290 likes | 423 Views
Wardialing and Modem Security. Lesson 19. From Maximum Security , 3ed. Page 627, items that will make an intruder’s life a little harder and your data a little more secure:
E N D
Wardialing and Modem Security Lesson 19
From Maximum Security, 3ed • Page 627, items that will make an intruder’s life a little harder and your data a little more secure: • “Do restrict or forbid the use of modems on desktops; they are the number one method of bypassing your organization’s security checkpoints.” • “Do remember that your phone PBXs also must be secured.”
Networks Crunchy on the Outside……Chewy on the Inside
What is the Network? There is a growing connectivity between the Data Network and the Telephone Network Network Security TechnologiesHave Focused Almost Entirely on the TCP/IP Network… The Weakest Link is Now the Phone Network.
The Data Network • One pipe • High speed • Thousands of connections • Controlled and monitored • One chokepoint Cat V … your Internet connection is just a dedicated, high-speed telephone line.
The Telephone Network Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) • Thousands of pipes • Low speed • Uncontrolled • Unmonitored • No chokepoint … think of your telephone network as thousands of low-speed internet connections.
Attacker IntrusionDetection Firewall The TCP/IP Network Internet Router WebServer Users
The Actual Network Internet Public Telephone Network Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
Security in The Actual Network Attacker Internet Public Telephone Network Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
Attacker “2-4% of all telephone lines have active modems” Security in The Actual Network Internet Public Telephone Network Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
Proprietary data can be uploaded by users Virus protection mechanisms can be circumvented Unauthorized access to ISP’s Internet Public Telephone Network Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
Wardialers • Step 1, Phone number footprinting • Public Domains Wardialers • ToneLoc • THC • Commercial • PhoneSweep • TeleSweep Secure
War Dialing the ‘Bay’ • In ’97, Peter Shipley dialed the San Francisco Bay area looking for systems answered by a modem. He eventually finished the entire range but the final report hasn’t been published. Early results reported, however, included: • 1.4 million numbers dialed • 500 an hour, 12,000 a day • 14,000 of the lines dialed were reportedly modems
Some interesting results: • An East Bay medical facility gave unrestricted modem access to patient records. • An Internet company offering financial services did not require a password to modify its modem-accessible firewall. • A Fortune 100 company’s air conditioner and environmental control units could be easily changed by modem allowing lights to be turned off or heating/air conditioning to be changed. • Only 3 of every 1000 modem lines he checked posted a warning banner (a requirement for gov. machines). • Some of the welcome banners gave the name of the operating system, release, and name of corporation.
Carrier Exploitation Once you have a number, now what? Check the wardialing log, you can get some clues, then dial back. CONNECT 57600 HP995-400: Expected a HELLO command. (CIERR 6057) Many default sequences (e.g. HP MPE-XL systems) CONNECT 57600 HP995-400: HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT PASSWORD=TeleSup Default for pcAnywhere -- no password/userid and…you can always try brute force password guessing if nothing else works!
The Current Prevention Approach • Policy • Scanning (ad hoc War Dialing) • Administrative Action
Current Scanning Challenge • Window of Visibility • Time / Scalability • Vulnerability Measurement • Cost (Long Distance Charges) • Data Collection and Consolidation • Logging / Reporting
Solution A better approach than the ad-hoc wardialing, is to apply the same type of control that is found on the IP network to the telephone network. Thus, the solution is a firewall for the telephone network
The Telephone Network Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) • Thousands of pipes • Low speed • Uncontrolled • Unmonitored • No chokepoint … think of your telephone network as thousands of low-speed internet connections.
A Firewall for Phone Lines Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) Phone Firewall • One virtual pipe • Controlled and monitored … get your hands around the problem, and take control of the telephone network.
Voice Modem Fax • Detect • Log • Alarm • Block Telecom Firewall Remote Enterprise-wide Telecom Firewall Protection Internet Public Telephone Network Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
Attacker Voice Modem Fax • Detect • Log • Alarm • Block TelecomFirewall Remote Enterprise-wide Telecom Firewall Protection Internet Public Telephone Network Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
Protect Phone-to-Switch • Telephone fraud is a tremendous problem (1999: $5B) • Most PBX’s have a remote dial-up port for maintenance purposes. • Often protected with a numeric password • The same device used to protect against attacks to unauthorized modems can be used to protect the PBX as well.
PBX Hacking • Dial-up connections are the most frequent means of remotely managing a PBX. Also frequently used for vendor external support. • Just like computers with default passwords, PBX’s often have default access codes. • What companies should do is remove defaults and if a problem occurs, then provide access code to vendor, unfortunately…this seldom is done.
Attacker DTMF Signaling Detection • Detect • Log • Alarm • Block Telecom Firewall Remote Enterprise-wide Telecom Firewall Protection Internet Public TelephoneNetwork Router WebServer IntrusionDetection Firewall RAS(Dial-in Servers) Users PBX
GW 10/100 PBX PSTN IP Telephony Security Issues Router Internet User Connected Modem (IP Phone)
Telecommunication Firewalls • Log call progress • Characterize call traffic • Enforce Security and Usage Policy • Control remote maintenance facility and port access • Report resource utilization • Fraud detection/prevention • Trunk line status and usage • Emergency notification • ROI • Protection of VoIP
Extensions to Telecomm Firewalls • Telephone bill reconciliation package. • Secure Voice • Secure VoIP • Additional ‘password’ (DTMF signaling) for increased security. • Securing of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems. • Roosevelt Dam in Arizona