1 / 29

The Minister and the Mandarin: Exploring the Paradox of Public Service Values

This article delves into the complexities of public service values, the tension between bureaucratic and elected officials, and the challenges faced by senior public servants and ministers. It also discusses the evolving role of ministers and the important relationship between ministers and their senior civil servants.

teressa
Download Presentation

The Minister and the Mandarin: Exploring the Paradox of Public Service Values

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The Minister and the Mandarin

  2. The Minister and the Mandarin

  3. The Minister and the Mandarin

  4. The Minister and the Mandarin

  5. PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES (Cont’d) The “Swivel Service”? October 10th, 2006

  6. Accountability/Responsibility of the Senior Public Service • subjective vs. objective responsibility • explicit political controls are not enough if there is no sense of subjective responsibility (Friedrich) • importance of public service values

  7. PROCEDURAL neutrality accountability responsiveness (political) integrity (ethics) fairness and equity (procedural) SUBSTANTIVE public interest efficiency/effectiveness responsiveness (public) fairness and equity (substantive) Procedural vs. Substantive Public Service Values

  8. The Public Service... • “The public service is a special calling. It is not for everyone. Those who devote themselves to it find meaning and satisfaction that are not to be found elsewhere. But the rewards are not material. They are moral and psychological, perhaps even spiritual. They are the intangible rewards that proceed from the sense of devoting one’s life to the service of the country, to the affairs of state, to public purposes, great or small, and to the public good.” The Tait Report

  9. The Public Service... • “The notion of public interest is a touchstone of motivation for public servants. It is for the public service what justice and liberty are for the legal profession, or what healing and mercy are for the medical profession.” The Tait Report • “The public service is there to remind elected leaders to do those things we should do but for which there is no immediate political gain.” Former Ontario Premier Bob Rae

  10. The Public Service... • “Speaking truth to power” • the corollorary of “honesty in advice” • What would be the characteristics of a senior bureaucracy likely (and able) to perform this type of function? • What type of person is likely to develop these types of values?

  11. The Career Public Service • benefits • speaking truth to power/long-term view of the public good • official anonymity & security of tenure • expertise/capability • performance based on merit • drawbacks • may not be politically responsive • may become ossified • rigid adherence to accepted policies • may challenge political leadership

  12. The Paradox of Public Service Values • demand high ethical standards of public servants • requires people devoted to public service • people with high ethical standards will have strong values/beliefs • may bring them into conflict with elected officials • demand people who are highly capable • capable of challenging elected leadership • built-in tension between bureaucratic and elected officials • may generate considerable conflict between public service and elected officials • systemic – e.g. the system operates this way by design • may raise issues of democratic control

  13. Bureaucratic-Political Conflict • what if there is no evidence of conflict between bureaucratic and elected officials? • are bureaucrats doing their job? • i.e. “speaking truth to power” • “...reminding political officials of things they should do but for which there is no immediate political gain” • have elected officials been captured by the bureaucracy?

  14. The Paradox of Public Service Values • bureaucratic domination • how serious a problem?? • depends on... • the model of democracy in question!! • bureaucratic surrender • how serious a problem?? • depends on... • the model of democracy in question!! • ...on which side would you err??

  15. The Not-So-Civil Service: Power Resources and the Relationship Between Ministers and their Senior Civil Servants October 10th, 2006

  16. Resources – Senior Bureaucratic Officials • expertise • policy • process • person-power • relationship with other departments • relationship with clientele

  17. Resources -- Ministers • political legitimacy • expertise • political • vis-a-vis public • vis-a-vis cabinet • ability to manage relationship • outside expertise • competing lines of advice • relationship with cabinet, PM • relationship with public/media

  18. Ministerial Resources and Public Opinion Polling • revolution in computer technology • costs of public opinion polling have dropped • exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments • the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete • senior bureaucrats probably have a better read of public opinion on a given policy issue

  19. The Tenure of Ministers (the Constant) • “ministerial musical chairs” • move often and frequency has increased • effects on ministerial power • the traditional view • ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister • the counter-traditional view • avoids ministerial capture

  20. The Tenure of Senior Public Servants (the change!) • the revolving deputy ministerial door • move often and frequency has increased • effects on deputy ministerial power • the traditional view • equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents • why? • an alternative view • strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) • DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO)

  21. The Tenure of Ministers and their Senior Public Servants • changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... • effects are ambiguous/contradictory • complex interaction between both patterns • power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question • HOWEVER... • relationships are changing • both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre

  22. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility • what is “responsible government”? • the executive must maintain the confidence of Parliament • what is collective ministerial responsibility? • all ministers must resign if the cabinet loses the confidence of Parliament • what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament? • what pre-conditions would the operation of collective cabinet ministerial responsibility require?

  23. Centralized Accountability: Collective Ministerial Responsibility • requirements (enforced by PM) • cabinet solidarity • cabinet secrecy • cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information • the problem of leaks • why would cabinet ministers agree? • price of being in cabinet • collective self-interest

  24. Centralized Accountability (Collective Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse Accountability (Individual Ministerial Responsibility) • the individual minister and cabinet • collective vs. individual ministerial paradox • ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet control • ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct other ministries • the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility • cabinet/departmental link • minister represents department in cabinet • minister represents cabinet to the department

  25. The Structure of Government: Centralized and Diffuse Accountability • Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an attempt to ensure political control... • from the centre of government (Prime Minister and Cabinet) • AND over individual departments (Ministers) • structure of government is an attempt to balance between collective ministerial responsibility (centralized accountability) and individual ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability)

  26. Centralized Accountability (Collective Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse Accountability (Individual Ministerial Responsibility) • the individual minister and cabinet • collective vs. individual ministerial paradox • ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet control • ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct other ministries • the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and individual ministerial responsibility

  27. The Structure of Government: The Balance of Centralized and Diffuse Accountability • cabinet structure and operation • size • cabinet committees • importance and number • balance between central agencies and line departments • line departments – e.g. HRSDC, DFO, Agriculture • central agencies – PCO, PMO, Finance, Treasury Board • role of the Deputy Minister • technically accountable to minister • appointed by PM • receives direction from PCO

More Related