Gateway Cryptography

1. Gateway Cryptography Hacking Impossible Tunnels Through Improbable Networks with OpenSSH et al. By Dan Kaminsky, CISSP http://www.doxpara.com

2. Summary • This is not how to crack SSH. This is SSH on crack. • 1) How to get there from here • 2) What to do once you get there • 3) Making getting there easier

3. Gateway Cryptography Methodology • Basic Philosophy For End To End Security • Step 1: Create a valid path from client to server • Step 2: Independently authenticate and encrypt over this new valid path • Step 3: Forward services over the independent link • Pragmatic Law: If it isn’t usable, nobody uses it.

4. The Basics • Bringing people up to speed • This is not another talk about the wonders of a simple local port forward • What OpenSSH does • Forwards a shell (w/ transparent X support) • Forwards a single command (with full stdio) • Forwards a single TCP port • “All SSH forwards are non-exclusive and non-transparent figments of userspace”

5. SSH under Windows • 1) Install Cygwin from www.cygwin.com • 2) Create a shortcut to rxvt • C:\cygwin\bin\rxvt.exe -rv -sl 20000 -fn “Courier-12" -e /usr/bin/bash • bash doesn’t work under whistler yet, so use zsh if you want to retain your tab-completion sanity • 3) Finally enjoy a usable Unix environment under Win32 • Everything in this talk is cross platform, as long as you’ve made Windows cross to another platform

6. Forwarding Shells • ssh user@host • Encryption: 3DES/Blowfish/AES • Authentication: Password, RSA/DSA • Key Generation • ssh1: ssh-keygen • ssh2: ssh-keygen –t dsa • Key Authorization • ssh1: cat ~/.ssh/identity.pub | ssh user@host ‘umask 0600; mkdir .ssh; cat >> authorized_keys’ • ssh2: cat ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub | ssh user@host ‘umask 0600; mkdir .ssh; cat >> authorized_keys2’ • Separate auth – so remember ssh -1 and ssh -2

7. Forwarding Commands • ssh user@host lsssh –t user@host top • Fully 8 bit clean for most commands, supports (unclean) TTYs for anything that wants to redraw screen (like top) using –t • Full STDIO(stdin/stdout/stderr) support • Allows pipelines across multiple systems

8. Command Forwarding:CD Burning Over SSH • mkisofs reads in files and spits out a burnable image • cdrecord burns the image. • Find out the SCSI ID of your burnercdrecord -scanbus • Normal CD Burningmkisofs –JR files | cdrecord dev=#,#,# speed=# - • Remote CD Burningmkisofs –JR files | ssh user@host cdrecord dev=#,#,# speed=# - • Remote CD Burning From Windowsmkisofs.exe –JR files | ssh.exe user@host cdrecord dev=#,#,# speed=# - • Remote CD Burning From Windows For Users • Right Click On Files/Directories, Click Send To, Click CDR. • Under development; trivial to write

9. Command Forwarding:File Transfer w/o SCP • # GETalicehost$ ssh alice@bobhost “cat file” > file# PUTfalicehost$ cat file > ssh alice@bobhost “cat > file”# LISTalicehost$ ssh alice@bobhost “ls”# MGETalicehost$ ssh alice@bobhost “tar -cf - /etc” | tar -xf –# RESUME GETalicehost$ ssh alice@bobhost “tail –c 231244 file” >> file • Planning on implementing SFTP using nothing more than these commands • SCP is just annoying me more and more, though the syntax is temporarily more convenient • Interesting possibilities through tunneling dd

10. Forwarding Ports • ssh user@host -L8000:127.0.0.1:80ssh user@host -R80:127.0.0.1:8000 • Separates into “listener” vs. “location” • If local listens, the destination is relative to the remote location • If remote listens, the destination is relative to the local location

11. Limitations on Port Forwards • By default, only the systems directly hosting the listener can connect to it • Local forwards can be made public using the –g option, but remote “gateway ports” must be enabled using GatewayPorts Yes • Destination locations are unrestricted

12. Accessing a Port Forward • Application Layer • Connect Directly to 127.0.0.1 or “localhost” • Operating System Layer (“systemspace”) • Pre-empt DNS lookup in hosts file • Unix: /etc/hosts • Win95: \windows\hosts • WinNT: \WINNT\system32\drivers\etc\hosts • All forwards must be preannounced, and share the same IP (127.0.0.1)

13. Problem:Static Forwards Are Inflexible • Work decently only when: • Each port is only used once • Passes: • Mail(smtp, pop3, imap) • Simple Web(HTTP) • Fails: • Web Surfing Multiple Sites (HTTP) • P2P File Transfer(Napster, Gnutella), • Ports are predictable in advance • Fails miserably • FTP, both Active and Passive

14. Solution:Dynamic Forwarding w/ SOCKS • ssh user@host -D1080 • SOCKS4/5: An in-band protocol header, nothing more, that allows the client to very quickly tell a proxy server where its actual destination was • SOCKS4 is extraordinarily simple • ~9 bytes from Client, 8 byte response, and the client has informed the “proxy” where it actually wants to go! • “Library Preloads” are excessive • The idea: Run a trivial SOCKS daemon in the ssh client; use it to redirect the destination of each channel.

15. Dynamic Forwarding:Application Support • Most major Windows applications support SOCKS proxies directly • Internet Explorer, CuteFTP, IM Clients, P2P Clients(Napster, Gnutella) • Dialpad (Voice over IP to a telephone for free over SSH!) • SocksCap32 can be used to “Socksify” remaining apps on Windows • Outlook Express, LeechFTP, Media Player, etc. • Unix applications can be reasonably socksified too

16. Dynamic Forwarding:Faults In The Hack • No Network Isolation • Though this, of course, is “trusting the client”, there’s still value in a client itself volunteering to ignore all communications not through the VPN “solution”. • No Unified Configuration and Management Interface • Fixable, should this become popular.

17. Dynamic Forwarding:THE BIG PROBLEM • Server Freeze • Most SSH servers will temporarily block(lock up) if you attempt to open a channel to a host that either doesn’t exist or cannot be resolved • General purpose solutions to this get…ugly. • OpenSSH has fewer problems in this arena • OpenSSH has no inherent SOCKS client support – cannot easily connect to dynamic port forwards

18. ProxyCommand:Blind Proxying w/ SSH • ssh -o 'ProxyCommand arbitrary_tool proxy %u %h %p' user@10.1.0.1 • A ProxyCommand is an arbitrary tool that, after it finishes executing, leads to an 8 bit clean path to an SSH daemon • OpenSSH's excuse for SOCKS support :-) • Tool for creating a valid path via an arbitrary command • host$ nc ssh_server 22 #see the bannerSSH-1.99-OpenSSH_2.9p1host$ arbitrary_tool proxy user ssh_server portSSH-1.99-OpenSSH_2.9p1 • Allows end-to-end crypto through any 8bit clean link • Like SSL over HTTP Connect

19. Wire Mode:Facilitating Self-Proxying SSH • ssh user@proxy -Whost:22 • ProxyCommand needs an 8 bit path • SSH exists to provide 8 bit paths • Correct Method: Open a local port forward, use glue code to directly connect it to ttyless stdio code • Cheap Hack Method: Translate –Whost:22 into “nc host 22”

20. Using netcat-based Wire Mode • ssh -o 'ProxyCommand ssh user@proxy "nc %h %p"' user@server • Completely unusable • Alternative Syntax Under Development • ssh –B proxy user@server • ssh proxy/user@server • Competes with: • ssh user@proxyproxy$ ssh user@server • The PROXY authenticates • The PROXY decrypts • The PROXY is Internet accessible • When the PROXY gets hacked, the network is toast.

21. No Internet Accessible Bastion Proxy: Now What? • server$ ssh user@client -R2022:127.0.0.1:22client$ ssh user@127.0.0.1 -o "HostKeyAlias server" -L8000:www-internal:80or (in upcoming builds, hopefully) client$ ssh user@proxy/2022 -L8000:www-internal:80 • Step 1: Create a valid path from client to server • Use a remote port forward • Outgoing in the context of the firewall • Incoming in the context of the client • Step 2: Independently authenticate and encrypt over this new valid path • Remotely Forward SSHD, not Web etc. • Step 3: Forward services over the independent link

22. Theory And Dire Warning • Turns inability to trust into irrelevancy of trust • Negative: “You can’t trust the addresses of x, y, or z!” • Positive: “It doesn’t matter if you think you’re talking to the addresses of x, y, or z.” • MUST CHECK HOSTKEY – it’ll work even if you don’t • Either use ‘HostKeyAlias’ or use the new concentrated syntax (not out yet)

23. Cross-Connecting Mutually Firewalled Hosts • server$ ssh proxyuser@proxy -R2022:127.0.0.1:22client$ ssh -o 'ProxyCommand ssh proxyuser2@proxy “nc 127.0.0.1 2022”’ user@server -L8000:www-internal:80 or in my syntaxclient$ ssh proxyuser2@proxy/2022 user@server -L8000:www-internal:80 • Step 1: Create a valid path from client to server • Server can’t directly connect to client anymore • Who said the server needs to be directly connected to the client? • Server and Client both use outgoing links • Instead of the client connecting to its own port 2022, it connects through a remote host’s 2022 • That’s the only thing different.

24. Fixing Port Forwards:Defaults • ssh -L143 -> ssh -L143:127.0.0.1:143ssh –Lfoo:80 -> ssh –L80:foo:80ssh –L2022:foo -> ssh –L2022:foo:22 • Begin with a default of 22:127.0.0.1:22, do some moderately painful string parsing in C, and actually end up with a decently compressed syntax • Would forwarding ranges be useful, i.e. ssh -L7000-7020 ? Still deciding.

25. Expanding Escape Syntax • noname# ~?Supported escape sequences:~. - terminate connection~R - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)~^Z - suspend ssh~# - list forwarded connections~& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)~? - this message~~ - send the escape character by typing it twice(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.) • Eventual goal: Port both ssh_config syntax and ssh command line syntax to the escape character mode • Allow on-demand things like activation of X forwarding

26. Secure SU:The Battle Against Direct Root • Most “security gurus” will decry direct root login • Holdover from the battle against admins doing everything as root • SU is a painless enough context switch • If it hurts to switch, people will just do it all as root • Advantages to being forced to switch accounts • Inertia • Emotion – significance of the action is emphasized • Accounting – logs show who used root • Even though it essentially reduces the security of the root account to the security of the Alice account, even OpenBSD (2.7, at least) still exhorts users not to ssh directly to root, and instead to use SU.

27. Secure SU:The Near-Perfect Compromise • alicehost$ ssh alice@bobhost -t “su –l root”or in my syntax ssh alice+root@bobhost • SSHD creates a secure execution environment when commands are explicitly specified • Shell configuration files not loaded • su, as a setuid app, can’t generally be traced by ordinary users • User logs in as normal, is safely prompted for the root password, gets a root shell without having to “slum” in through insecure space

28. Secure SU:Developing: Individuated Root • Individual Public Keys For Root Access • Nobody learns root password • authorized_keys contains list of identities allowed to connect as root to the system • SSHD modified to log who connected to root • Scales to multiple security-critical accounts • Root can modify its own authorized_keys, but other accounts could have root owned, root readable authorized_keys files. • Individual Root Accounts • Multiple accounts all set to same UID, but with different passwords • Alice_Root, Bob_Root, etc. • Really only works for root

29. SLIRP/PPTP over SSH:Starting with PPPD • PPPD: Standard Unix PPP Server • Generally creates an interface on its host called ppp# • Sets up a bidirectional route—works as an infrastructure-level datapath • Addressing can be manually or automatically negotiated • Standard Dialup Protocol • Command Forwarding allows remote PPPD to cleanly talk to local PPPD, thus creating a Host-To-Host VPN between two hosts • Requires root on both • “PPP over SSH”

30. SLIRP/PPTP over SSH:SLIRPing a way • SLIRP: User Mode NAT • Written around 1995 • Amazingly useful to this day—doesn’t require root! • Converts any 8 bit clean shell into a PPP server, NATs the incoming TCP/UDP/ICMP and opens the necessary sockets on the shell server • Command Forwarding SLIRP instead of PPPD into local PPPD requires root on only one host, but only the host running PPPD gets an OS-level route • Useful, but dangerous--but you’re trusting the server not to replace SLIRP with a hacked version that gives them a path back through your ready-and-willing PPPD.

31. SLIRP/PPTP over SSH:PPP over PPTP • PPTP: Point to Point Protocol • Encapsulates PPP(Layer 2) inside of a GRE(Layer 3) Tunnel, allowing TCP/UDP/ICMP(Layer 4) traffic to pass • Also uses 1731/TCP to initialize link • Try not to wrap your brain around this • Created by Microsoft as a VPN Solution • Version one was…infamously flawed. Version two is somewhat better, but not widely trusted. • Client ships with and is integrated into Windows 98/Me/2000 • Stable Interface • Network Isolation • Good UI • SSH cannot forward GRE internally

32. SLIRP/PPTP over SSH:PoPToP Puts It Together • PoPToP: Unix PPTP Daemon • Implements GRE encapsulation only • Doesn’t re-implement PPP! • Executes PPPD or SLIRP inside of GRE • Who says the daemon needs to be local? • End Result • Windows 98 connects to user bastion host using PPTP • PoPToP strips GRE header, goes to execute PPP daemon • SSH cleanly forwards a SLIRP command run as a user on a remote bastion host into PoPToP • Windows 98 isolates itself and experiences remote bastion host as a PPTP VPN gateway!

33. SLIRP/PPTP over SSH:HowTo • The really lazy way • Used when source is closed but the binary app shells out to some external binary • Really really lazy for PoPToP because it’s open source • mv /usr/bin/slirp slirp_binaryecho ‘#!/bin/sh’ >> /usr/bin/slirpecho ‘ssh user@host slirp_binary’ >> /usr/bin/slirp; • The less lazy way • Modify PoPToP to execute ‘ssh user@host slirp’ instead of ‘slirp’; • Should be noted that there’s *no* authentication to this link inside the PPTP network

34. The Link Crypto Problem • Link Based Systems: SSH, SSL, SCH(Spiffy Custom Hardware) • All have decryption key available on other side of link • Corollary: Decryption key available on linked host • All decrypt immediately • Reality: Almost never re-encrypted • File Based Systems: GPG • Can, but often don’t segment ability to encrypt from ability to decrypt

35. Quick File Crypto Tip 1:Locked Drops • Public/Private Encryption • AKA Asymmetric • Anyone can encrypt, only you can decrypt • Storage Purposes • Any machine can encrypt data, but only a limited set of systems can decrypt it • Hosts send data to a backup server that never receives the encryption key • Clients send encrypted logs to a server through insecure network; decryption key is stored on a central server far behind the network • Database stores credit card numbers in encrypted form, decryption occurs in the administrator’s client one at a time

36. Quick File Crypto 2:Dynamic Rekeying (DROP) • Damage of a key compromise tied to how much useful information can be decrypted with that key • Changing keys restricts the damage of a key compromise, but increases risk that a bad key will be used • Using a long term identity key to sign short term encryption keys limits damage of key update while providing Forward Secrecy

37. Conclusion • ssh is powerful • ssh is flexible • ssh is fun. • gpg is cool too • any questions? any requests? bueller?