Biosecurity Activities of U.S. Scientific Organizations: Examples from NAS and AAAS

1. Biosecurity Activities of U.S. ScientificOrganizations: Examples from NAS and AAAS Jo L. Husbands Scholar/Senior Project Director Board on Life Sciences NOTE: This presentation includes both findings and recommendations of the National Academies and my own personal views.

2. Background: The NAS and Biological Weapons • Long history of NAS activity on biological weapons issues: Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) • In the 1980s and 1990s much of the work with other academies, especially Soviet Union/Russia and the UK Royal Society; now deeply engaged with international networks of academies and other scientific organizations • Also long engagement with global public health risks from naturally occurring to deliberate use of disease as a weapon • Since September 11th engaged in providing advice on biodefense and other efforts to prevent or respond to bioterrorism (not my focus today)

3. Biosecurity and Dual Use Issues • Engaged with dual use issues in biotechnology research before 9/11 and anthrax mailings • Concerned with: • Potential risks of misuse of research for bioterrorism or biological weapons • Potential negative impact on research and scientific freedom

4. Relevant Reports:The Foundations • Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (2004; the Fink report) NRC • Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access, and Genome Databases (2004; the Falkow report) NRC • Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences (2006; the Lemon-Relman report) NRC/Institute of Medicine

5. Common Messages from Reports • In dual use research, the scientific community has a responsibility to help reduce the risks of misuse • Scientific societies and associations need to educate scientists about dual use issues and their responsibilities to mitigate the risks of misuse • Forums should be created for communication between scientists and policy-makers on how to best create and harmonize standards for addressing dual use issues • Efforts must be international as well as national

6. General Views onResearch Oversight Drawing on conclusions and recommendations of our reports: • Misuse of dual use research is a serious potential risk for biological weapons and bioterrorism • Need a mix of policies that both enhance security and enable continuing scientific advances • Scientific community has a key role in helping to reduce the risks of misuse

7. General Views onResearch Oversight (2) • Need for oversight throughout the life cycle of research – from proposals to publication / dissemination • Mix of formal, including legal and regulatory, and informal, including self-policing and guidelines • Preference for self-governance by scientific community and guidelines by governments • Important role for “soft law” – norms, codes of ethics, conduct, and practice

8. General Views onResearch Oversight (3) • “Web of prevention” most likely to be effective • Biosafety and laboratory biosecurity are essential elements; may be best beginning for many countries • Importance of advice from scientific community in design and implementation of oversight systems • Significant role for scientific organizations at all levels in working with policy-makers • Continuing need for awareness raising and education

9. Most Recent Work A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (2009) • Intended to address gap in empirical data and the “dueling anecdotes” problem • Web-based survey of AAAS members in the life sciences • Of 10,000 surveys, approx. 2,000 partial and complete responses • Means cannot generalize the results beyond those who responded • Nonetheless more information than available before

10. Most Recent Work • The survey results suggest there is support for: • Greater oversight that is not federally mandated. • Self-governance mechanisms as an approach for preventing misuse of life science research and knowledge. • Professional and scientific societies adopting codes of conduct that include dual use research as suggested in the Fink report. • Establishing and implementing policies for authors and reviewers to consider the dual use potential of research manuscripts submitted to journals. • The survey results suggest there is opposition to: • Mandatory government regulations to govern the conduct of dual use research and the communication of knowledge from that research. • Other mandatory oversight actions, such as oaths or licensing of scientists.

11. Most Recent Work Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (2009) • Asked to contribute to Executive Branch process begun by Bush Administration and continued under Obama Administration • Asked to consider physical security and personnel reliability for research with biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) • Complements other studies from 2008/9; released 9/30/09 • Executive Order Working Group • National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity • Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety • Defense Science Board, GAO, AAAS, DHB, etc.

12. Guiding principles • Research on biological select agents and toxins is essential to the national interest. • Research with biological select agents and toxins introduces potential security and safety concerns. • The Select Agent Program should focus on those biological agents and toxins that might be used as biothreat agents. • Policies and practices for work with biological select agents and toxins should promote both science and security. • Not all laboratories and not all agents are the same. • Misuse of biological materials is taboo in every scientific community.

13. Major Findings and Recommendations • Personnel reliability: No “silver bullet” that will screen out terrorists and criminals • Personnel reliability: Management matters most; laboratory leadership and the Select Agent Program should encourage programs and practices to foster a culture of trust and responsibility • Stratify the list of select agents and toxins • Because biological agents have an ability to replicate, accountability is best achieved by controlling access to stocks and working materials

14. International Activities What has the NAS done? • Focus on genuinely international scientific organizations • Not so much “top down” as providing endorsements respected within the scientific community ─ messages from more than governments • All have national affiliates or adhering bodies • In particular, InterAcademy Panel on International Issues (IAP) and scientific unions • IAP: Network of 104 academies of science • IAP Biosecurity Working Group since 2004 – academies of China, Cuba, Nigeria, Poland (chair), UK, and US • Frame the problem as one of “social responsibility of science” and “enhancing the culture of responsibility in science”

15. Center for Science, Technology,and Security Policy What Should the Scientific Community Do? • Proactively address national security concerns • Promote integrated risk management • Security reviews would augment, not substitute, for scientific peer-review • Educate scientists and institutional leaders about dual use research and broader biosecurity concerns

16. Center for Science, Technology,and Security Policy Workforce Workshops • Professional and Graduate-Level Programs on Dual Use Research and Biosecurity for Scientists Working in the Biological Sciences • Biological Safety Training as a Component of Personnel Reliability • Workforce Development: Preparing the Next Generation for Infectious Disease Threats • Building the Biodefense Policy Workforce

17. Center for Science, Technology,and Security Policy Professional and Graduate-Level Programs on Dual Use Research and Biosecurity for Scientists Working in the Biological Sciences • The scientific, ethical, and legal issues related to identifying and addressing issues related to dual use life sciences research should be taught to American and foreign scientists working in the life sciences in the U.S. • The NSABB should recommend general guidance for what scientists should do if they encounter a dual use situation. • The NSABB should develop a resource listing possible topics to cover, and existing methods and materials for teaching about the dual use dilemma for institutions to use when developing their own education programs. • Scientific organizations should develop discipline-specific case studies applicable to dual use research beyond the dual use research of concern outlined by the NSABB. • Institutions should develop education programs on dual use research for scientists and non-scientists. • Institutions should encourage senior scientists’ interest in training and mentoring junior researchers about responsible conduct of research and the dual use dilemma. • Informed by the NSABB’s guidance recommendations, institutions should develop their own guidance for scientists about dealing with dual use concerns and designate an institutional point of contact to consult on dual use research issues if the need arises.

18. Center for Science, Technology,and Security Policy Engaging the Academic Community to Promote Science and Security Major Themes: • The scientific and security communities share the same goal – ensuring public safety • Promoting and maintaining mutual trust among the scientific community, security community, policy-makers, and the public is critical to addressing potential security risks associated with advancing research • Safety and security measures must be addressed at the institutional level • Leadership is important in fostering a safe, ethical, and secure research environment.

19. Center for Science, Technology,and Security Policy Bridging Science and Security Activities • “Building Bridges Around Building Genomes”, San Francisco, August 2009 • FBI/MSMR: The 3 I’s: Learning Through Collaboration, Connection, and Community…AdvancingBioscience and Security, Arizona, April 2010 • “Building Bridges Around Biotech”, Boston, August 2010 • Washington, DC, August 2011

20. Center for Science, Technology,and Security Policy Additional Activities • Monthly Biosecurity Meetings • How Scientists View Law Enforcement, FAS/AAAS activities, February 2009 • Interactive Meeting: Minimizing the Risks of Synthetic DNA: Scientists’ Views of the U.S. Government Guidance on Synthetic Genomics, January 2010 • Transparency, Compliance, and Building Confidence: Workshop Series on the 2011 BWC RevCon: NGO Input, August 2010 • Virtual Biosecurity Center, FAS/NAS/OECD/AAAS activity

21. For more information Jo L. Husbands Scholar/Senior Project Director Board on Life Sciences NAS jhusband@nas.edu 202-334-2816 Kavita M. Berger, Ph.D. Associate Program Director AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy kberger@aaas.org 202-326-7027