The Unfinished Business of Devolution: The Challenges Ahead

1. The Unfinished Business of Devolution: The Challenges Ahead Guy Lodge Research Fellow, Democracy g.lodge@ippr.org Institute for Public Policy Research

2. Outline • Basic features of UK devolution settlement • Future Challenges & Tensions • Political • Constitutional • Citizenship • Cultural/Identity • Potential solutions

3. Caveats • This is a short overview • Not a detailed exploration of the individual settlements in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland: in particular will not deal with Northern Ireland • V interested in lessons from the Spanish experience

4. UK Devolution: A very British Affair • Muddle through – Asymmetry • Scotland: Parliament; full legislative powers; marginal tax powers • Wales: secondary legislative powers (unique model); no tax powers; evolving process • Northern Ireland- consociation model • Individual settlements reflect specific national contexts and public opinion

5. Implementing Devolution • Smooth and painless implementation (NI exception): not the break up of Britain • Support for devolution is high • But benign conditions: • Labour in power in all 3 capitals • Public spending feast • Yet constitutional reform unleashes powerful dynamic forces – with both anticipated and unanticipated consequences • Legal; political and institutional • Devolution no exception • there is unfinished business • Outstanding anomalies & new challenges need addressing • Benign conditions unravelling

6. Challenges to the devolution settlement • The position of England • The end of Labour hegemony • Changing nature of UK citizenship • A weak and uninterested centre • A Union without Britishness

7. 1. England – the gaping hole in the devolution settlement • Most significant post-devolution anomalies concern England • Representation: West Lothian Question – Scots voting on matters only affecting England (decisive over foundation hospitals & tuition fees) • Finance: English subsidy (esp south-east middle England) • Galvanised by right wing press the English are beginning to sit up and take note of these anomalies: over 70% think it is wrong for Scottish MPs to vote on English matters • Electoral arithmetic not good: Labour majority in England (43) likely to fall and increase reliance on Scottish and Welsh votes.

8. 2. The end of Labour hegemony: Prospect of New Political Configurations • Devolution settlement will be tested by party political conflict: e.g. SNP/Lib Dem Edinburgh and Labour or Tory in London • Especially over funding: Barnett formula/ Public spending feast is over • Intergovernmental institutions are weak and untested and based on gentlemanly agreements

9. 3. Changing the basis of UK citizenship rights • Devolution means differences: substantial policy divergence (esp. public services: e.g. ‘4 NHS’) – and this when the same parties are in power • Equity versus diversity conundrum: How do you sustain UK-wide minimum standards and allow difference? • Paradox – the public want devolution but they wont tolerate difference: ‘postcode lottery’ syndrome • Lack of leadership on this – esp. from UK government

10. 4. The centre: ‘an event not a process’ • No capacity to think UK-wide anymore • The centre has turned its back on the devolved administrations – it was an event not a process • No articulation of what devolution means (e.g. citizenship rights); no attention paid to IGR machinery • No interest in capturing policy innovation

11. 5. The Union without Britishness • Growth of national identities at expense of Britishness (though not directly linked to devolution) • 2003 Scottish not British: 72% Welsh not British: 60% English not British: 38% (and growing) • Parallel communities: Too much difference not enough of what we have in common? Similarities with multiculturalism debate • What impact will a decline in common identity have on fiscal transfers (that S/W/NI depend on)? • We need to know more about what impact a decline in Britishness will have

12. Solutions: redefine the role of the centre • Department for the Nations and Localities • to manage territorial conflict • to capture innovation • to provide leadership on devolution • UK govt should reinvent itself as the guarantor of UK-wide minimum standards • Ultimately a constitutional statement on the level of divergence on social minimum and fiscal transfers? • Time for the centre to engage with devolution

13. Answering the West Lothian Question? • English votes on English laws is not the answer. • Legal – no such thing as English law • Practical – legislative ‘hokey cokey’ • Constitutional – UK govt (Lab); Eng govt (Tory) – bigger constitutional anomaly than WLQ. English parliament by stealth. • The only coherent answer to the WLQ is an English Parliament • No support (16%) • Unworkable federation (85% English dominance) • Instead PR & revival of local government (not regions): alleviate but not solve WLQ • Instead reform Barnett – move to needs-based system (public care more about cash than constitution) • These would take the heat out of post-devolution anomalies

14. WLQ is the wrong question • WLQ worse that Schleswig-Holstein question: no one knows the answer. We need a new question • Recast the WLQ around questions of how the government of England can be improved • End curse of English centralism: Revitalise local government