008 • IMT conducts visits with and evaluation of security providers throughout Caucasus region (in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia).

48. Questions?