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MPTCP threats. MPTCP WG - IETF79 marcelo bagnulo. Changes from 02 version. Clarified to not rely on ingress filtering for security Clarified some parts of SCTP behaviour. Reccomendation.
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MPTCP threats MPTCP WG - IETF79 marcelo bagnulo
Changesfrom 02 version • Clarifiedtonotrelyoningressfilteringforsecurity • Clarifiedsomepartsof SCTP behaviour
Reccomendation • MPTCP shouldimplementsomeformofreachabilty check using a randomnonce (e.g. TCP 3-wayhandshake) beforeadding a newaddresstoanongoingcommunication in ordertopreventflooding • Thedefaultsecuritymechanismsfor MPTCP should be toexchange a key in theestablishmentofthefirstsubflowandthensecurefollowingaddressadditions by using a keyed HMAC usingtheexchangedkey. • MPTCP securitymechanismshouldsupportusing a pre-sharedkeyto be used in thekeyed HMAC, providing a higherlevelofprotectionthanthepreviousone. • A mechanismtopreventreplayattacksusingthesemessagesshould be providede.g. a sequencenumberprotected by the HMAC • The MPTCP protocolshould be extensible anditshouldabletoaccommodatemultiplesecuritysolutions, in ordertoenabletheusageof more securemechanismsifneeded.