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States and Safeguards Implementation

States and Safeguards Implementation. NGSI Safeguards Courses. May 2012. Justin Reed. Much of this course is devoted to the IAEA’s implementation of safeguards. IAEA safeguards authorities, tools, and technologies IAEA’s application of safeguards within States

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States and Safeguards Implementation

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  1. States and Safeguards Implementation NGSI Safeguards Courses • May 2012 • Justin Reed

  2. Much of this course is devoted to the IAEA’s implementation of safeguards • IAEA safeguards authorities, tools, and technologies • IAEA’s application of safeguards within States • Case studies of responses to State noncompliance • Assistance provided to the IAEA

  3. This talk focuses on safeguards from the viewpoint of the State** Non-nuclear weapon State with CSA or CSA+AP

  4. Outline • What are the State’s safeguards obligations and rights? • Comprehensive Safeguards Agrmt • Additional Protocol • State organizations implementing safeguards obligations • State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • Safeguards Regulatory Authorities (SRA) • Implementation best practices and challenges

  5. What are the State’s safeguards obligations?

  6. What are the State’s safeguards obligations? • “Each non-nuclear weapon State party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement…with the IAEA” • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement • Additional Protocol Top: The cover of the CSA Left: Malaysia signs its AP (Photo: IAEA)

  7. State CSA obligations: • Basic Undertaking • “…an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards…on all source or special fissional material in all peaceful nuclear activities…” (1)

  8. State CSA obligations: • Cooperation • “…the Agency and the State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein.” (3) • State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • “…the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards…” (7) • MORE ON THIS LATER IN THE PRESENTATION!

  9. State CSA obligations (continued): • Provision of Information to the Agency • “…the Agency shall be provided…with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material…” (8)

  10. State CSA obligations (continued): • Provision of Information to the Agency • “…Agency shall be provided…information concerning nuclear material…” (8, as elaborated in paras. 59-69) • With respect to each material balance area: • Accounting records / Inventory of material • Including measurement results, adjustments, corrections • Measurement and accounting procedures • Material unaccounted for (MUF) • Transfers within, into, and out of the State • Material reaching the starting point of safeguards

  11. State CSA obligations (continued): • Provision of Information to the Agency • “…Agency shall be provided…information concerning…the features of facilities…” (8) • “As early as possible before nuclear material is introduced” (42) • Description of facility • Processing equipment for nuclear material • Location and flow of nuclear material • Features and procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control • Operating records • Modifications to the facility relevant to safeguards

  12. State CSA obligations (continued): • Take steps to ensure Agency inspectors can perform their functions (9) • Locations (76-77): • Strategic points and records • For independent measurements, other verification rights • Prior to establishment of strategic points, to • Any location State’s initial report indicates nuclear material is present • Any location where inspections indicate nuclear material is present • Points where international transfers are received or dispatched • To additional locations as part of a special inspection

  13. Select rights of the State under a CSA: • Avoid undue interference with peaceful nuclear activities • Commercial or confidential state information protected • Consultation opportunity if questions arise about interpretation or application of safeguards, prior to IAEA determination that action is “essential and urgent”

  14. State Additional Protocol obligations: • Provides the IAEA with enhanced authorities and information • Information about R&D and more parts of the nuclear fuel cycle • Complementary access • Ability to use additional tools • Requires State to fulfill additional obligations • Increased information sharing • Facilitate increased IAEA access

  15. State Additional Protocol obligations: • Article 2: Provision of Information • 2.a. “[The State] shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing:” Information about, but not limited to: • Nuclear related R&D NOT involving nuclear materials • Expanded locations • Expanded types of safeguards-relevant activities • Expanded types of safeguards-relevant materials and equipment (see INFCIRC/540 Article 2.a. for complete list)

  16. State Additional Protocol obligations: • Article 2: Provision of Information (continued) • 2.b. “[The State] shall make every reasonable effort to provide the agency with the following information:” 2.b (i) – Description of R&D related to enrichment, reprocessing, HEU/Pu waste processing not involving nuclear material carried out in the country but not authorized, controlled, or carried out on behalf of the State. 2.b (ii) – Information on entities or persons carrying out such activities upon specific request by the IAEA. • 2.c. Provide clarifications upon request.

  17. State Additional Protocol obligations: • Articles 4 through 10: Complementary Access • Article 5: The State “shall provide the Agency with access to” • Article 2 declared locations in addition to CSA declared locations • Sites • Decommissioned facilities • Agency specified locations for environmental sampling • Article 4(a)(i-iii): For the purpose of • Assuring absence of undeclared nuclear material • Resolve questions or inconsistencies about declared information • Confirm decommissioned status

  18. Select rights of the State under an Additional Protocol: • In addition to those rights granted by the CSA, an AP state has the right to • Not have mechanistic or systematic verification by the Agency of Article 2 declarations • Find alternative means or adjacent locations to satisfy Agency requirements if the State is “unable” to provide access to locations requested by the Agency. (The Agency decides if it is satisfied) • “Manage” IAEA access to AP locations, provided the Agency is not precluded from performing its functions

  19. Implementing safeguards obligations:State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material&Safeguards Regulatory Authorities

  20. What does the IAEA expect a State to do to fulfill its safeguards obligations? • Establish national laws and regulations requiring safeguards obligations to be fully met • National laws binds relevant entities to the treaty requirements of the State • Provide timely, correct, complete information to IAEA • Provide the IAEA support and timely access to necessary locations and information

  21. What does the IAEA expect a State to do to fulfill its safeguards obligations? • State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • Safeguards Regulatory Authority

  22. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • “Organizational arrangements at the national levelwhich may have both • A national objective to account for and control nuclear material in the State, and • An international objective to provide the basis for application of IAEA safeguards” Definition from: IAEA Safeguards Glossary

  23. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • Involves government, governmental entities, regulators, operators • A system for nuclear material accounting: • Facility operators keep track of nuclear materials and report to government regulators • Regulator assembles reports, conducts audits of its facilities • Government transmits reports to IAEA • IAEA reviews reports, conducts independent verification

  24. What does the IAEA expect a State to do to fulfill its safeguards obligations? • State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA)

  25. What does the IAEA expect a State to do to fulfill its safeguards obligations? • State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) • Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA)

  26. Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA) • Refers to the specific State authority/authorities responsible for all international safeguards implementation, including provision of design information and AP information • NEW TERM!! (But not new concept) • Introduced in IAEA Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (March 2012)

  27. A few Safeguards Regulatory Authorities:

  28. What is an SRAsupposed to do? • Develop and enforce regulations • Collect, compile, maintain, and manage information • Conduct audits or inspections to ensure regulatory compliance and correctness of information • Transmit correct information in a timely manner • Support/facilitate IAEA activities in country

  29. What are some SRA best practices for meeting IAEA safeguards obligations? • Independence • from facility operators • from State policy makers • Empowerment • Laws giving SRA legitimate authority • Procedure-driven • Clear role and responsibilities • Timely and correct meeting of responsibilities • Self-improving • Continuous reviews of and updates to procedures • Training for staff

  30. What is the relationship between the SRA/SSAC and the IAEA? • “The Agency…shall make full use of the [SSAC]…and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the State’s accounting and control activities” • “The Agency’s verification shall include…independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency” - INFCIRC/153 (31)

  31. What challenges might a SRA have in meeting its safeguards obligations? • Resistance from other national agencies/entities • Lack of authority or high-level support • Scale of nuclear fuel cycle / related industry • Small – limited pool of experts, less familiarity • Large – complex activities, greater scope of activity • Experience / Human resources • Need experts in nuclear engineering, materials, physics, chemistry, law, political science, management, accounting, statistics, IT… • Funding *In some states, SRA nonexistent because of challenge

  32. Why develop a strong SRA/SSAC? • Improve efficiency of IAEA safeguards • Other benefits of nuclear material accounting • Domestic safeguards benefits • Economic operation of nuclear facilities • Secure international investment • Demonstrate nonproliferation commitment

  33. Assistance provided by the international community to SRAs: • IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) • Provides assistance on regulatory, technical, and administrative measures • For States without SSACs or rudimentary SSACs, assistance focuses on establishing measures • For States with more advanced SSACs, ISSAS evaluates performance on these measures and recommends improvements • NNSA NGSI and other advanced states • Technology and methodology development • Regulation development • Other infrastructure development

  34. Concluding thoughts: • “Safeguards” isn’t only something that the IAEA does to a State • States accept obligations when they sign the NPT and their safeguards agreements • Fulfillment of obligations can be challenging, regardless of intentions • A strong SRA is NOT a guarantee of compliance • A weak SRA is NOT a guarantee of noncompliance

  35. Thank You Questions?

  36. Other than safeguards, what else might the Authorityserving as SRA be responsible for? • Other nuclear regulation and enforcement • Safety at nuclear facilities • Security at nuclear facilities • Regulation of other peaceful uses of nuclear technology • Nuclear medicine • Industrial use of radioactive sources • Auxiliary activities • Radiation protection and health physics • Quality assurance / quality control of its own activities • Radioactive waste management • Nuclear/radioactive emergency preparedness

  37. SEMINAR 20 YEARS OF ABACC Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, PalácioItamaraty, 10 - 11 November 2011 An example SSAC Slides taken from presentation available at: http://www.abacc.org.br/?page_id=2405&lang=en State system of accounting forand control of nuclear material(SSAC) in Japan Seiji Uchikoshi Nuclear Material Control Center JAPAN

  38. SEMINAR 20 YEARS OF ABACC Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, PalácioItamaraty, 10 - 11 November 2011 State system of accounting forand control of nuclear material(SSAC) in Japan Seiji Uchikoshi Nuclear Material Control Center JAPAN

  39. Taken from Uchikoshi, Seiji, “State sytem of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in Japan”, Nuclear Material Control Center Japan SSAC Structure in Japan BILATERALAGREEMENT COUNTRIES International Atomic Energy Agency Annual Declaration - Accountancy Report - Inspection Report - Inspection Result - Conclusion - Report on Inventory & Material Transfer - Notification/Confirmation of Transfer etc. Comple- mentary Access GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (Japan Safeguards Office, MEXT) International Inspection Data Processing Accountancy Report NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONROL CENTER Report on buildings, activities, etc. under AP National Inspection Inspection Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) - Nuclear fuel-related R&D activities without NM - Buildings in sites - Activities specified in Annex I - Uranium mines, etc. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) NUCLEAR FACILITIES

  40. Taken from Uchikoshi, Seiji, “State sytem of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in Japan”, Nuclear Material Control Center Japan State Inspection Scheme MEXT (JSGO) Routine Inspection Assignment • Access -Item count • -Book Audit -NDA • -DA sampling -C/S Inspection Reports (inspection results & analysis results) -Scheduling -Inspection -DIV -CA NMCC NMCC is only the organization which has been approved on the national law to carry out the national SG inspection Inspection Nuclear Facilities

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