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ECC-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol with Un-traceability for Low-Cost RFID

ECC-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol with Un-traceability for Low-Cost RFID. Authors: Hung-Yu, Chi-Sung Laih Sources: Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, Accepted Speaker: C. H. Wei. Outline. The problem Authentication protocol Security analysis, and performance analysis

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ECC-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol with Un-traceability for Low-Cost RFID

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  1. ECC-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol with Un-traceability for Low-Cost RFID Authors: Hung-Yu, Chi-Sung Laih Sources: Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, Accepted Speaker: C. H. Wei

  2. Outline • The problem • Authentication protocol • Security analysis, and performance analysis • Conclusion • Comments

  3. The Problem • Only a few of the previous RFID authentication schemes consider anonymity and un-traceability • In some schemes, the tags do not respond to identification-related information • A server must search the whole database • About perform computation, per tag in order to identify the communicating tag, which is not efficient.

  4. 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 e (1) send 1101 Received 1101010 Hamming code (2) (3) (4)

  5. Initialization • The server randomly chooses a secret linear code C(n, k, d), length n, dimension k and minimum distance d • The server assigns row vectors G[j] to the tag, where j=(i-1)*s+1,…i*s

  6. Ti, Ki, g( ), G[j] Ti, Ki, G ci =mi*G G*HT=0

  7. Security Analysis • Mutual authentication • Only the genuine server can compute • Only the genuine tag can compute Vs • Privacy • The value seem random to an attacker who does not have the private parameters.

  8. Security Analysis (cont.) • Anonymity and un-traceability • Attacker eavesdrop two or more sessions (c1+e1, …, ci+ei) • Compromise of tags • The attacker could derive the row vectors and key inside the tag • The scheme does not provide the forward secrecy

  9. Security Analysis (cont.) • Performance analysis • Only the server is required to be equipped with the decoding algorithms. • The tag require the pseudo-random generator and simple bit operations • The number of row vectors per tag being l, the space requirement per tag is l*n+|Ki| • ex. (n=128,k=64,d=22), l=3, 64/3=21 tags, length of key is 32, space=3*128+32=416 bits

  10. Comments • 之前的論文在解決traceability和anonymity都需要將資料庫全部搜尋一次,才能確認對方身份 • 此論文建議的方法使用linear error correction codes 可以達到low-cost and better performance • 缺點:不適合用在有大量的tag環境下 因為每個tag需要用到的儲存空間很大

  11. A binary K-tuple m can be encoded to an N-bit codeword c=m*G, where G is an K-by-N generator matrix. An error vector e added to the codeword ci results in a vector • r can be decoded in to c based on the syndrome vector s=r*HT, where H is an (N-K)-by-N parity-check matrix such that G*HT=0

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