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Insider Threat. Final Breakout Report. Creation of an Insider Threat Research Community. Initiate a community of insiders for the financial community to define the problem. Organize workshops to accomplish this integration and build the relationships.
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Insider Threat Final Breakout Report
Creation of an Insider Threat Research Community • Initiate a community of insiders for the financial community to define the problem. • Organize workshops to accomplish this integration and build the relationships. • Leads to a more detailed RFP, internships, consortia, … • Bring in people from the financial industry to expose them to research methodology (perhaps to become graduate students) • Workshop needs to get buy-in from CxO level officers in the financial industry
RFP Ideas • RFP parameters: • Overlap between insider detection and all other previous IDS work implies that we need a stronger relationship between the real data and systems and the PIs for this research. Sponsoring organizations need to actually promote real data sharing. • Livin’ d’ life == becoming an insider == access to the real places, not a copy of the data. • Graduate students to spend 6 months at a financial institution
RFP Ideas (continued) • Awards will encourage the integration of a researcher and a financial institution to provide access to systems, business processes, and data used in the research. • For a proposal on a specific research project focused on insider threat, the PI will identify how previous research results will be used to advance the capability of a financial institution to prevent, detect, or respond to insider threat. Each proposal will consist of the following 3 phases.
RFP Ideas (continued) • Phase 0: panel of experts that will work with financial institutions to further define the problem and potential solutions • Phase 1 will focus on problem definition and codification of current practice for finding and responding to insider threat. • Within the environment of the Financial Sector
RFP Ideas (continued) • Phase II Create a prototype or fundamental research result that addresses specific problems identified in Phase I • Phase III Publication and integration of these results to one or more financial institutions as a proof of concept
Short-term Actions • Workshop: financial services sector funding for a gathering of academics and industry experts to tightly define the insider threat problem and build relationships. • Encourage the publication of white papers for best practice regarding insider threat. • Socialize these papers with other institutions that will validate the practice throughout the sector.
Workshop Details • 50 person workshop (bank, finance sector representatives, mid-sized regional banks). • Researchers from leading institutions. NSF academic oriented workshop. • Hosted at Department of The Treasury. • IC community perhaps invited • Scope to the insider of an individual company. • Tutorials on • insiders from NSA and other groups. • banking and finance. • On insider threat (case studies?) on how insiders have operated in the past. • Presentations on their information infrastructure
Workshop Details (continued) • Open workshop – attendees submit a position paper (or resume?) for a competitive slot (on the academic side). Financial sector attendees and tutorial presenters will be invited. • Session 1: define the current threat. How do insiders operate in various parts of the sector. What’s accepted practices versus unaccepted practice. (may or may not be criminal behavior) • Precursor to sponsoring an annual symposium on insider threat (developing a community of experts focused on the insider threat problem)
Pilot and Testbed Projects • Focused studies on defining insider activities • New trust models (business trust models) • Is the current information infrastructure trustworthy enough? • Building a simulation environment (to study new technologies and approaches) • Study: How do you discourage people from becoming insiders in the first place
Pilot and Testbed Projects (continued) • Usability • PSYops against your employee • When has an employee been compromised? How can you tell? • Interfaces that encourage or discourage insider behavior (e.g., systems that provide feedback on now the systems are being monitored) • External information on Usability • IEEE Sec and Privacy special issue on Usability (HCISEC) • ACM CHI2003 • International journal of HCI Oct 05 special issue on usability and security
Pilot and Testbed Projects (continued) • Transaction data from a day or two ago is unimportant (not confidential), gather these up for analysis. • Feature extraction and anomaly detection techniques to discover patterns. • Use injection to add insider activity to the data. • Create a transaction data set that could be shared to the research community. • Conforms to standard practice in the industry.
Pilot and Testbed Projects (continued) • Detecting exfiltration of data in preparation for some bad insider activity • Detecting changes under the user’s control in preparation for some bad insider activity • Study to discover the prevalence of masquerading across the sector • Experimental design workshop • Why didn’t past technologies work? (maintainability, expense)