Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) Mission

1. Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) Mission Particles and Fields Package Safety and Mission Assurance Critical Design Review May 23 -25, 2011 Jorg Fischer, MAVEN PFP SMA

2. PFP Quality Organization SSL Quality Committee PFP Project Manager LASP SMA Manager CESR/IRAP SMA Manager Configuration Management SSL Safety & Quality Group Manager GSFC SMA Manager PFP MAM Manager Quality Assurance Quality Assurance Engineer Team Safety Inspections, Audits Personnel Safety Build Configuration Verification PMPCB, FRB, MRB Flight Hardware Safety Support lessons Learned Documentation and Records ESD Control Training and Certification Contamination Control Support Flight H/W & S/W QA Testing Lab Inspections

3. SSL PFP Quality Organization • Jorg Fischer, Safety & Quality Group Manager, MAM - Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance • Chris Scholz, Quality Lead Engineer - Quality Control, Inspections, Audits - Fabrication Control and Support - Training • Anloc Le, Quality Parts Engineer - PFP Parts Control and Support • Erica Kotta, Quality Associate - ESD Monitor & Control and Support - Parts and Materials Control and Support • Daniele Meilhan, Quality Support - Calibration Control and Support

4. Responsibilities of Mission Assurance TECH MD (or 5 plus H) • Traceability Selection, Procurement, Shipping /Receiving -> Documentation • ESD Control • Calibration Control • Holistic Approach Monitoring, Reviews, Training and Lessons Learned, QMS. • Material and Process Control Non-Conformance Control – ECO, PFR, SCR, SPR Reporting and Reviews Manufacturing, Software Assurance, Contamination, and Test Control (I&T, Verification and Environmental Test), Test Witness , Internal and External Auditing (formal/Informal), In-process and MIP Inspections, Shipping/Receiving. • Documentation Configuration Management and Data and Record Control EIDP, Final Acceptance Data Package -> Traceability

5. Mission Assurance Implementation Plans Mission Assurance Implementation Plans (MAIP) Status SSL, LASP, CESR/IRAP have submitted a MAIP indicating how SSL will implement the MAVEN Mission Assurance Requirements SSL: MAVEN_PF_QA_002 LASP/LPW: MAVEN-RSS-PLAN-0038 CESR/IRAP SWEA: SWEA-PL-32100-CESR-001-GEN GSFC/MAG: MAVEN_PF_QA_002 Result of many iterations between Project SMA & PFP MAIP was reviewed and approved by Project It includes a compliance verification matrix, deliverables list

6. SMA Requirements and Documentation 1. GENERAL 1.1. Basis and Scope of the Plan 1.1.1. CESR 1.2. General Requirements 1.3. Use of Previously Designed, Fabricated, or Flown Hardware 1.4. Flow-Down of MA Requirements 1.5. Surveillance 1.6. SR&QA Verification 1.7. Status Reporting 1.8. Applicable Documents (Appendix A) 2. ASSURANCE REVIEW REQUIREMENTS 2.1. General Requirements 2.2. GSFC Flight Assurance Review Requirements 2.3. Flight Assurance Review Program 3. PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 3.1. General Requirements 3.2. Documentation Requirements 3.2.1. Verification Matrix 3.2.2. Verification Test Plan 3.2.3. Verification Test Procedures 3.2.4. Verification Test Report 3.3. Demonstration of Failure-Free Operation 3.4. Comprehensive Performance Test 4. SAFETY 4.1. General 4.2. System Description and Safety Assessment Report 4.2.1. Preliminary Safety Assessment 4.3. Procedure Approval 4.4. Safety Noncompliance Requests 4.5. Safety Working Group Meetings 4.6. Safety Data Package, Launch Site Safety Plan, and Orbital Debris Assessment 4.7. Mishaps 4.8. Assessments 5.1. PARTS SELECTION 5.1.1. EEE Parts Identification List 5.2. Other Parts 5.2.1. Magnetic Devices 5.2.2. Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs) 5.2.3. Units and Subassemblies 5.2.4. Field Programmable Devices 5.2.5. PIND Testing 5.2.6. Destructive Physical Analyses (DPA) 5.3. Ceramic Capacitors 5.4. Derating 5.5. Radiation Tolerance 5.6. Alerts 5.7. Parts Age Control 5.8. Parts Control Board 6. MATERIALS AND PROCESSES CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 6.1. Selection Requirements 6.1.1. Compliant Materials 6.1.2. Noncompliant Materials 6.1.3. Conventional Applications 6.1.4. Nonconventional Applications 6.1.5. Inorganic and Metallic Materials 6.1.6. Non-metallic Materials 6.1.7. Fasteners 6.1.8. Lubricants 6.1.9. Consideration in Process Selection 6.1.10.Shelf Life Controlled Items 6.1.11.Magnetics Compatibility 6.2. Documentation 6.3. GIDEP Alerts 6.4. Materials and Process Control Board 7. DESIGN ASSURANCE AND RELIABILITY 7.1. Requirements 7.2. Implementation 7.3. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 7.4. Limited Life Items 7.5. Trending 7.6. Parts Stress Analysis 7.7. Worst Case Analyses 8. QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 8.1. Support of Design Reviews 8.2. Configuration Management 8.3. Identification and Traceability 8.4. Procurement Controls 8.4.1. Purchased Raw Materials 8.4.2. Age Control and Limited-Life Products 8.4.3. Inspection and Test Records 8.4.4. Purchase Order Review 8.4.5. Re-submission of Non-conforming Materials 8.5. Receiving Inspection 8.6. Fabrication Control 8.6.1. Manufacturing Certification Log 8.6.2. Workmanship 8.6.3. Process Control 8.6.4. Reuse of Parts and Materials 8.6.5. Retention of Test Samples and Removed Parts 8.7. ESD Control 8.8. Non-conformance Control 8.8.1. Discrepancies 8.8.2. Failures 8.8.3. Alert Information 8.9. Inspections and Tests 8.9.1. Inspection and Test Records 8.9.2. Printed Wiring Boards Inspections and Tests 8.10. Metrology 8.11. Handling, Storage, Marking, Shipping... 8.11.1. Handling 8.11.2. Shipping 8.12. Government Property Control 8.13. End Item Acceptance 8.14. Ground Support Equipment 9. CONTAMINATION CONTROL 9.1. Project Requirements 9.2. PFP Concerns 9.3. Control Plan 9.4. PFP Requirements on S/C I&T and Ops 10. SOFTWARE ASSURANCE General, Software Development, Documentation, Software Design Reviews, Configuration Management

7. PFP MAR Checklist MAR compliance checked and approved MAVEN_PF_QA_001

8. Requirements and Safety Flow-Down of MAIP Requirements SSL, LASP, CESR/IRAP, GSFC Deviations Materials and Processes requirements, Section 6 of MAIP Compliance deviations are documented in the MAR checklist System Safety Personnel, facility, and mission safety have been considered. The Safety Plan has been generated MAVEN_PF_QA_005 Safety Plan and MAIP section 4 The safety plan identifies all requirements, planned tailoring approaches, intended non-compliances, and safety data submittals have been identified. There are no safety compliance issues. Safety Assessment Report

9. Suppliers and Alerts Suppliers SSL procures all active EEE flight parts from GSFC SSL procures passive EEE parts directly from the manufacturer or through authorized distributors. Material certs on all machined parts and surface finishing Source control drawings for detectors SSL requires full traceability on all flight procurements. Program requirements are flowed through procurement documentation. Where necessary, procurement documentation may include source control documents (SCDs) and engineering documentation. GIDEP Status SSL will respond to GSFC GIDEP evaluation requests There are no current GIDEP impacts – no parts on MAVEN are currently impacted by any Alert or Advisory. Other Memos and Alerts will be Incorporated, for example: “The use of brominated polyimide is unacceptable” (Polyimide board material)

10. Alerts Status DB Alerts Status DB snapshots

11. Contamination and ESD Control Contamination Control Class 100,000 cleanrooms available Contamination requirements and preliminary control plans have been defined, MAIP section 9. Laminar Flow Benches available Nitrogen available (Oxygen Sensors fixed and portable) ESD Control ESD Control Plan meets ANSI/ESD S20.20 requirements Q-001-PROC-00002-A ESD Control Plan All applicable personnel trained and certified by RMV Technology: Robert J. Vermillion, CPP-Lifetime Fellow, Certified ESD & Product Safety Engineer. Training certifications are required for flight work Planetary Protection Ongoing participation

12. Planetary Protection Status • Attended training for PP Policies and Practices (Dec. 2010) • Attend Weekly PPWG Telecons • Developing PP Implementation Document • Released PFP Planetary Protection Implementation Plan • Includes IRAP Role (SWEA Peer Review RFA) • Updates incorporated into Contamination Control Plan and Bakeout Plan • Setting up Assay Process • Attending ARC meeting at LM (26 May) • UCB PFP PP Point of Contact • Jeremy McCauley

13. Calibration, Parts and Materials Control Calibration Control Calibration Data base All tools used for PFP flight are under Calibration Control Blanket P.O. for MAVEN ANSI/NCSL Z540 Receiving Inspection and EEE parts storage MAM implements parts and materials control Incoming Inspections (two) Bonded Flight parts storage All Flight parts are in a data base Packaging and shipping provisions to maintain low contamination exposure and ESD control during transport.

14. Workmanship  Manufacturing, Assembly, and Quality Control of Electronic System will be in compliance to the most recent version of the following technical standards: NASA-STD-8739.1 Workmanship Standards for Staking and Conformal Coating of Printed Wiring Boards and Electronic Assemblies NASA-STD-8739.2 Workmanship Standard for Surface Mount Technology NASA-STD-8739.3 Soldered Electrical Connections NASA-STD-8739.4 Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harness, and Wiring ANSI/ESD 20.20 Electrostatic Discharge Control

15. Training and Certification  Training and Certification DB snapshot

16. EEE Parts and Materials Parts selection, de-rating, screening, and qualification test criteria are defined EEE Parts per GSFC-311-INST-002 add1, Level 2 Parts derating, Parts age control, Parts control board (PCB) Radiation tolerance per MAIP section 5.5 Alerts Tests, Test Data & EIDP Photos Materials and Processes Controls Hazardous materials requirements Vacuum outgassing requirements Approved materials and processes lists Limited Life Items list Alerts, shelf life controls Material certs (Mfg. CoC)

17. EEE Parts and Materials EEE Parts DB history snapshot

18. EEE Parts and Materials  EEE parts DB snapshot

19. EEE Parts and Materials  Materials List DB

20. Inspections and Audits  Audits and Mandatory Inspection Points Audits Vendor Audits, Compliance Audits (Safety, ESD, Configuration Control, Traceability, Non-Conformance, Calibration), Interface with External Audits, Assembly Traveler data package at each inspection point Inspections Incoming/Receiving, Flight Kits, Pre-cap, Calibration, Acceptance and Environmental Test, Software, Interface with External Inspections, Printed Wiring Assemblies, Polymerics, Cables, Harnesses, and Wirinig.

21. Non-conformance Control Non-conformance Reporting Methods Non-Conformance – Problem Failure Report (PFR) Dispositions include: scrap, rework, repair, return to supplier, refer to MRB, safe for non-flight use. Processing of Repair or Rework Material Review Board (MRB) PFP MRB Customer participation and approval required Dispositions include scrap, rework, return to supplier, repair by standard or non-standard procedures, use-as-is, request for waiver

22. PFP PFR Process

23. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) MAVEN_PF_QA_009, PFP Preliminary Hazard Analysis submitted to Project High Voltage Hazard SWEA, SWIA, STATIC have significant HV (up to 15kV) Not a personnel safety issue (no exposed HV) Can damage the instrument if HV powered on in Air Green-tag enable plugs prevent accidental power-on Radiation Sources Used for SEP CPT Small hand-help low activity sources Handled by trained and qualified personnel Not used at launch site Non-explosive Actuators (NEA) Use spacecraft pyro system to limit risk of accidental actuation SWEA, SWIA, STATIC covers – risk of instrument contamination if opened inadvertently on the ground LPW – risk of damage to instrument, some small risk of harm to personnel if deployed inadvertently on the ground Red-tag safety pin prevents accidental deployment

24. Safety Assessment Report SAR MAVEN_PF_QA011B_SAR Preliminary design and planning documents for bench and integration testing contain sufficient controls to diminish hazard exposure probabilities to an acceptable level. The following Hazard Categories were reviewed and determined to be not applicable to the PFP. • Fire/Explosion: The PFP does not contain flammable or explosive materials in the completed instrument. • Noise: There are no acoustic issues pertinent to the instrument. • Pressure: PFP utilizes no pressure vessels or containers meeting the working fluid, pressure differential, or energy criteria of AFSPCMAN 91-710 for flight pressure devices. The purge cart is provided by Lockheed Martin. • Temperature: PFP does not possess potential hazards associated with variations in the thermal environment during the integration, test, or launch phase. • Non-Ionizing Radiation: Neither PFP nor GSE contain any non-ionizing radiation sources. • Temperature: PFP does not possess potential hazards associated with variations in the thermal environment during the integration, test, or launch phase • Contamination, Toxicity: Neither the PFP nor the GSE contains hazardous materials.

25. SAR The safety hazard assessment showed: Hazard Distribution by Subsystem Hazard severity categories, as defined in NPR 8715.3

26. SAR - Hazards • Asphyxiation Hazard: Nitrogen purge will be provided by the spacecraft contractor, risk to be carried there. Further, the instrument purged volume and flow rate are not large enough to be hazardous. • I&T Cable Trip Hazard: Observation of proven safety practices for cable routing, handling of EGSE, and appropriate connectors and protective devices will be sufficient to preclude unacceptable exposure to electrical hazards. • Radiation Hazard: Radiation sources (Am241, 1mCi) will be used to stimulate the SEP instrument during selected tests during ATLO at Lockheed Martin (not used at the launch site). The sources are small low level sealed sources which will be held by trained personnel close to the instrument apertures. Sources will be handled, stored, and shipped following appropriate procedures. Sources will not be used at the launch site.

27. SAR - Hazards • HV Hazard: SWEA, SWIA, STATIC, supplies up to 15kV HV surfaces cannot be reached without disassembling instruments, Supplies are current limited to microampsThey are designed to insure that current returns to the supply locally so that a HV failure will not damage any other hardware outside the instrument. Enable plugs are necessary. In order for HV to come on the following actions have to take place: HV enable installed • Spacecraft turns PFP power service on • Ground command sent to instrument to power on the instrument • Ground command sent to enable high voltage (requires a hardware key code not present in any software or script on board . The ground command script which contains the enable codes is password protected against accidental execution before launch) • Ground command sent to ramp up high voltage

28. SAR - Hazards • Accidental Deployment Hazard: SWEA, SWIA, and STATIC contain small non-explosive actuators (TiNi P5 SMA pin-pullers) to operate their 1-time contamination control covers. These coves are entirely contained inside the instrument and involve moving a few grams a few millimeters. They pose no personnel hazard, but inadvertent actuation could risk contaminating the instruments. LPW booms contain small non-explosive actuators (TiNi Frangibolts)deploy to 7m at about 1m/s by spring force (~1.5 lbs). Should they deploy inadvertently, there is a small risk of harm to personnel and a larger risk of damage to the instrument. A red-tag safety pin which prevents deployment will be installed. • Software Hazard: PFP software is not safety critical – and no involvement in personnel safety. In flight, FSW safes the instrument in response to zone alert commands from the spacecraft. On the ground, enable plugs prevent flight or GSE software from performing hazardous operations.

29. SAR - PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT

30. Mission Assurance Summary Experienced Personnel provide oversight and technical support across all elements of PFP Project Mission Assurance Requirements are well defined and comprehensive. These are traditional requirements for SSL Missions and they are understood. Systems with experienced personnel are in place and operating. The Mission Assurance team is ready to support MAVEN PFP