Environmental Policy

1. Class 13: Env Policy Making: Institutions and Politics CofC Fall 2010 Environmental Policy

2. Env Policy Making:Presidents Part I1: Chapter 3

3. Vids • Conservative: Bush Declares War on Environment • Obama: Reversing Previous Policy

4. Presidential Powers • Greatest Power is as: Chief Executive (Manager) • Make cabinet appts; appt fed judges; agency & program budgets; oversee regulatory process; issue exec orders; propose and veto legislation; propose politic priorities & initiatives; power of fed budget; authority to negotiate Int’l agreements and treaties for Congressional approval. • Influence over every step of the policy process • Agenda Setting: Swaying Public opinion, public debate • Policy Formation: devoting presidential staff & resources to issues; mobilizing experts; consulting • Legitimate Policy: supporting legis in Congress, and can block legis through veto. • Policy Implementation • Assess and Evaluate existing policies and reforms • Office of Presidency (institution) • EOP: Exec Office of the President (e.g. OMB—Mgmt and Budget; NRC—Nuclear Reg Committee) • NEPA (Nat’l Enviro Policy Act 1969): provides Commission to advise President

5. 2 Waves of Presidential Leadership on Environment • 1970-72: Pres Nixon declared “Environmental Decade • Signed NEPA,CAA, ESA, and created the US EPA by exec order • The 80s: Reagan and HW Bush • Reagan (early 80s) roll back much of the enviro legislation and curtailed much of the enviro funding. • Late 1980s: HW Bush declared himself the “environmental President”  but came after Reagan, probably the most “hostile” US Pres to the enviro • HW Supported passage of CAA of 1990 • Obama—3rd wave? • What’s his track record? • Truly an “environmentalist”?

6. Classifying Modern Presidents • Opportunistic Leaders: Nixon and HW Bush • In office during public surges in environmental awareness demanding action, although neither had strong record on environmental policy  both adopted Roosevelt’s “conservationist” mantel • Frustrated Underachievers: Carter and Clinton • Large environmental agendas and support from enviro agencies/NGOs but got little done • Both forced by competing priorities & little public support • Rollback Advocates: Reagan and W. Bush • Anti-regulatory forces in the the Rep party, that sought to rollback or weaken existing enviro policy. • Reagan actually “launched a crusade against what he called ‘unnecessary social regulation that impeded economic growth’ ”

7. Reagan • During period of econ decline, Reagan sought to rollback environmental regs that he saw standing in the way of economic progress. • “Administrative Presidency”—an attempt to change federal policy to maximize control of policy implementation within exec branch • His appts (hostile to environment) backfired as public was not supportive. • Although he weakened enviroregs and policy, his policies also galvanized and strengthened enivo orgs and participation in enviro groups.

8. HW Bush • Tried to distance himself from Reagan’s failures in public on environ  return to moderation and embraced “conservation” • Mixed Record: Actually appointed environ leaders to his admin, but left Reagan’s appointees in BLM and Sec of Interior • Signed CAA 1990: Acid Rain, air pollution (80 urban areas); lower airborne toxic chems • Proposed cap and trade for acid rain (not command & control) • However, threatened to boycott Earth Summit in Rio (1992) if contained binding targets for CO2 emissions • Refused to sign CBD • Isolated US over global environmental issues

9. Clinton • Promises: Raise CAFE stnds; mass transit; support for renewable energy, limit CO2 emissions (1990 levels), create new solid waste reduction prog, preserve ANWR, sign CBD, reform Superfund. • Jobs v. Enviro was a “false choice” because enviro cleanup provided jobs and future US econ depended on clean (efficient) energy • Provided incentives and infrastructure for “green technologies” • Estab OEP (office of Env Policy) to coordenvirodepts and integrate enviro considerations into all depts • Failures revolved around 2 issues: • Attempt to revolutionize Western land use policies  to raise grazing fees to market levels. • BTU Tax: tax on energy content of fuels as means of promoting conservation and addressing climate change • Support for WTO and NAFTA further eroded support by enviro groups • Also, failed to implement CBD (altho signed) and CO2 limits. • Biggest failure: ratify Kyoto Protocol

10. W. Bush • Regulatory retreat through expansion of executive power to advance anti-regulatory pro-business agenda • “Pure Executive Style” rather than cooperation with other parts of gov’t • Appointments were largely filled with business execs and oil/gas interests. • Result was a “highly politicized form of administration in which the political interests of the president & his supporters frequently overrode scientific and technical considerations.” • Survey in 2008 showed that 889/1600 staff scientists at EPA reported they “experienced political interference with their work in last 5 yrs.” • House Oversight & Gov’t Reform Committee determined that, in collecting 27,000 pages of climate science docs, the Bush admin “manipulate[d] climate science and mislead policy makers and the public about the dangers of global warming.” • “Clear Skies” Bill, actually scaled back the regulations of the CAA was stalled in Congress, he implemented them through executive fiat. • New Source Review (expanding plant or new) had to meet more stringent pollution stnds was eliminated or scaled back in CSBmuch of which has been overruled in courts. • Leaving office: opened more lands to drilling, eased disposing of mountain-top removal wasted, lessened obligations under the Endangered Species Act

11. Consequences of W. • Serious consequences for enviro policy • Exec rulemaking bypassed Congress and opened itself up to judicial review immediately • Many of his policies and changes have been or will be reversed in the court system OR changed by the Obama administration • Thus the primary consequence was to delay implementation of existing laws and prevent adoption of new policies (e.g. reg of mercury from coal plants) & creation of temporary loopholes.

12. Early Signs from Obama • Appointed ardent environmentalists to environmental posts • Abe Lincoln’s “team or rivals” approach—debate and transparency • Goals: Create a new “Super-Energy Highway” • Global Warming a priority through cap & trade • Reinvigorated EP • 10% of electricity to come from renewables 2012 and 25% by 2020. • National building efficiency stnds—carbon neutral by 2030. • Double fuel economy within 18 yrs and 1m hybrids on road by 2015 • Uphold Roadless Area Rule • Increased EPA budget by 48% over W’s. • Question is whether Obama can take advantage of the “apparently large policy window opened by Bush’s failures” and a democratically controlled Congress. Economy will limit his options in the short term.

13. Lessons • Presidents have varied in their support for enviro policy since Earth Day (1970) • “So-called green presidents have often been the least successful enviro policy-makers” (p81) • BP Oil Spill, Pres has limited control over fed agencies (once appt’d key personnel), HOWEVER, it was “a political disaster for Obama”  Politics (p83) • 1 mo earlier he proposed expanded offshore drilling – Why? • 1 mo later, he reversed his position – halting OSD indefinitely • Pres has influence over all aspects of the policy process, but that influence wanes as the processes get deeper

14. Env Policy Making:Congress Part II: Chapter 3

15. CAFE Standards 1978-2006

16. Projected Fuel Stnds ‘02-22

17. CAFE and New Standards • Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE): enacted by Congress in 1975. • Designed: to improve the average fuel economy of cars and light trucks (trucks, vans and sport utility vehicles) sold in the US in the wake of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. • The new standards will raise the industry-wide combined average to 27.3 mpg (a 2 mpg increase over the 2010 model year average). • It will save about 887 million gallons of fuel and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 8.3 million metric tons. • Obama recently proposed a new program covering model year 2012 to model year 2016 and ultimately requires an average fuel economy standard of 35.5 mpg in 2016 (of 39 miles per gallon for cars and 30 mpg for trucks), a jump from the current average for all vehicles of 25 mpg.

18. CAFE Debate • CAFE does not directly offer incentives for customers to choose fuel efficient vehicles • It also does not directly affect fuel prices. • Rather, it attempts to accomplish higher fuel standards (and less reliance on oil) indirectly by making it more expensive for automakers to build inefficient vehicles by introducing penalties • Advocates: much of the gains in fuel efficiency is attributed to CAFE. • Future: argue fuel-efficiency is future for US automakers so higher CAFE stnds • Critics: Economics drove fuel efficiency as higher fuel prices drove customers to buy more fuel efficient vehicles. • Future: argue higher CAFE will financial strap US Automakers • Reality: increases in efficiency led to driving longer distances & large vehicles (over 8500lbs) avoided CAFÉ stnds

19. Congress’ Role in EP (pp 99-119) • Inhibited by “era of partisan welfare” • Not always so, 1960s-1990s Congress enacted and strengthened an extraordinary range of enviro policies (in response to public opinion on enviro issues) • More receptive to enviro issues with 111th Congress b/c: • Democrat controlled houses • Public reached a critical “tipping point” • Difficult to gain bipartisan support in latest Congress’ sessions • Bottom Line: Effective Enviro Policy-making always requires coop b/w 2 branches (& leadership within) and public support • History of Congressional policy-making on enviro “strongly suggests the power of public beliefs and action.” (p 119).

20. Debating CAFE • Greenpeace vs. Competitive Enterprise Inst

21. Congressional Authority • Under US Constitution: Congress shares authority with President for federal policymaking on enviro issues. • Many actions within Congress not only create new policy but assist in “framing” issues or budgetary decisions that can promote or inhibit solutions • Has a role in Presidential nominees to agencies and courts, which decide on environmental issues. • Historically, Congress has been more influential than President in formulation and adoption of environmental policies. • Two critical variables to Congress enacting EP policies • Public op on enviro • Whether President’s party controls Congress • IF so, by what margin and willingness to defer from Pres’ recommendations

22. Congressional Implications for EP • 1. Building policy consensus is rarely easy b/c of diversity • 2. policy compromises invariably reflect members’ preoccupation with local and regional impacts of enviro decisions • 3. White House matters a great in how the issues are defined and are acceptable, but is ultimately limited by “political calculations made on Capitol Hill.” (p105). • Given these, “Congress frequently finds itself unable to make crucial decisions on EP.””gridlock”

23. Increasing Role of States • Centralized Federal Enviro Protection was the focus of env policy; however, this has changed recently, with an increasing focus on states. Why? • More creative • Enhanced capacity • Fewer political ideological obstructions • Public has higher degree of “trust & confidence” • Directly deal with local realities • States now ¾ of all “federal environmental programs that can be delegated to them.” • States issue 90% of permits, complete 90% of all enviro enforcement, and collect 95% of data on enviro protection • Areas dominated by States: Waste disposal, land use, groundwater protection, transportation and electricity production.

24. Expanded Role May Be Accelerated • 1. Civic environmentalism provides the impetus for “bottom-up” policy development • 2. proliferation of environmental professionals and policy advocates has created a sizable pool of talent, and autonomy and networks generate more creativity and policy innovation • 3. Expanding use of direct democracy (initiatives and referendums)

25. EP Innovation from States • Much quicker and efficient at shifting from reactive to proactive pollution regulations. • All 50 states have pollution prevention programs • Economic Incentives arguably better than commond and control rules—i.e. econ incentives and taxes • Increasingly states are creating emissions and waste fees to provide econ disincentive to enviro degradation and source of funds • Increasing use of “green taxes” • Fill in Voids for Federal Inaction (e.g. climate change) • Suing the Feds: • Increasing litigation by States against Fed gov’t to protect enviro • Mass vs. EPA (Bush) to regulate CO2 under CAA

26. Drawbacks of States • Uneven State Performance: Some states like CA take the lead and advance EP as a primary State goal; others like MS and SC don’t • In low-performing states, political culture, ideology and social capital have significant explanatory powerpublic values again • Federal Dependency: many states continue to rely on Federal design and program priorities (from Washington) • 4 Forms of Valuable Assistance to States • 1. Toxics Release Inventory for states to use • 2. rely on fed R&D • 3. Coordination of EP on a multistate basis • 4. Effective in overseeing State agencies • States may be ill-equipped to handle a large range of environmental concerns—esp if they may migrate to another state

27. Future Role of States Shaped by: • The extent to which States have fiscal support to maintain core environmental considerations • Esp concern given States increasing focus on econ development • Divided Control of State legislatures—has influence over EP • Extent of Fed environmental legislation (like Climate cap and trade) with significant ramifications for states. • Most plausible and effective regime would avoid extreme decentralization or centralization, but requires functional and discerning “environmental federalism” • Ex/ Climate Change: Federal Carbon Tax reduce emissions nationally (and globally) while providing funds for mitigation/adaptation strategies within states and locales. Provides incentives for states’ inclusion in climate policy