In Retrospect: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICs OF THE Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations

1. In Retrospect: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICs OF THE Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations March 2014

2. The Palestinians and The Israelis are paralyzed by intransigence and fall back on provocations. Both parties are unable to make tough decisions. For the U.S. to continue to invest that kind of bandwidth in the process, it needs to see some investment from the parties.

3. Palestinian Perspective contextual impediments: • Strategic • Psychological • Institutional In 4 periods: • Madrid conference • Oslo Process • Camp David • "Road Map“ The goal - was it in fact an agreement on two states ?

4. The Madrid Conference (1991- 1993) Strategic Barriers: • USSR collapse, end of the Cold War = weaker cards to play; • US focus elsewhere (on the Syrian–Israeli conflict); • Weakened PLO due to its support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion to Kuwait; The set goal - world recognition rather than conflict resolution;

5. The Madrid FrameworkWashington Talks (1991- 1993) Psychological Barriers: • Mind set – victim hood not problem solving; • No awareness of the other side’s needs; • Significance of the American political scene unappreciated;

6. The Madrid FrameworkWashington Talks (1991- 1993) Institutional Barriers: • Palestinian delegation as part of a foreign Jordanian delegation - unrepresentative of its own political leadership; • PLO identified as a terror organization - illegal to contact; • Positional negotiations in the absence of back channel interests testing;

7. The Oslo Process (1993 - 1996) Strategic Barriers: • Parallel use of terror and negotiations lead to loss of credibility to the Israeli public • Failure to insist on a complete freeze on Israeli settlements reduced Israeli and process credibility to Palestinian public • Gradual process allowed opposition to sabotage the process thereby undermining mutual trust

8. The Oslo Process (1993 - 1996) Psychological Barriers: • Public incitement against Israel rather than preparation for compromise: • Arafat: “the fight against Israel’s existence continues” • military outfit maintained

9. The Oslo Process (1993 - 1996) Institutional Barriers: • Underestimated danger of Hamass and Islamic Jihad – non-confrontation of terror org’s; • Corruption of PA reduces its popular support which had sifted to Hamass;

10. Camp David (2000) Strategic Barriers: • Resistance to Summit; • Preference - third redeployment in order to improve position prior to Final Status negotiations; • Failure to assess Israel's position on refugees as real bottom line; • Failure to recognize temple mount was the holiest place in Judaism; • Refusal to accept Clinton’s proposal and subsequent initiation of violence – left Israeli Peace camp confused and diffused;

11. Camp David (2000) Psychological Barriers: • No contact between Arafat & Barak, lead to mistrust; (was is not a reflection of it ?) • Arafat could not accept end of claims concept; never prepared for compromise; • Rifts among Palestinian team prevented the pragmatists from counter balancing Arafat;

12. Camp David (2000) Institutional Barriers: • Arab world rejects proposals on refugees and Jerusalem - reluctant to influence Arafat to compromise; • Political time pressure (Clinton’s and Barak’s) provided some leverage that was overplayed;

13. The “Road Map” (2002 - 2004) Strategic Barriers: • Never negotiated with the parties; • Conditional and gradual process - playing to the hands of its opposition, especially when the leaders prefer status quo;

14. The “Road Map” (2002 - 2004) Psychological Barriers: • Degree of mistrust between the parties - paralysis in the absence of external pressure; • American administration looking for successful case of democracy in the Arab world – wasted opportunity;

15. The “Road Map” (2002 - 2004) Institutional Barriers: • American boycott Arafat, but unengaged in empowerment of alternative moderate leadership; • Arafat insists on remaining in effective and exclusive control;

16. Summary: (is it really necessary?) • The biggest mistake – legitimization of violence along side negotiations. • Confrontation of terror organizations and incitement against Israel could have created such political support among Israeli public that would have forced the governments to compromise; • Failure to prepare the public for peace restricted capacity to negotiate.

17. Recommendations: • Code of conduct: violence /settlement activity unacceptable • Accountability mechanism • Peace activity – not just for leaders. Public involvement early on (education for peace, people to people activities) • Active American engagement • US activity to isolate terrorists from finance & support • Moderate Arab regimes assistance to PA in fighting extremists and capacity to compromise