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An Introduction to Honeynets and Intrusion Protection Systems James Kearney Oct. 25, 2004. Outline. What are honeypots/honeynets? Some basic implementation techniques What is an IPS/basic implementation General Comments Tie-in to research being done with Scott Miller.
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An Introduction to Honeynets and Intrusion Protection Systems James Kearney Oct. 25, 2004
Outline • What are honeypots/honeynets? • Some basic implementation techniques • What is an IPS/basic implementation • General Comments • Tie-in to research being done with Scott Miller
A machine deployed intentionally to be broken in to. Deceptive by design Ideally provides information about penetration attempts against your network Honeypots
Honeypots - Design • Developed by what is now known as The Honeynet Project • Standardized design, based upon Linux (flexible in terms of distribution) • Based upon a particular combination of components: • Firewall • IDS • Extensive System Logging
Honeypots - Implications • Two classes of Honeypots • Low-Interaction • Simulated system, many commands/capabilities compared to a normal operating system are impared. • High-Interaction • Full-blown system, running real servies • Relative risks?
Honeynets • Expand the concept of a simple honeypot to a complete network of honeypots • Currently in their second generation (the topic of this presentation) • First generation tools somewhat limited in potential
Honeynets - Design • Three major principles: • Data Control • Firewalls, IPS', bridging, session/rate limiting • Data Capture • IDS', Sebek (or Termlog) • Data Analysis • Honey Inspector, Sleuthkit, Sebek (web-interface), etc...
Honeynets – Implications • First-gen honeynets and rate-limiting outgoing connections • Limited Lifetime • How to restore • Potential Dangers
Intrusion Protection Systems • Affect in real-time the contents of a malicious payload • Example implementation • IPTables + Snort Inline
Intrusion Protection Systems • Use the QUEUE target in IPTables • Snort Inline picks up the packets, using a modified ruleset (compared to common Snort implementations) • Potentially makes changes to a given packet • Modify contents to render harmless • Drop packet entirely
General Comments • Ease of deployment • Necessary time/space complexity of honeynets • Bob's Theorm
Work with Scott: • Modified version of a honeynet • More extensive (or completely new) uses of IPS' • Employs many techniques based upon the research already done with honeynets
“Know Your Enemy”, Second Edition. The Honeynet Project. Addison-Wesley, 2004 www.honeynet.org Security-Focus' Honeypot Mailing List (honeypots@securityfocus.com) www.snort-inline.sf.net www.rootsecure.net (variety of articles used) References