1 / 23

Identity Creating Goods and Free Trade

Identity Creating Goods and Free Trade. Gerhard Clemenz University of Vienna. 1. Introduction. Questions: Does globalization lead to a crowding out of identity creating (cultural) goods, If so, does this imply a welfare reduction (mainly of small countries) because of free trade. Examples:

tate-carver
Download Presentation

Identity Creating Goods and Free Trade

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Identity Creating Goods and Free Trade Gerhard Clemenz University of Vienna

  2. 1. Introduction Questions: • Does globalization lead to a crowding out of identity creating (cultural) goods, • If so, does this imply a welfare reduction (mainly of small countries) because of free trade. Examples: • Food (McDonaldisation) • Music • Movies

  3. Content • Introduction • Literature • Model • Autarky • Free trade without comparative advantage • Free trade with comparative advantage • Discussion

  4. 2. Literatur Akerlof, G.E., Kranton, R.E., 2000. Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 715-753. – Not applied to international trade Janeba, E., 2007. International trade and consumption network externalities, European Economic Review 51, 781-803. – Focus on comparative advantage Francois, P., vanYpersele, T. 2002, On the protection of cultural goods, Journal of International Economics 56, 359-369. - French vs. Hollywood movies, economies of scale

  5. Pandey, M., Whalley, J., 2004, Social networks and trade liberalization, NBER Working Paper 10769. – networks of labor force Bekkali, M., Beghin, J.C., 2005. The economics of domestic cultural content protection in broadcasting. Working Paper 05033. Iowa State University. Bala, V., Van Long, N. 2005. International trade and cultural diversity with preference selection. European Journal of Political Economy 21, 143-162. Cowen, T., 2002. Creative destruction: How Globalization is changing the world cultures, Princeton University Press, Princeton

  6. 3. Model Production Labor only factor of production, three goods, quantities denoted as z, x1 and x2. z = Lz/a, x1 = L1/k1, x2 = L2/k2, k1 = k2 = k, 2k < 1 = L. w = 1, pz = wa and pj = wk (perfect competition).

  7. Utility function Modified Hotelling Model: z = Quantity of standard consumption good Good 1 and good 2 at end points of unit interval, consumers uniformly distributed.  = utility of identity creating, traditional good  = marginal disutility of distance from ideal good  = marginal network effect.

  8. A country or society is • conformist if  > ; • individualistic if  < ; • super-individualistic if 2 < ; • traditional if  > ; • non-traditional if <.

  9. Social Optimum in Autarky First derivative of W w.r.t. q: dW/dq =  + 4q  2 2q +  W is convex in q if 2 > ,  corner solution q* = 1.

  10. Social Optimum of super-individualistic Country q* < 1 for  <  2, q* = 1 for  >  2.

  11. 4. Autarky Hotelling’s indifference condition: • + q q = (1  q) (1  q), consequently 0 < qa < 1 requires<

  12. Equilibrium 0 < qa < 1 if< qa = 1 if  +  > 0 Consumer with strongest preference for good 2 won‘t switch unilaterally. qa = 0 if  > . Consumer with strongest preference for good 1 won‘t switch unilaterally.

  13. Equilibria

  14. 5. Free trade without comparative advantage Assumption: Foreign country consumes only good 2 as its “traditional” good in autarky and continues to do so in the free trade regime. Prices are the same in both countries. • = measures “cultural openness”, with 0  1, (no xenophobia). Utility function in open economy:

  15. Social Optimum Welfare function First derivative w.r.t. q: dW/dq =  + q[4 2] [2 + ] + . W is convex in q for 2 >  corner solution: q* = 1 for   . (inward looking society) q* = 0 for  < . (outward looking society)

  16. Interior solution: 0 < q** < 1 requires  <  2.

  17. Free trade equilibria of conformist economy ( > ) qf = 1   +  or (1 ). qf = 0  (1 + )    . Both conditions are mutually compatible! Diversified equilibrium: Indifference condition:  + (  )q = (  )(1  q) + ,

  18. qf = 1iff (1 + ) .(“super-traditional”). This condition requires in conformist economy • > . 0 < qf < 1 requires –     –  

  19. Free trade equilibria if  > 

  20. Free trade equilibria if 2 >  > 

  21. Free trade equilibria if 2 < 

  22. 6. Free trade with comparative advantage Assumption: Price of good 2 lower in foreign country: ph > pf, ph – pf := . Modified indifference condition: • +q – q – ph= ( – )(1 – q) +  – pf. Define and substitute for  in above analysis.

  23. Scenarios: Big, very traditional, inward looking (foreign) country enters free trade with smaller, less traditional, less inward looking domestic country: Welfare loss due to partial crowding out of traditional domestic good, Welfare gain due to complete crowding out of traditional domestic good; Efficiency loss because of insufficient crowding out of traditional domestic good 7. Discussion

More Related