STRATEGIC DETERRENCE IN THE 21 ST CENTURY

1. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY Richard Mies Admiral USN (Ret)

2. COLD WAR DETERRENCE WAS MORE COMPLEX AND NUANCEDTHAN FREQUENTLY DEPICTED

3. UNPREDICTABLE, DIVERSE, GROWING THREATS • Changing character of war: irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and asymmetric • No longer confined to the battlefield • Proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents, and cyber technology • Proliferation of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile technology • Proliferation of hard and deeply buried targets • Rise of non-state and rogue state actors • Re-emergence of potential peer, near-peer competitors

4. DETERRENCE RELATIONSHIPS IN A MULTI-POLAR WORLD Middle East South Asia Egypt Syria Pakistan Palestine Israel Afghanistan Iraq Iran India Caspian States Russia China Terrorists Ukraine Extremists USA Taiwan South East Asia North Korea Canada East Central America South Korea Germany Europe South America Japan NATO Cuba South Pacific France England East Asia North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa

5. POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC FORCE ATROPHY Weaknesses highlighted in numerous reports. Erosion of: • Senior leadership interest • People and expertise • Research and development • Technology • Infrastructure • Congressional support “Our lack of nuclear weapons production capability – and our stricture against not only development but design – holds our future hostage.” Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study

6. OUR AGING LEGACY COLD WAR STOCKPILE 34yrs 25 20 15 10 5 0 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Number of Warhead Types in Production Stockpile Age Number of Warhead Types in Production Average Weapon Age (Years) 1945 1950 1955 1960 19651970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2020 End of Fiscal Year

7. OUR AGING LEGACY DELIVERY PLATFORMS ALCM/ACM BOMBER MINUTEMAN III SSBN/SSGN TRIDENT D-5

8. Addressed in arms control indirectly via launcher accounting rules Strategic Nuclear Weapons Tactical Nuclear Weapons Inactive Nuclear Stockpile Nuclear Warhead Components Fissile Material Nuclear Infrastructure Scientific/Technical Expertise Arms control frameworks need to be more comprehensive THE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

9. THE RETURN OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION

10. NUCLEAR STRATEGY • Deter nuclear and nonnuclear attack. • Assure allies and partners. • If deterrence fails, achieve US objectives. • Hedge against an uncertain future. The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy are supported through these four principal roles for US nuclear forces

11. STRATEGIC WAR PLANS DEVELOPMENT • Guidance for Employment of Nuclear Weapons Presidential Guidance Nuclear Joint Strategic Campaign Plan Theater War Plans National Strategic War Planning BLACK BOOK Family of OPLANS

12. PRESIDENT NAOC NMCC NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL USSTRATCOM C2F Travis AFB Offutt AFB Washington DC Pax River NAS Tinker AFB ABNCP

13. DAY-TO-DAY STRATEGIC FORCE BASING NAVSUBASE BANGOR WA 8 OHIO SSBN MALMSTROM AFB MT MMIII ICBM MINOT AFB ND 23 B52H 150 MMIII ICBM FE WARREN AFB WY 150 MMIII ICBM WHITEMAN AFB MO 20 B2 BARKSDALE AFB LA 23 B52H NAVSUBASE KINGS BAY GA 6 OHIO SSBN

14. STRATEGIC FORCE ATTRIBUTES

15. STRATEGIC FORCE COSTS(1960 - 2040) 18% 16% 1962: TOTAL TRIAD: 17.1% of DoD Budget 14% 2029: Peak Recapitalization of Nuclear Enterprise Funding, including 100% of B-21 funding TOTAL TRIAD: 6.4%of DoD Budget 12% 1984:TOTAL TRIAD: 10.6%of DoD Budget 10% 8% Peak Recapitalization: 3.7% of DoD Budget PERCENT OF DOD BUDGET 6% 4% Recapitalization 2% Legacy Triad and Sustainment Sustainment: 2.7% of DoD Budget 0% 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2004 2007 2010 2013 2031 2034 2037 2040 FISCAL YEAR

16. STRATEGIC FORCE COSTS(1960 - 2040) 90% 100% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% PERCENT OF DOD BUDGET 30% 20% 10% 0% 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2004 2007 2010 2013 2031 2034 2037 2040 FISCAL YEAR

17. THE RISKS OF FURTHER STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS • Credibility of our extended deterrent commitments may fall into serious question • Potential adversaries may be emboldened to challenge us • Viability of the strategic triad may fall into question • Comparative stockpile asymmetries are likely to become more pronounced • Inherent robustness and flexibility in options available to the President will be lost • A shift from a counter-force toward a counter-population strategy is contrary to historical practice, politically intolerable, and morally repugnant

18. RUSSIA’S NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

19. THE STRATEGIC TARGETING DOCTRINE DILEMMA NOMINAL MAX DETERRENT REQUIREMENT COUNTER-POPULATION MEASURE OF DAMAGE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE NUMBER OF AVAILABLE WEAPONS

20. THE ILLOGIC OF ZERO • Is it feasible? • Is it verifiable and enforceable? • Is it inherently stabilizing and hence sustainable? • Is it desirable? “The means for creating a world without actual nuclear weapons would have to be of a basic political kind, not a matter of technical arms control. Secure nuclear abolition would be consequence, not cause; and in the journey it has to be cart, not horse.” Sir Michael Quinlan

21. A PARADIGM SHIFTIN WARFARE 2 1.5 Wartime Fatalities (% of world population) WW I 1 .5 0 1800 1600 1700 1900 “Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war, than one with major war but no nuclear weapons.” Sir Michael Quinlan STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 2.5 WW II 2000

23. QUESTIONS

24. A WISE STRATEGIC ARCHITECT

25. GLOBAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILE COMPARISON

26. STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTION GUIDING PRINCIPLES • The journey is more important than the destination • Focus on stability and capabilities rather than just numbers • Preserve strategic adaptability as a hedge against uncertainty • Strategy must drive numbers rather than numbers driving strategy • View reductions as a means to an end – national security- and not as an end in itself • Place burden of proof on reduction advocates • Eliminate artificial distinctions between strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces • Utilize deliberate planning as the foundation of adaptive planning • Exercise capabilities regularly

27. THE ABOLITION CART BEFORE THE GEOPOLITICAL HORSE? “The trouble with disarmament was (it still is) that the problem of war is tackled upside down and at the wrong end. Upside down first; for nations do not arm willingly. Indeed, they are sometimes only too willing to disarm, as the British did to their sorrow in the Baldwin days. Nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the weather be warm, and people will discard their clothes readily and without committees to tell them how they are to undress.” Salvador de Madariaga

28. GLOBAL ZEROQUESTIONABLE ASSERTIONS • Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition • A large scale conflict with Russia or China is implausible • Strong conventional forces and missile defenses can supplant nuclear deterrence • 9-11 exposed the irrelevance of nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats • Catastrophic risks still exist for missiles to be fired by accident, miscalculation, or unauthorized action • ICBMs in silos are inherently vulnerable and depend heavily upon launch on warning • Rigorous analyses have proven that dealerting would promote stability

29. RADICAL ISLAMIC VISION Result • Strongest army in the world • Strongest currency in the world • Largest country in the world • Atomic and super power country • Half of world population in Islamic State

30. CHINA’S ANTI-ACCESS AREA DENIAL STRATEGY

31. PROLIFERATION OF HYPERSONIC, CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES PROLIFERATION OF WMD AND CYBER RISE OF TERRORISM NEW WAYS OF MANAGING NUCLEAR FORCES IMPORTANCE OF SUSTAINING DETERRENCE NEW REALITY CREATION OF STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS • More Diverse, Less Predictable Threats • Need to Shape Strategic Forces for 21st Century • Return of Great Power Competition

32. Strategic Warheads Tactical Warheads Production Capacity Strategic Warhead Uncertainty Tactical Warhead Uncertainty US / RUSSIAN STOCKPILE COMPARISON RUSSIAN STOCKPILE U.S. STOCKPILE + UNCERTAIN CHEMICAL CAPABILITY + UNCERTAIN BIOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 2005 2019 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 STOCKPILE ASYMMETRIES MORE PRONOUNCED AT LOWER LEVELS