Organizational Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis

1. Organizational Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis PO 326: American Foreign Policy

2. The Organizational Perspective of the Crisis • We saw in our RCT treatment of the crisis that, while rational choice provides some satisfactory explanations for American and Soviet actions, it seems to fall short in providing others • The organizational model not only can help to fill in these gaps, it provides different (and sometimes equally plausible) explanations for action, few of which have much to do with reasoned, deliberate action on the part of the highest foreign policy decision-makers

3. Why Were Missiles Deployed? • Recall the several RCT explanations for deployment, all based on Soviet intentions • There are several inconsistencies regarding these explanations and the realities of the deployment; the Organization Model, while possibly not providing better answers to the “why” question, helps address these inconsistencies • If the Soviets intended to present the US with a fait accompli in Cuba (i.e., secret installation before Berlin question was addressed): • 1. Why were the SAMs, installed before the deployment, not used against U-2s when doing so would have maintained all-important secrecy? • 2. Why were the missiles constructed so slowly? • 3. Why was camouflage not employed?

4. Why Were Missiles Deployed? • The answer to all of these puzzles may lie in the ways in which organizations accomplish complex tasks • 1. Failure of SAM utilization against U-2s was the result of organizational preparation for another type of threat • The installation of SAMs was meant to stave off US invasion of Cuba, not protect the secrecy of the missile deployment; Soviet Group of Forces had set into motion the installation to meet this contingency, which was probably Khrushchev’s primary concern • Indication that the missiles had been discovered was thus not passed along to Moscow until too late

5. Why Were Missiles Deployed? • 2 & 3. The deliberate, open construction of missile sites in Cuba mimicked the mode of construction for missile sites in USSR • Tasked with installation, GoF simply set into motion the pre-established routine in use for general construction • Slow construction pace allowed the US to discover buildup and consider solutions not based on fait accompli • No need for camouflage in original SOP also allowed for easier American detection • All of these inconsistencies led to ExComm uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions, making formulation of response option difficult

6. Why Blockade? • Even the American choice of a blockade to signal its intentions, a seemingly clear-cut rational move, was shaped, helped, and hindered by the American SOPs relevant to the imposition of a blockade

7. Why Blockade? • Early missile intelligence was not immediately utilized and conclusions reached because of organizational procedure and inertia. • Human intelligence (sometimes unreliable) indicated missile activity in San Cristobal as early as September 7; information not made available by CIA until September 20 • Shipping analysis indicated that Soviet cargo ships were carrying heavy loads below deck during September • Flights on the periphery of east and central Cuba took place earlier in 1962, and SAMs were discovered; organizational movement was slow to include western Cuba (including San Cristobal) on the basis of human intelligence • As late as September 19, though there were several indications that missile activity had increased, there were no official conclusions that missiles had been introduced • Direct western overflights were ordered by McCone on October 9 on the basis of increasing concerns, and missiles discovered

8. Why Blockade? • Conclusion: The overflights that discovered the missiles were the result of SOP, not presidential decision-making; though they were slow in discovery, it is probable that no discovery would have been made at all had SOPs not run their course

9. Why Blockade? • Why was the blockade chosen? RCT indicates that a carefully formulated blockade was the least costly means of displaying resolve • The Organizational approach stresses that the blockade was chosen on the basis of options that were already made available by SOPs but that Kennedy himself had not drawn up (defining menu of choice) • Essentially, Kennedy chose to implement an established operations plan (OPLAN) for the blockade because the other established OPLANs for invasion and air attack were simply too costly • Even the SOP for blockade involved actions that would send unfavorable signals • DEFCON increase was problematic; signaled US intent to go to war when that option was only to be considered further down the line • Actual operational contingencies for blockade involved shooting which Kennedy did not want; he had to “override” these contingencies personally during the blockade • In other words, Kennedy did not make an independent choice; he studied the options available and chose one, taking care to “rein in” the contingencies laid out by SOPs

10. Why Were the Missiles Removed? • According to RCT, the missiles were removed because Khrushchev recognized that the blockade was only the first step toward increasing hostility • However, his actions late in the crisis indicate that he was willing to test US resolve even after the blockade was chosen, and not remove the missiles until he secured some further concessions. Why?

11. Why Were the Missiles Removed? • Did US actions based on SOPs invite Khrushchev’s risky behavior? • Test firing of ballistic missile from Vandenberg AFB on October 26; though a pre-scheduled test, it signaled US escalatory intent when undesirable • SAC alert (DEFCON 2) deployed armed planes to civilian airports, some of which were within striking distance of Cuba • Inadvertent U-2 violation of Soviet airspace; fighters, armed with nukes as part of the DEFCON 3 status, scrambled to protect it, and were authorized to fire • The State Dept., Turkey, and the MLF • All of these potentially catastrophic occurrences dictated by previously established (but largely unrelated) SOPs and their inertia

12. Lessons from the Application of the Organizational Approach to the Crisis • Ultimate foreign policy decisions begin with SOPs – they define but constrain the presidential menu of choice, thus limiting the applicability of a pure RCT approach (decision-making is not unitary) • SOPs can often only be tailored to politically sensitive interactions with great difficulty, and some of their contingencies can run counter to the executive’s view of national interest • While providing several potential difficulties, effective action in complex settings is made possible only by organizational planning