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Lecture 6. CSE 331 Sep 10, 2012. Homeworks. HW 1 posted online: see blog/piazza. Pickup graded HW 0 in TA OHs. Suggestions for Piazza. Email them: team “ at ” piazza “ dot ” com. Lecture pace. Mid-term. Online Office Hours. Tomorrow: 9:30pm to 10:30pm. Stable Marriage problem.
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Lecture 6 CSE 331 Sep 10, 2012
Homeworks HW 1 posted online: see blog/piazza Pickup graded HW 0 in TA OHs
Suggestions for Piazza Email them: team “at” piazza “dot” com
Lecture pace Mid-term
Online Office Hours Tomorrow: 9:30pm to 10:30pm
Stable Marriage problem Input:M and W with preferences Output: Stable Matching Set of men M and women W Preferences (ranking of potential spouses) Matching (no polygamy in M X W) Perfect Matching (everyone gets married) m w Instablity m’ w’ Stable matching = perfect matching+ no instablity
Two Questions Does a stable marriage always exist? If one exists, how quickly can we compute one? Answer both Qs in +ve by the Gale-Shapley algorithm
Gale-Shapley Algorithm (er, not Nobel prize winners, at least not yet) Women do all the proposing (different from the book) Everyone is in one of three states: free, engaged and married Step 1: A free woman w proposes to her most preferred man m. (m,w) get engaged General step: A free woman w proposes to her top unproposed man m.
Gale-Shapley Algorithm Intially all men and women are free While there exists a free woman who can propose Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to w proposes to m If m is free (m,w) get engaged Else (m,w’) are engaged If m prefers w’ to w w remains free Else (m,w) get engaged and w’ is free Output the engaged pairs as the final output
Preferences Mal Inara Wash Zoe Simon Kaylee
GS algorithm: Firefly Edition Inara Mal Zoe Wash 4 5 6 1 2 3 Kaylee Simon 4 5 6 1 2 3