Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie: Sprachphilosophie

1. Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie: Sprachphilosophie Nathan Wildman nathan.wildman@uni-hamburg.de

2. Something to Ponder Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely, first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought; secondly, that the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking; and, finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language. [...] [T]he acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytical school… (Dummett 1978: 458)

3. More About Russell’s Theory of Descriptions Or, the lecture where we discuss a series of puzzles& problems that concerned theThird Earl Russell

4. The Plan • Restate the Basics of Russell’s view • Russell’s solutions to the Puzzles • Strawson’s Objection to Russell • Donnellan’s Objection to Russell • Evaluation of The Two Pictures

5. Russell’s Objections To Frege • ‘Darth Vader is tall OR Messi is the best in the world.’ • This disjunction is true! The argument re-constructed: • We can use non-denoting phrases in logically complex expressions. • These expressions retain their truth values when a term used therein doesn’t have a referent. • Frege would have us say they become truth-valueless. • Therefore Frege is wrong.

6. The Heart of Russell’s Objections According to Russell: • The meaning of a sentence and the object of a thought is a proposition 2. Propositions are composed of objects and properties • A genuine proper name contributes the object it stands for • Predicatescontribute the properties/relations they stand for • If ‘a’ is a name for a and ‘F( )’ is a one-place predicate that stands for the monadic property F, then ‘Fa’ expresses a proposition, <Fa> composed of a and F.

7. The Heart of Russell’s Objections Russellian propositions: a proposition is a complex consisting of the very objects which are the values of the words which express the proposition The propositions can be either: • Object dependent – when the subject of the sentence is a term that refers to an object • Object independent – when the subject of the sentence is a term that does not refer to an object

8. Russell’s Positive Proposal Propositional functions: functions which take you from phrases to propositions Two ways to ‘complete’ propositional function: • With a genuine proper name • With a quantifier expression Note that (1) would give us an object dependent proposition, but (2) an object independent proposition!

9. Russell’s Positive Proposal One notable kind of quantifier expression: Definite Descriptions • ‘the F is G’ means • There is at least one x whichis F; and • There is at most one x whichis F; and • all Fs are G ‘The present king of France is bald’ means: • There is a present king of France; and • There is only one present king of France; and • Everything that is a king of France is bald

10. Russell’s Positive Proposal Everything, nothing, and something, are not assumed to have any meaning in isolation, but a meaning is assigned to every proposition in which they occur. This is the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate: that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. (Russell, OD) These terms do not express dependent but rather independent propositions – there need not be a particular object denoted to express a proposition involving one of the above.

11. Russell’s Positive Proposal In ‘On Denoting’, Russell suggests treating empty names as disguised descriptions: A proposition about Apollo means what we get by substituting what the classical dictionary tells us is meant by Apollo, say ‘the sun-god’. All propositions in which Apollo occurs are to be interpreted by the above rules for denoting phrases. (Russell, OD) • Apollo helped kill Achilles • There is an x such that, x is a sun-god, and, for all objects y, if y is a sun-god, then y=x, and x helped kill Achilles.

12. Russell’s Positive Proposal The upshot of this move is that, if the above argumentation is correct, we can understand and evaluate for truth propositions involving empty names: • <Apollohelped kill Achilles> is false because there is no x which satisfies the definite description! Similarly, we can say that • <The Present King of France is bald> is false because there is no xwhich satisfies the definite description!

13. Russell’s Positive Proposal But the Russell of ‘Descriptions’ is more radical: therein, we are told that it is ‘a very rash assumption’ to regard ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and ‘Aristotle’ as genuine proper names. In fact: We may even go so far as to say that, in all such knowledge as can be expressed in words—with the exception of ‘this’ and ‘that’ and a few other words of which the meaning varies on different occasions—no names, in the strict sense, occur, but what seem like names are really descriptions. (Russell, Descriptions)

14. Russell’s Positive Proposal In other words: every singular term is in fact a concealed definite description! • Lionel Messi is the greatest living footballer • The Argentinian striker who plays for Barcelona is the greatest living footballer • There is an x such that, x is an Argentinian striker who plays for Barcelona, and, for all objects y, if y is an Argentinian striker who plays for Barcelona, then y=x, and x is the greatest living footballer

15. Russell’s Positive Proposal One small exception: Logically proper names! They are particular instances of ‘this’ and ‘that’. For these expressions, if you don’t know the reference, you can’t use the term correctly Importantly, this means that the problematic cases involved in the puzzles could never come up – you’d simply not know the denotation (and thus the meaning) of the term!

16. Russell’s Positive Proposal This gives us Russell’s picture: I. Definite descriptions are quantifierexpressions, rather than referring expressions II. All singular terms (barring logically proper names) are concealed definite descriptions Upshot: Singular terms are concealed definite descriptions, the meaning of which is the associated quantifier expression, and propositions involving them turn out to be object independent

17. Russell’s Solutions – An Aside on Scope Wide scope (primaryoccurrence) (1a) The present king of France is believed by Frank to be bald. (2a) The present king of France is not bald Narrow scope (secondaryoccurrence) (1b) Frank believes that the present king of France is bald. (2b) It is not the casethat the present king of France is bald.

18. The Puzzles Again • Frege’s Puzzle: How can two identity statements differ in cognitive value, if the terms involved refer to the same thing? • Predicational Puzzle: How can two predicational statements differ in cognitive value, if the singular terms involved refer to the same thing? • Substitution Puzzle: How can a = b but ‘S believes that a is F’ not mean the same as ‘S believes that b is F’?

19. The Puzzles Again • Empty Names Puzzle: how can ‘a is F’ be meaningful when ‘a’ stands for a non-existing or fictional entity? • Law of Excluded Middle: How can it be that, for any formula ϕ, (ϕ V ϕ)? • Negative Existentials Puzzle: How can ‘a does not exist’ be true?

20. Russell’s Solutions General strategy Definite descriptions, like ‘the F’, are not genuine singular terms; their function is to describe, not denote • Whether or not anything satisfies a definite description, it is still meaningful • Unlike for Frege, there is no appeal to senses • While ‘the F’ is the grammatical subject of ‘the F is G’, it is not its logical subject • The surface grammar misled us into thinking that ‘the F’ is a singular term, but it’s really a definite description!

21. Russell’s Solutions • Frege’s Puzzle: How can two identity statements differ in cognitive value, if the terms involved refer to the same thing? (1a) The father of Luke is Vader. (1b) Vader is Vader. ‘The father of Luke’ doesn’t mean ‘Vader’ – rather, it means ‘Forsomex, xisa fatherof Luke, and, for all y, ifyis a fatherof Luke, theny=x’ So (1a), properly translated, says

22. Russell’s Solutions (1a’) Forsomex, xis a fatherof Luke, and, for all y, ifyis a fatherof Luke, theny=x, and x = Vader Of course, given that singular terms are definite descriptions, ‘Vader’ must also be translated too, e.g. as ‘Forsomex, xis a Dark Lord oftheSith, and, for all y, ifyis a Dark Lord oftheSith, theny=x‘ So, this means that (1a) really says (1a*) Forsomex, xis a fatherof Luke, and, for all y, ifyis a fatherof Luke, theny=x, andforsomez, zis a Dark Lord oftheSith, and, for all y, ifyis a Dark Lord oftheSith, theny=z, andx=z

23. Russell’s Solutions (1b*) Forsomex, xis a Dark Lord oftheSith, and, for all y, ifyis a Dark Lord oftheSith, theny=x andforsomez, zis a Dark Lord oftheSith, and, for all y, ifyis a Dark Lord oftheSith, theny=z, andx=z So translated, it is obvious what the difference between the two is: (1a) asserts that there is one thing that satisfies two different definite descriptions, while (1b) asserts that one thing satisfies the same definite description. Answer: Because the definite descriptions invoked differ!

24. Russell’s Solutions • Predicational Puzzle: How can two predicational statements differ in cognitive value, if the singular terms involved refer to the same thing? • Clark Kent = ‘the mild mannered reporter’ • Superman = ‘the man from Krypton’ (2a) ‘Clark Kent is a reporter’ (2b) ‘Superman is a reporter’

25. Russell’s Solutions (2a*) Forsomex, xis a m. m. reporter, and, for all y, ifyisa m.m. reporter, theny=x andx is a reporter. (2b*) Forsomex, xis a man from Krypton, and, for all y, ify isa man from Krypton, theny=x andx is a reporter. • The difference: (2a) says something that satisfies a particular description and has a further property, while (2b) asserts that something that satisfies a different description possess the property Answer: Because the definite descriptions invoked differ!

26. Russell’s Solutions (3) Substitution Puzzle: How can a = b but ‘S believes that a is F’ not mean the same as ‘S believes that b is F’? Answer: because (i) ‘a’ & ‘b’ are different concealed definite descriptions; and (ii)belief has wide scope (3a) Luke believes that Vader is Vader (3b) Luke doesn’t believe that the father of Luke is Vader

27. Russell’s Solutions Two ways to read both (3a’)Vader is believed by Luke to be Vader (3a*) Luke believes that Vader is Vader (3b’) The father of Luke is not believed by Luke to be Vader (3b*)Luke does not believe that the father of Luke is Vader

28. Russell’s Solutions Two ways to read both (3a’)Vader is believed by Luke to be Vader. (3a’’)Forsomex, xis a Dark Lord oftheSith, and, for all y, ifyis a Dark Lord oftheSith, theny=x andx isbelievedby Luke tobeVader (3a*) Luke believes that Vader is Vader (3a**) Forsomex, xis a farm-boy fromTatoone, and, for all y, ifyis a f.b. fromTatoone, theny=x andx believesthatforsomez, zis a Dark Lord oftheSith, and, forall y, ifyis a Dark Lord oftheSith, theny=z andz=z.

29. Russell’s Solutions The importantpoint: (3a’’)’s subject is Vader, (3a**)’s subject is Luke We want to say something about what Luke believes, so we need to use (3a**) Upshot: it isn’t blatantly contradictory to believe something concerning an object under one designation, but not under another! (Compare what would happen if we used (3a’) & (3b’))

30. Russell’s Solutions (3a*) Luke believes that Vader is Vader (3b*)Luke does not believe that the father of Luke is Vader But how can both of these be true? Answer: the difference in the definite descriptions involved! We can apply the lessons from the previous cases and see that the propositions Luke is related are different in the two situations!

31. Russell’s Solutions • Empty Names Puzzle: how can ‘a is F’ be meaningful when ‘a’ stands for a non-existing or fictional entity? • The Present King of France is bald Answer: because ‘a’ is a concealed definite description, which means that ‘a is F’ expresses an object independent proposition • <Forsomex, xisa P.K.o.F, and, for all y, ifyisa P.K. o. F., theny=x, and x is bald>

32. Russell’s Solutions • <For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K. o. F., then y=x, and x is bald> This proposition is false, not meaningless • False because there is no x that is a Present King of France Upshot: we can have meaningful talk about things that don’t exist. Even better…

33. Russell’s Solutions (5) Law of Excluded Middle: How can it be that, for any formula ϕ, (ϕ V ϕ)? Answer: because ‘a’ is a concealed definite description, ‘a is F’ expresses an object independent proposition Recall that the problematic cases involved empty singular terms: • The Present King of France is bald • <Forsomex, xistheP.K.o.F, and, for all y, ifyisthe P.K. o. F., theny=x, and x is bald>

34. Russell’s Solutions • <For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K. o. F., then y=x, and x is bald> is false • Because there is no x that is a Present King of France Consequently, <  For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K. o. F., then y=x, and x is bald> is true • Because it is not the case that there is an x that is a Present King of France

35. Russell’s Solutions (6) Negative Existentials Puzzle: How can ‘a does not exist’ be true? Answer: because (i) ‘a’ is a concealed definite description; and (ii) the negation has wide scope. • The consequence of (i) is that ‘a does not exist’ expresses an object independent proposition • Consequence of (ii) is that the expression is true whenever the object denoted doesn’t exist! • The Present King of France does not exist

36. Russell’s Solutions Twowaystoread: (Narrow): <Forsomex, xis a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, ifyis a P.K.o.F., theny=x, and x doesnot exist> • This ascribes to objects the property of ‘not existing’, which quickly leads to contradiction (Wide): <Itis not thecasethat, forsomex, xis a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, ifyis a P.K.o.F., theny=x> • This doesn’t lead to contradiction, and fits intuitive truth conditions!

37. Objections to Russell Two Key Points of Russell’s picture: I. Definite descriptions are quantifierexpressions, rather than referring expressions II. All singular terms (barring logically proper names) are concealed definite descriptions Both are employed in his solutions to the puzzles; both have received some rather heavy criticism…

38. Strawson on Russell Strawson holds that, generally, we must be careful to focus upon the actual use of language; this is important because not all putative definite descriptions are used as singular terms: (1a) The whale is a mammal. (1b) Napoleon was the greatest French soldier. However, let’s focus on cases where definite descriptions are used as singular terms.

39. Strawson on Russell Distinguish between sentences/expressions from particular utterances of them and uses of them to assert and to refer • Although the sentence ‘The president is wise’ itself is neither true nor false, it may—depending on when it is uttered—be used to say something (false) about Bush or else used to say something (true) about Obama • Although the expression ‘the president’ itself does not refer, it may—depending on when it is uttered—be used to refer to Bush or else used to refer to Obama

40. Strawson on Russell Expressions: the meanings of expressions (in particular, singular terms) are rules, habits, and conventions governing their correct uses to refer. The meaning of a singular term is neither its referent, nor a description; instead, the meaning of a singular term is a set of instructions for determining whether a particular use of it refers • Note: a singular term’s referent is what is introduced into the statement made by an utterance • Consequence: singular terms are neither definite descriptions nor logically proper names!

41. Strawson on Russell Sentences. The meanings of sentences are rules, habits, and conventions governing their correct uses to make true or false assertions. • ‘I am tall’ can be used to make a true assertion iff the utterer is tall The meanings of sentences are not the statements they can be used to make; instead, the meaning of a sentence is a set of instructions for determining whether a particular use of it is true.

42. Strawson on Russell Objection from neglect. In general, Russell has focused too much on the meanings of linguistic expressions apart from their uses. By doing so, he has neglected the fact that speakers, not sentences or expressions, assert and refer • Pace Russell, the meaning of ‘the F’is not whatever (if anything) the description describes; instead, it is a set of instructions for how to introduce an object which satisfies the description (this is why a definite description may be meaningful even if it fails to describe anything). Note: This objection is simply Strawson insisting his view is correct. It’s not really an objection!

43. Strawson on Russell Objection from assertion. On Russell’s view, to assert K The present king of France is bald. is in part to assert that there is exactly one present king of France. But even if this is presupposed by one’s assertion of K, it is not part of what is asserted in asserting K. The use of ‘the’ signals that a unique reference is to be made, but does not assert this.

44. Strawson on Russell Objection from spurious uses. Russell’s view says K is false since E There is a present king of France. is false. This is implausible: K is neither true nor false because KpresupposesE. • Sentence S presupposes T iffS is either true or false only if T is true. • When a sentence’s presupposition is false, then ‘the question of its truth simply does not arise’.

45. Russell’s Reply These objections stem from the same claim: ‘The F is G’ presupposes the existence of something which is F, while Russell’s analysis requires that ‘The F is G’ entails the existence of something which is F. • Apresupposes B iff, if B is false, then A is neither true nor false • Aentails B iffit is impossible for B to be false and A true Entailmentcontraposes, presupposition doesn’t: Contraposition: P → Q iff ¬Q → ¬P

46. Russell’s Reply Strawson finds his account more intuitive. Is it? First problem: it’s easy to find instances where Strawson’s intuition is simply wrong (a) The king of France exists (b) Arsenal won on the King of France’s goal (c) The King of France does not exist

47. Russell’s Reply Second Problem: presuppositions can becancelled If A putatively presupposes B, we can always assert the joint falsity of A and B: e.g. by saying A is false because B is false. This shows that presupposition simply does not hold, for if it did, the falsity of B would be enough to show that A lacked a truth value. • The king of England came to the reception and so did the king of Norway, but France isn’t a monarchy, so the king of France didn’t come • The king of France isn’t bald, because there is no king of France

48. Donnellan’s Objection ‘the’ – the centrepiece of Russell’s theory, is ambiguous between attributive and referential interpretations. A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing. -Donnellan, Reference & Definite Descriptions

49. Donnellan’s Objection • Attributive: object independent, as on Russell’s analysis; the definite description is true of whoever satisfies the description. • Referential: object dependent, as with demostratives; ‘The F’ functions as a singular term, with ‘F’ simply being used to ‘point’ to a particular object that may or may not in fact be F Donnellan’sclaim, then, is that, at best, Russell’s account is partial: it completely ignores referential uses

50. Donnellan’s Objection Suppose we come across Smith foully murdered. I might exclaim, due to the vileness of the scene: M The murder of Smith is insane Now, we don’t know who murdered Smith. But, whomever that is, when I utter M in this way, I am attributing to that person the property of being insane. • Donnellansuggests this is an attributiveuse – it is true just if whoever murdered Smith is insane.